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Abstract
The work described in this thesis is concerned with formal safety analysis methods and
their application to the "design for safety" process of marine and other large Made-To-
Order (MTO) products with particular reference to the incorporation of safety aspects
into the design process from the initial stages. Large MTO products are complex
assemblies of components for which building and testing of prototypes is not usually
possible.
This thesis proposes a "design for safety" methodology for large MTO products based
upon the general spirit of the recommendations from recent government reports
including the Cullen and Carver reports. Such a methodology, consisting of five phases,
namely problem definition, risk identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation and
design review, is used as the basis for the development of more scientific and objective
safety analysis methods and techno-economic modelling techniques applicable to the
control of major accidents of large MTO products.
An analysis of the input requirements and the outcomes of the typical safety analysis
methods is conducted to identify their possible inter-relationships within the "design for
safety" process in order to make full use of the advantages of each method. The
selection of these safety analysis methods is discussed in the context of large MTO
products. Problems concerned with failure and repair data collection programmes are
studied and some typical failure and repair data sources are described.
In order to systematically and effectively identify and estimate risks of large MTO
products, an inductive bottom-up Modified Boolean Representation Method (MBRM) is
developed to directly make use of the information produced using Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to identify and estimate all possible system
failure events and respective causes. Such a method can be used to analyse any
engineering system which is capable of being broken down into subsystems and
components. The overall model and the algorithms are described and tested in
association with appropriate computer software.
A modified qualitative reasoning method is developed to describe the behaviour of a
large complex system. Such a modelling method can be used for failure propagation
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analysis. The proposed qualitative modelling method is further combined with the
MBRM to form a flexible mixed safety modelling methodology. In this methodology,
the MBRM is used to process the information produced from the qualitative reasoning
analysis at the component level to obtain a description of the total system behaviour.
This methodology allows a bottom-up safety analysis approach to be taken even in
those cases where it is difficult to obtain complete input-output relations for all the
components of the system.
Two general simulation models are developed to process the information produced
using FMECA and the MBRM. Such simulation models can be used as a quantitative
safety analysis tool to simulate system availability, component/subsystem failures, and
the probability of occurrence of each identified system failure event. These two models
are developed in an Object-Oriented Programming (OOP) environment.
This thesis also presents a new safety analysis and synthesis methodology involving the
use of fuzzy Set modelling and evidential reasoning, where fuzzy set modelling is used
to describe each failure event and an evidential reasoning approach is then employed to
synthesise the information produced to assess the safety of the whole system. This
subjective reasoning methodology can be used as an alternative approach by safety
analysts to carry out analysis particularly in those situations where mostly non-
numerical safety data is available or where there is a lack of information regarding
distributions of variables for use in probabilistic risk studies.
A techno-economic modelling methodology is also developed to determine where
reasonably practicable design actions are required. The proposed methodology brings
together risk and cost objectives into the decision making process for the improvement
of design aspects and maintenance policies. Information produced using the safety
analysis approaches developed in this thesis can be utilised to construct a techno-
economic model. Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM) techniques are then
employed to process the constructed model. The results produced can assist designers in
developing good compromise designs that take into account risks, their possible
consequences, maintenance cost, repair cost and design review cost.
A hydraulic transmission system of an offshore pedestal crane is used to demonstrate
the methodologies developed in this thesis.
Finally, the results of the research project are generally summarised and the areas
where further effort is seen to be required to improve the developed methodologies are
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outlined.
A diagrammatic representation of the work presented in this thesis is shown in Figure
1.
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Key Definitions
The following definitions of terms are used in the thesis. Numbers in square brackets
represent references.
Availability: The ability of an item (under combined aspects of reliability,
maintainability and maintenance support) to perform its required function at a stated
instant of time or over a stated period of time [1.5].
Common cause failure: The failure of two or more apparently independent items or
systems due to the occurrence of a single event [1.5].
Cost benefit analysis: The identification of the "cost" of reducing risks and comparing
this with the likely "benefit" resulting from the risk reduction [1.22].
Criteria: Standards of performance with which actual (measured or estimated)
performance may be compared [1.22].
Cut set: A cut set is a collection of basic events; if all these basic events occur, the top
event is guaranteed to occur [1.10].
Down time: The time during which an item is not able to perform to specification
[1.22].
Failure: The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function [1.5].
Failures may be unannounced and not detected until the next full test (covert failures),
or they may be announced and detected at the instant of occurrence (revealed failures).
Failure mode: A specific manner in which the item under investigation could
malfunction [1.5].
Failure rate: For a stated period in the life of an item, the ratio of the total number of
failures in a sample to the cumulative time on that sample. The failure rate is to be
associated with particular and stated time intervals (or summation of intervals) in the
life of the item, and with stated conditions [1.5].
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Fault: An accidental condition that causes a functional unit to fail to perform its
required function.
Hazard: A physical situation with a potential for human injuty, damage to property,
damage to the environment or some combination of these [1.10].
Maintainability: The ability of a machine to be maintained in a state which enables it
to fulfill its function under conditions of intended use, or restored into such a state, the
necessary actions (maintenance) being carried out according to specified practices and
using specified means [1.3].
Maintenance: The combinations of all technical and corresponding administrative
actions intended to retain an item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform its
required function [1.5].
Mean time between failures: For a stated period in the life of an item the mean value
of the length of time between cumulative failures computed as the ratio of the
cumulative time to the number of failures under stated conditions [1.5].
Mean time to failure: For a stated period in the life of an item, the ratio of the
cumulative time to failure for a sample to the total number of failures in the sample
during the same period under stated conditions [1.5].
Mean time between maintenance: For a stated period in the life of an item the mean
value of the length of time between cumulative maintenances computed as the ratio of
the cumulative time to the number of maintenance activities under stated conditions.
Prime implicant: Prime implicants are unique failure modes of systems which contain
other than simple fault modes connected by AND-OR logic gates, i.e., exclusive OR
gates, working states, etc. [1.10]. A prime implicant is the equivalent of a cut set in
fault tree analysis but for systems with multiple state variables
Probability distribution: The characteristic of an item expressed by the probability
that it will perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of
time [1.10].
Redundancy: The performance of the same overall function by a number of
independent means. The means need not be identical [1.5].
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Reliability: The ability of a machine or components, or equipment, to perform a
required function under specified conditions and for a given period of time without
failing [1.3].
Repair time: The time during which an item is undergoing diagnosis, repair, checkout
and alignment [1.22].
Risk: A combination of the probability and the degree of the possible injury or damage
to health in a hazardous situation [1.3].
Risk Assessment: A comprehensive estimation of the probability and the degree of the
possible injury or damage to health in a hazardous situation in order to select
appropriate safety measures [1.5]
Scenario: The development path of an incident from an initiating event to a cause to a
top event.
Top event: Undesired event of an item [1.10].
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
SUMMARY
Following a brief review of the history of safety analysis obtained from within the
military and nuclear industries, this chapter describes the concepts of risks, hazards and
safety analysis together with ways of reducing risks to employees, the public, the
environment and property. Particular emphasis is placed on "design for safety". The
objectives, criteria and requirements of "design for safety" are addressed. The levels of
"design for safety" are briefly discussed with regard to human behaviour and system
design procedures. Difficulties involved in the "design for safety" process of
engineering products are discussed with particular reference to large Made-To-Order
(MTO) products. Finally, the objectives of this work are described and the extent of
this thesis is outlined.
1.1 Historical Developments
Safety and reliability aspects were considered in the process of engineering design
relatively late. In the 1930s, as air transportation was developed, the collection of
statistical data on the failure rates of various aircraft components, and especially of
aircraft engines, was studied for further improvement in design to avoid, wherever
possible, further aircraft accidents [1.27]. This was how the first concepts concerning
the safety and reliability levels of aircraft came into being. However, before the 1940s,
safety design was largely intuitive and based upon specific designers' experience. The
Titanic shipwreck also produced an impetus for further investigation into system safety
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and reliability [1.27].
During the 1940s, the first predictive reliability models appeared in Germany where the
Vi missile project was carried out [1.1]. Vi missiles, during their ultimate development
stages, were the first industrial systems for which the safety and reliability were
deliberately and successfully defined based upon component performance. In that
decade, courses and books on safety and reliability analysis as well as on the related
statistical techniques grew in number. Probabilistic safety and reliability analysis
methods were also increasingly used.
It was in the 1950s that safety and reliability as a branch of engineering was born in
the United States of America. Attention was increasingly centred on safety matters,
especially in the aeronautical and nuclear industries. During this decade the use of
parameters characterising the reliability of components, such as failure rate and Mean
Time Between Failures (MTBF), spread. It was also in the early 1950s that efforts were
made to understand and to prevent human error which contributes to system failures.
The 1960s saw the emergence of some new reliability and safety analysis techniques as
well as a wider variety of applications. The first analysis of component failures and
their effects on system performance and on the safety of property and human beings
was performed. As a result, techniques for carrying out such an analysis were rapidly
developed, particularly in the aeronautical and aerospace industries. In 1961, Watson of
Bell Telephone Laboratories introduced the fault tree concept to assess the reliability of
the system designed to control Minuteman missile launching [1.10]. Later, the Boeing
company further developed the concept resulting in the fault tree building method
which is still in use. The Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
method [1.12] was also devised in the early l960s.
Public concern with safety also grew in this decade. For instance, in 1962, after a series
of missile accidents, the Air Force in the United States of America called for safety
studies. It was at the end of the i960s that system safety analysis became widespread in
the aeronautics and nuclear fields. The awareness of safety concerns became essential to
developers in the "high technology" industries. Potential accidents classified in terms of
consequences and frequency of occurrence were, for the first time, taken into account in
the design process.
Again in the 1960s, it was recognised that integrated studies were necessary to detect
and reduce potential hazards of a large engineering product. As a consequence, a large
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number of national and international standards regarding safety and reliability were
developed. This also happened in the U.K. where similar standards were adopted [1.27].
In the 1970s, a large number of innovations were introduced in industrial safety
prediction methods. In the nuclear power industries, accident scenarios were considered
covering system failures as well as operator error during tests, maintenance, operations
and reactor control. Many new methods were developed during this decade, including
the event tree analysis to evaluate accident scenarios. Furthermore, the fault tree
analysis, created in the field of aeronautics, was extensively adopted in other "high
technology" industries.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accident caused no deaths but dictated a re-evaluation of
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods [l.13][1.27]. As a result of the inquiry of
this accident, the Commission, set up by the President of the United States,
recommended that PRA methods should be increasingly used in the design of large and
expensive engineering products. It was also recognised that reliability data, human error
and common cause failures played a very important role in the assessment of the safety
of large complex projects.
From the end of the 1970s, reliability and safety assessment techniques were widely
adopted in the oil, chemical, railway, and car industries, and also for industrial
wastewater treatment, i.e., in a great variety of activities and systems with different
technological structures. Probabilistic reliability, availability and safety criteria were
increasingly used, sometimes to comply with regulations, sometimes as self-imposed
goals in the design process. Safety criteria began to play a very important role in
product design from the initial design stages. For instance, at the end of the 1970s, the
safety analysis of the Canvey Island petrochemical plant in the U.K. led to considerable
changes in the design of the plant [1.27].
From 1980 onwards, the number of safety assessment studies increased both in the
"high technology" industries and in the other industrial sectors. Possibly the most
decisive step in the development of safety analysis methodologies was the publication
of "Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Nuclear
Process Plants" which was produced at the request of the safety authorities [1.19][1.27].
Its objective was to provide the organisations wishing to perform such analyses with the
correct procedure. Furthermore in parallel, again at the request of the safety authorities,
a significant effort was made to take qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of
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human factors into account in safety and reliability analysis [1.13].
In the 1980s, reliability, availability, maintainability and safety assessment techniques
tended to be adopted on a wide scale to control and to manage major industrial hazards.
This gave birth to an actual distinct engineering discipline (safety) which, like others
used in engineering design, involves concepts, measurable quantities and mathematical
tools as well as methods for measuring and predicting these quantities [1.27]. As
computers became more and more widely used in engineering design, more and more
safety and reliability analysis techniques such as event tree and fault tree analyses were
implemented through different codes of practice. Expert systems were also widely used
together with the computerised safety and reliability assessment tools to conveniently
and effectively predict the safety and reliability of engineering systems or products.
Also in the 1980s, the importance of failure and repair data collection programmes was
realised [1.27]. Both the marine classification societies and other authorities showed
great interest in collecting failure and repair data, obtained either by laboratory tests or
from field reports, which was used to compile failure and repair data banks. Examples
of such data banks are Lloyds Data Bank and System Reliability Service Data Bank
managed by the United Kingdom Energy Authority.
Traditionally, safety analysis has been primarily used in many industries for verification
purposes. However, this approach fails when large and complex engineering products
with significant elements of novelty are designed. For such products, safety aspects
should be more systematically integrated into the design process from the initial stages.
More recently, interest in the improvement of the safety of large engineering products
through quantitative safety analysis from the initial design stages is growing
considerably, both within industries and within the authorities. Some of the large
companies and organisations have used quantitative safety analysis techniques to a
considerable extent and some have only used qualitative methods due to the fact that
many quantitative safety analysis methods are still insufficiently developed to contribute
to major improvement in the safety of engineering products. In the 1990s, the need for
the development of more objective, flexible and effective safety analysis methods has
been identified, and the use of cost-benefit analysis and formal decision making
techniques in the design process is demanded in order to achieve an optimal safety of a
product within both technical and economic constraints [1.32].
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1.2 Safety Analysis
1.2.1 What is Safety Analysis?
Reliability analysis and safety analysis are different concepts although there is a
considerable overlap (and often confusion) between them. They both refer to the studies
of process and equipment failures or operability. Reliability analysis of an item involves
studying its characteristics expressed by the probability that it will perform a required
function under stated conditions for a stated period of time. An item could be a piece
of equipment, a component, a subsystem, or a system. If such an analysis is extended to
involve the study of the consequences of the failures of the item in terms of possible
damage to property or injury/death of people, the study is referred to as safety analysis.
System safety analysis is devoted to the prevention or control of risks of a product. A
risk is defined as the measure of the occurrence of a hazard and its associated effects or
consequences. A hazard could be a condition such as high voltage, an event such as a
contact with high voltage, or a result such as death from the electric shock.
Safety analysis as used for the assessment of risks associated with an engineering
system or product may be summarised to answer the following four questions:
i. What can go wrong?
ii. What are the effects and consequences?
iii. How often will they happen?
iv. What measures need to be undertaken to reduce the risks and how can this be
achieved?
To answer above questions it is necessary to examine an actual or proposed design to
identify and assess potentially hazardous situations and associated risks in order to
provide a rational basis for determining where risk reduction measures are required.
Although reduction of risks to employees, the public, the environment and property can
be achieved through other ways such as safety training and the application of sound
engineering standards with respect to design, manufacturing, installation,
commissioning, operations, and maintenance aspects, safety analysis is increasingly
recommended to estimate the safety of a product in order to take proper measures to
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reduce risks to a minimum by the improvement of design aspects, maintenance policies
and similar actions. It is realised that safety aspects should be incorporated into the
design process. Actually, incorporation of safety into the design process from the early
stages, that is, "design for safety", may be the most effective way to reduce or
eliminate potential serious risks of large MTO products. This is particularly so as large
MTO products are complex assemblies of components for which building and testing of
prototypes can often be impractical, and hence analytical tools must be used.
1.2.2 Design for Safety
"Design for safety" is a process aimed at minimising personnel injury or death, product
damage or destruction, or degradation of the environment and mission performance
[1.1]. It provides a systematic approach to the identification and control of high risk
areas [1.30].
When an engineering product is designed, "design for safety" is required to be carried
out to identify all possible failure conditions and to assess how often they may happen
and how serious the possible consequences may be. This is achieved by applying
various system safety analysis methods in the design process.
The assessment of probability of occurrence of a system failure event is a matter of
judgement, usually based very much on the experience of similar products. However,
when there is no such experience it may be difficult to make this kind of judgement.
This is particularly true in the development of a Made-To-Order (MTO) product which
is specially ordered by a customer [1.30]. As a consequence, quantitative probability
analysis techniques rather than experience-based techniques are usually recommended to
make a judgement of such a failure probability.
Consequence analysis is not an exact science [1.7] since it varies greatly with the value
placed on a human life or a loss of any kind. Over the past years, experience has been
obtained and calculation methods have been developed to produce a specification of the
magnitude of a failure consequence. There is no doubt that development and
improvement of consequence analysis techniques will be increasingly seen in the
coming years.
"Design for safety" through the full quantification of consequences and probabilities of
hazards can provide figures describing risks. When risks, either qualified or quantified,
are judged to be not acceptable with respect to the corresponding criteria, the design
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may need to be rearranged or modified by the provision of a set of protection systems,
alarm systems, or more reliable components, for example, to reduce risks (i.e., reduce
the frequencies of unacceptable system failure events and/or the magnitudes of the
respective consequences) to an acceptable level. Cost-benefit analysis may also be
beneficially applied to make full use of the available technical and economic sources to
produce an optimal safe product.
1.2.3 Criteria and Requirements for "Design for Safety"
It is usually very difficult to determine the acceptable safety level of a system. One
basis for judgement used in British law is that the product should be designed to be as
safe as is reasonably practicable. However, that poses the question - what is
reasonably practicable? It may be assumed that the whole subject of criteria of "design
for safety" depend on the answers to the following three basic questions [1.22].
i. What is "design for safety".
ii. What is the effect of "design for safety".
iii. What is the time period of concern.
The answers to these questions may change with time or the particular problem in
hand. However, "design for safety" would have the general objectives of improvement
in safety and reliability utiising technological advances within economic constraints.
Modern methods of safety analysis enable the risks to be more easily identified and an
estimation of the magnitudes to be more confidently determined. Control systems,
sensors, alarm devices and protection systems provide the means to determine
disturbance conditions and necessary actions. The criteria of "design for safety" of
engineering systems can generally be described as follows:
i. Safety devices and protection systems are the principal contributors to system
safety.
ii. Safety devices, control systems and protection systems should be designed to
have lower failure rates than the system being protected.
iii. The sources assigned to the improvement of the system safety should be
optimally utilised to control high risk areas.
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iv. "Design for safety" should not, in general, be in conflict with the general
design process, and it should be consistent with the engineering design
framework.
1.2.4 Levels of "Design for Safety"
Generally, levels of "design for safety" can be classified with regard to two aspects, i.e.,
the human behaviour and the system design procedures. Such levels are studied as
follows:
1.2.4.5 Human Behaviour
It has been postulated that there are three levels of human behaviour in controlling or
supervising tasks of "design for safety" as shown in Figure 1.1 [1.21]. These three
levels are:
i. Skill-based.
ii. Rule-based.
iii. Knowledge-based.
The information produced at each of these levels can be used in decision making in the
"design for safety" process. Each of these levels is briefly discussed as follows:
Skill-based
Skill-based "design for safety" deals with safety problems at the lowest level. This
requires little conscious attention - that is, it is automatic. For an experienced
safety analyst, determining where some safety devices need to be provided in a
design according to experience falls into this category.
Rule-based
With rule-based behaviour more mental effort is required. Examples of rules
include BS 327 and BS 1957 which can be used as a design guide in the design of
cranes.
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Figure 1.1 The three levels of human behaviour in controlling
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Knowledge-based
The structure of the knowledge-based behaviour is an evaluation of the situation
and planning of proper sequences of actions to pursue the goal. The activity
depends on fundamental knowledge of the processes, functions and structure of the
system. Ifleretore, lcnowleclge-based 'design tor satety" involves higher level
thinking, typically using fundamental principles, functional relationships and
knowledge to identify and assess risks and determine what measures should be
taken to control risks.
It is interesting to note that as experience is gained the "design for safety" of
engineering systems may move from knowledge-based to rule-based to skill based.
When a MTO product is designed, knowledge-based actions may be essential to
cover all the aspects of the design since experience may not be available.
1.2.4.2 System Design Procedures
As previously described, "design for safety" involves the use of a set of alarm devices,
protection systems and more reliable components designed to increase safety on the
basis of the information obtained from experience or produced using formal safety
analysis methods. This is usually achieved by applying a three-level approach to the
"design for safety" process [1.2].
Level I
Within level I, the definition of safety objectives is required. It is important that
these objectives be realistic. Once a tentative set of objectives is obtained,
consideration should be given within level I to identify the system functions
required to satisfy each objective. The purpose of specifying system functions is to
clarify the objectives.
Level II
As the design moves from level I to level II, decisions requiring more detailed
analysis and less philosophical reasoning will be encounted. The system will be
divided into subsystems. Safety analysis is carried out at the subsystem level, and
safety systems such as alarm devices and protection systems may then be
determined and used to reduce or eliminate significant system failure events where
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required.
Level III
At level ifi, more details of the system "design for safety" are produced. Safety
analysis may be progressed to the component level. The procedures used in level
II may be repeatedly applied at this level.
1.3 Difficulties Involved in "Design for Safety"
Although, in recent years, quantitative safety assessment techniques have been
increasingly developed and applied by both design engineers and safety researchers,
there are still some problems for these techniques to be widely applied to provide
ultimate answers to safety based decision making in the design process. In order to
effectively use these techniques, to develop more objective and efficient safety analysis
methods and to integrate "design for safety" into the design process from the initial
stages, it is necessary to describe the difficulties involved in the "design for safety"
process. Such difficulties are briefly addressed as follows:
In many cases only limited data is available on component failures and
repairs as well as on system failures and repairs for which statistical accuracy
is often poor. In some cases, it may be difficult to obtain any such data,
especially when human error is involved. This may be particularly true for
MTO products.
ii. The safety of an engineering product is affected by many factors such as
design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, operations and
maintenance as shown in Figure 1.2. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult
to precisely construct a mathematical model for the product to describe its
behaviour and to carry out "design for safety".
iii. A fully quantified safety analysis entails considerable work and therefore is
costly. The scope and depth of "design for safety" may be very difficult to
define.
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Figure 1.2 The factors affecting the safety of an engineering product
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iv. The quantification of effects and consequences of hazards involves great
uncertainty, even in those cases where the physical processes are clearly
understood.
v. An analytical exercise associated with the quantification of risks involves a
large number of assumptions, estimates, judgements and opinions which are
often subjective. Therefore, it may need considerable skill for a safety analyst
to interpret the results produced.
vi. It is extremely difficult to set up absolute criteria for safety acceptability since
safety is only one of the important factors in the appraisal of the acceptability
of an industrial activity.
1.4 Objectives
"Design for safety" should be carried out in a systematic way in parallel with other
design processes to aid decision making on a product design from the initial stages. It
includes a wide range of activities. The inherent purpose of the systematic use of these
activities is to accurately predict the safety characteristics of an engineering product, to
control the high risk areas, to maximise system safety and minimise its life cycle cost.
The work in this thesis deals with such activities. The objectives of this work are
outlined as follows:
i. To identify the needs in the process of designing large MTO products with
respect to safety aspects.
ii To construct a "design for safety" methodology in order to objectively and
effectively incorporate safety aspects into the design process from the initial
stages.
iii. To study typical safety analysis methods and to investigate their interrelations
with regard to each stage of the "design for safety" process.
iv. To synthesise the typical safety analysis methods to form more flexible and
efficient mixed safety assessment tools in order to make full use of the
advantages of such methods.
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v. To develop novel safety analysis methods to meet the challenge imposed by
the increasing complexity of engineering products and the increasing public
concern on safety.
vi. To develop a techno-economic modelling philosophy to integrate safety
analysis and cost modelling in order to obtain optimal system safety within
both technical and economic constraints.
vii. To identify further research areas which are required to be explored and
exploited in the future.
1.5 Scope of the Work
It is quite obvious that the safety analysis methodologies described and developed in
this work are of fairly general nature and can therefore theoretically be applicable to the
design of a wide range of large engineering products such as marine cranes, offshore
platforms, vessels and different types of marine vehicles. The developed methodologies
in this work can also be used to effectively and efficiently incorporate and quantify
safety as an integral part of the process of designing large MTO products, especially for
those with a comparatively high level of innovation.
Chapter 2 studies the engineering design methodologies and "design for safety"
methodology for large Made-To-Order (MTO) products. Following a survey of current
"design for safety" status in engineering design, a "design for safety" methodology is
proposed to address the needs identified by both the Cullen report and the Carver report
[1.24]. The proposed "design for safety" methodology is studied together with the
engineering design process of large MTO products and is used as a basis for further
development of formal safety assessment procedures and safety-based decision making
modelling techniques.
In Chapter 3, the concepts of qualitative and quantitative safety analysis, and bottom-up
and top-down event-based safety analysis approaches are described. The typical safety
analysis methods are outlined and discussed with respect to each phase of the proposed
"design for safety" framework. An analysis of the input requirements and the outcomes
of these methods is carried out to identify their possible inter-relationships in order to
make full use of their advantages. The selection of these safety analysis methods is also
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studied with respect to the characteristics of the particular product.
In Chapter 4, an inductive bottom-up safety modelling and assessment methodology is
developed in a general way. In this methodology, the Modified Boolean Representation
Method (MBRM) is developed to directly process the information produced using
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) in order to identify the system
failure events and respective causes. This inductive bottom-up methodology can be
applied to the "design for safety" process of engineering products involving multiple
state variables and with feedback loops.
In Chapter 5, a modified qualitative reasoning approach is developed on the basis of the
qualitative reasoning approaches used in the Artificial Intelligence (AT) field. The
developed approach is also combined with the MBRM to form a mixed safety
modelling methodology. In this methodology, the MBRM is used to process the
information produced from qualitative reasoning analysis at the component level to
produce a description of the total system behaviour. This developed methodology
allows a bottom-up approach to be taken even in those cases where it is difficult to
obtain complete input-output relations for all the components of a system.
In Chapter 6, two simulation models are developed to process the information produced
using FMECA, MBRM as well as other safety analysis methods described and
developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The system availability, componentlsystem failures,
and the probability of occurrence of each undesired system failure event can be
simulated on the basis of these two models.
The safety of a large product is affected by so many factors that great uncertainty exists
in safety analysis. Generally, these problems of uncertainty can be treated using two
principal types of method involving probability and possibility, respectively. The safety
analysis methods developed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are usually classified as the
probablistic type and have been widely applied in various engineering environments. In
some circumstances, however, possibility analysis, which often involves fuzzy sets and
evidential reasoning, may prove to be a worthwhile alternative for system safety
analysis. Therefore, in Chapter 7, the applications of fuzzy set theory and approximate
modelling, are explored. A hierarchical framework incorporating fuzzy set modelling
and evidential reasoning is developed to assess the safety of a system. Such a reasoning
framework provides the safety analyst with a rational tool to make full use of the
information generated at the lowest level in design in order to evaluate the safety of the
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whole system. This tool can be used as an alternative approach for safety analysts to
carry out analysis particularly in those situations where distributions of variables for use
in probabilistic risk studies are difficult or impossible to obtain.
To incorporate safety into the design process of a large engineering product from the
initial stages, a techno-economic analysis may be needed. Therefore, in Chapter 8, a
techno-economic modelling approach is developed to bring together the cost of
undesired top event-caused consequences, maintenance cost, repair cost and design
review cost in the decision making process for the improvement of design aspects and
maintenance policies. Information produced using the safety analysis methods
developed in this work is used to construct such techno-economic models. Multiple
Objective Decision Making (MODM) techniques are then utilised to optimise the
system design aspects and maintenance policies in terms of life-cycle cost and safety.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
Design for Safety Methodology
SUMMARY
As indicated in the last chapter, both the Cullen report [2.8] of the Piper Alpha disaster
and the Carver report [2.12] on ship safety have recommended that safety should be
incorporated into the design process from the initial stages and that more scientific and
objective approaches are required to be developed in order to control major accidents,
to demonstrate safety by design and to describe the operational requirements of large
marine and by implication other Made-To-Order (MTO) products effectively and
efficiently.
In this chapter, the characteristics of large MTO products are described and their design
process is studied together with a proposed MTO product design framework. After
investigating the current "design for safety" status of large MTO products, a "design for
safety" methodology is proposed in a generic sense and discussed in the context of the
general design process. The proposed "design for safety" methodology could form the
basis for the further development of safety assessment procedures and safety-based
decision-making modelling techniques. The phases in the proposed "design for safety"
methodology are studied together with their objectives and requirements. Finally,
concluding remarks are given.
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2.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, system "design for safety" provides a systematic approach to
the identification and control of high risk areas, and it should be integrated into the
design process from the initial stages to reduce or eliminate major hazards. However,
due to the complexity of the safety assessment of marine and other large Made-To-
Order (MTO) products and the lack of clear and complete guidance for a "design for
safety" methodology, "design for safety" has not been specifically integrated into the
design process for such products. It is worth noting that deficiencies in MTO products
are usually corrected only after accidents have occurred, and few organised "design for
safety" programmes devoted to MTO products have been implemented. Many accidents,
even those involving human error, could have been prevented with greater attention to
safety in the initial design stages. There is therefore a perceived need for a "design for
safety" methodology for MTO products in order to improve their safety.
As "design for safety" is a part of the overall design process, design methodologies of
MTO products are studied first.
2.2 Engineering Design Methodologies for Made-To-Order (MTO)
Products
2.2.1 Made-To-Order (MTO) Products
A Made-To-Order (MTO) product is an expensive, large and complex engineering
structure, made up of many subsystems which must be carefully integrated to form a
complete working system. Each MTO product may be a unique commission ordered by
a customer for a specific purpose and location. The efficient design process for a MTO
product is a key procedure to allow alternatives to be generated and compared.
MTO product design is a broad-based activity. The design process combines creativity,
empiricism, theory and practice, while the range of influencing factors and diversity of
applications require the latest technology to be utilised.
MTO products add the following difficulties to the general design process.
.	 The non-existence of historical data on design aspects. This is particularly
true for original design problems and design solutions.
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The impracticability of full-scale experimentation with many design aspects.
Difficulty of replacing or modifying them once on location and in operation.
2.2.2 Engineering Design Methodologies
Engineering design is a creative process, which begins with a requirement, and defines
a system and the methods of its realisation so as to satisfy the requirement [2.10].
Three broad categories of design, which are related to the design of various marine and
other large MTO products, have been identified as follows [2.6]:
i. Original design: which involves producing an original solution for a system
to carry out a new task.
ii. Adaptive design: which involves adapting a known system to a changed task.
iii. Variant design: which involves varying the size and/or arrangement of certain
aspects of the chosen system, the function and the solution principle
remaining the same.
Patterns within each individual category above and various engineering disciplines can
be identified and analysed to form a series of steps for organising and guiding an
engineering design. Such a framework is referred to as an engineering design
methodology [2.7].
The benefits of engineering design methodologies are obvious. These include rapid and
direct generation and evaluation of design solutions. A rational and systematic
framework can make the work of an engineering design more efficient and effective.
It is widely recognised that two types of model, which are the descriptive and
prescriptive types, are generally available for representing the creative process of a
MTO product design [2.6]. Both types of model are offered as a rational, systematic
framework simplifying the process of design and increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the design engineer. The descriptive type of model describes how a design
is done by the design engineer. It is important to make the distinction that the
descriptive type of model does not necessarily describe what should be done to arrive at
an optimum solution, rather it exemplifies how the design engineer performs the
process of design. Consequently, the descriptive type of model, unlike the prescriptive
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type, is entirely subjective.
The prescriptive model typically represents systematic and algorithmic approaches to
design. Many of the regulatory bodies concerned with approving the design of marine
and other large MTO products actually encourage design engineers to follow a
prescriptive model. The prescriptive model which may simpiy consist of a number of
steps starts with the identification of essential problems and finishes with the design
being worked up in great detail. Unfortunately, this kind of representation does not
usually permit the concept of concurrency to be modelled. It should be noted that those
activities would take place in practice, especially in the design of MTO products [2.6].
The descriptive model involves the continuing development of a project from
recognition of need through feasibility study, preliminary study, detailed design,
qualification testing, production planing, production and acceptance testing to
operations.
Applicability of both the prescriptive and descriptive types of model has been
extensively studied with respect to MTO products [2.6]. A number of mismatches exist
between prescriptive design theory and actual design practice. This is mainly due to the
fact that heuristics play such a significant and influential role in MTO product design.
The empirical knowledge actually allows the design engineer to treat the product to be
designed as a complete system. Heuristics are often used to firm up on certain "globaV'
aspects of the design of a MTO product [2.6]. For example, when a topside of an
offshore production platform is designed, heuristics are usually used to locate
compartments/activities/items of equipment in three-dimensional space at the initial
stages of the preliminary design phase [2.6]. Therefore, MTO product design is initiated
as a top down process which requires that the design engineer uses very crude
representations of information during the early stages of development but gradually
progresses to more meaningful and detailed information models. The design engineer is
then able to provide a fairly comprehensive but preliminary definition of the design. As
the conceptual design activity is completed detailed design starts.
It is clear that certain elements of the prescriptive methodology are not closely relevant
to MTO product design [2.6]. Generally, the generation of a large number of possible
candidate designs and subsequent selection of most promising alternatives do not often
happen for most MTO products. The only occasions on which this is likely to happen
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are either when the design engineer is generating alternative preliminary arrangements
or selecting major items of equipments. It is therefore concluded that the prescriptive
design methodology is not really applicatable to the development of most MTO
products although it is, in some occasions, worthwhile to be utilised to ensure that the
design engineer approaches all problems in a systematic and rational manner in order to
scan all possible solutions without in any way predicating the choice of a particular
solution. A more appropriate descriptive methodology relating the details of the design
problem is required. The details of such a descriptive engineering design methodology
are outlined as follows.
2.2.3 A Proposed Methodology for Marine and Other Large MTO Products
Figure 2.1, which is proposed on the basis of the design frameworks described in [2.6]
and [2.7], depicts the typical steps in the design process of MTO products. This
framework is considered to be generally applicable to most design efforts of MTO
products but it should be recognised that individual projects may require variation of
the process, including total elimination of some steps.
2.2.3.1 Prospect Evaluation
Specification
The scale and variety of the need are vast, but any listing would have to include
following information [2.9]:
.	 Formal request.
.	 Informal request.
Assignment from superiors.
. The need pursuant to new regulations.
Information
Based on the description of the need, design concepts can be identified to satisfy the
need constraints. The best concept can then be selected.
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Figure 2.1 The steps in the design process of MTO products
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The feasibility assessment of the selected concept is often accomplished as a part of the
conceptualisation task. The aim of assessing the feasibility of the chosen concept is
basically to ensure that the project proceeds to the design phase on the basis of a
concept that is achievable both technically and economically. Feasibility assessment is
very important for defining the concept to such a degree that the design can proceed
with confidence that the end product will accomplish the intended purpose within the
available resources. Cost estimating is involved in the feasibility study.
Establishing the requirements of a project is one of the most important and difficult
elements in the design process. This task should be accomplished prior to initiating the
design and after the concept has been defined. The requirements are so critical to the
ultimate product capability and cost that they must be established as early as possible in
the design process. Although the requirements are established to be permanent,
nevertheless they should be continuously reviewed and revalidated during the design
process to ensure that they continue to reflect the goals and objectives of the project.
Definition
After the concept has been approved, overall system configuration and component
specifications need to be studied in order to establish requirements at the component,
subsystem and system levels. This is repeated continuously over the design process as
the system and its constituent elements continue to be defined, tested, evaluated,
produced, and finally assembled to form a working system.
Once the project becomes viable, a systematic structure breakdown of the effort must
be made. The breakdown structure is basically a family tree subdivision of the effort
which is used to provide a means for management of the various work elements. It
relates each task to the others and to the end product and provides a baseline against
which the technical, schedule, cost and manpower reporting may be accounted. The
degree to which a design process is subdivided for work assignment and management
responsibility is a function of the complexity and duration of effort, the overall cost of
the project, the organisational structure, etc [2.9].
2.2.3.2 Preliminary Design
Preliminary design is the phase of the design process that bridges the gap between the
design concept and the detailed design phase of the effort. This phase of the effort is
referred to as embodiment design in some textbooks [2.9].
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Creation
During the preliminary design stage, the overall system configuration is defined and
schematic layout and definition drawings are developed to provide early project
configuration. Both the system level and component level may be involved in this
creation stage.
Careful analysis should be carried out in the creation process. This may involve
detailed literature search of design and analysis methods, previous experience of
designs of similar products, arid discussions with experts in particular areas. Testing
may also be involved in the the preliminary phase. In general, it is costly for MTO
products to run test programmes. Therefore, it is desirable to minimise testing during
this design phase.
Evaluation
As the design concept continues to be refined and the layout of the design at both the
component and subsystem levels is gradually constructed, both the technical and
economical estimations will become more realistic. The technical evaluation is carried
Out to make sure that the designed parameters satisfy the requirements. The examples
of such parameters are stability, weight distribution, flows, safety, reliability and
availability. The economical evaluation should also be undertaken with regard to
aspects such as costs of construction, equipment and operation and maintenance. It may
be beneficial if the system test, checkout, operation and maintenance procedures are
taken into account from the initial stages in the design.
Selection
As the design is further defined during the preliminary design phase and if more than
one alternative is involved, an evaluation leading to selection of the "best" alternative is
conducted.
2.2.3.3 Detailed Design
The intent of the detailed design phase of a project is to develop a comprehensive
system description that completely describes the design. At this stage, all the various
disciplinary organisations are actively involved, resolving the system design concept
into component parts, evaluating components to validate previously established
CHAPTER 2 - Design For Safety Methodology 	 Page 27
requirements, specifying those design requirements left undefined, and assessing the
effects of the component requirements and the overall system requirements.
During the detailed design phase of the project, the cost of the end items must continue
to be authenticated. A qualification testing may then be carried out, if necessary, to
validate the design in a sense that it proves that the product meets the specifications.
2.2.3.4 Production Planning, Production, Acceptance Testing and Operation
Production planning is initiated by reviewing the design drawings to identify machines
and tooling required and to determine machinery operations to be used. After the
production planning is finished, the production process begins. The design process is
finalised with the completion of acceptance testing. Operations can then be started by
the customer.
2.3 "Design for Safety" Methodology for MTO Products
2.3.1 Introduction
Although the concept of "design for safety" was introduced in the aerospace, nuclear
and chemical industries many years ago, a series of standards, covering the general use
of safety and reliability through other industries, were used from 1980 [2.17]. "Design
for safety" of most MTO products is usually based on British standards and
classification society requirements (or their equivalent), which incorporate the necessary
rules and codes implemented over the years and updated, often under public pressure,
following catastrophic accidents. Safety analysis is still mostly applied (if applied at all)
at the final stages of the design mainly for verification purposes, although many of the
decisions having the greatest impact on product safety may be taken at the earlier
design stages [2.14].
The growing technical complexity of large MTO products and the public concern
regarding their safety have aroused great interest in the development and application of
safety assessment procedures. This may be demonstrated by the conclusions and
recommendations of the public inquiries of the Piper Alpha accident and some serious
marine accidents such as the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise.
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2.3.2 Safety Case
2.3.2.1 Safety Case of Offshore Installations
On 6 July 1988, an explosion and subsequent fire on the Piper Alpha offshore
installation led to the loss of 167 lives. As a result of this, a public inquiry was
established to discover the circumstances of the accident and its causes. The produced
report (Cullen report) suggests that a "safety case" is required for the design of offshore
installations, and the "safety case" approach is currently in use in the offshore industry.
A safety case covers all aspects of the safety of the plant or process in question, and
how the risks involved are to be minimised [2.12]. It should include sufficient
particulars to demonstrate that [2.8]:
hazards with the potential to cause major accidents have been identified, and
. risks have been evaluated and measures have been taken to reduce them to a
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) level.
A safety case should be prepared demonstrating safety by design, describing operational
requirements, providing for continuing safety assurance by means of regular review,
and setting out the arrangements for emergency response. It should also include
identification of a representative sample of major accident scenarios and assessment of
the consequences of each scenario together with an assessment in general terms of the
likelihood of its happening. The report suggests that innovative safety analysis methods
and cost-benefit analysis may be beneficially used for the prediction and control of
safety.
The report recommends Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) to be used in the process of
hazard identification and risk assessment in preparing a safety case [2.8]. QRA can help
to provide a structured objective approach to the assessment of risks, provided that it
relies on and is supplemented by good engineering judgement and the limitation of the
data used is roughly understood. The significant pathways leading to serious system
failure conditions can be systematically identified using QRA and hence all reasonably
practicable steps can be taken to reduce them.
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2.3.2.2 Safety Aspects of Ship Design and Technology
As a result of several serious marine disasters such as the capsize of the Herald of Free
Enterprise on 6 March 1987, the Carver report was produced not only to see that the
particular calamity is not repeated, but also to reduce the inherent hazards of "Ro-Ro"
ferries [2.12].
The report points out that there is a general trend towards more scientific forms of
safety regulations to deal with hazardous activities. Shipping industries should use the
"safety case" approach that the offshore industries are adopting and which the nuclear,
chemical and aerospace industries have already used. It recommands that formal safety
assessment methods should be used to prepare the safety case for U.K. shipping.
2.3.3 "Design for Safety" Methodology
It is necessary for "design for safety" of large MTO products to be undertaken from the
fairly early stages of the design process as suggested by the Carver report and the
Cullen report [2.8][2.12]. There is a perceived need for a "design for safety" framework
to be developed to allow various safety assessment tools to be applied individually and
in combination so that as the design process advances and the available information
increases in detail, safety assessment can move from a qualitative basis to a quantitative
basis, and from an assessment function to a decision making function to a verification
function, ensuring that a final design meets explicitly defined levels of safety [2.19].
For a MTO product design, the following phases are proposed for the process of
"design for safety":
i. Problem definition.
ii. Risk identification.
iii. Risk estimation.
iv. Risk evaluation.
v. Design review.
"Design for safety" is an iterative process. For example, risk identification phase may
make use of the information produced from design review, converging to safety design
goals defined in the problem definition phase. The interactions of the above phases are
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shown in Figure 2.2. The above five phases comprise the general parts of a "design for
safety" framework for MTO products. Each phase is described as follows in more detail
with respect to the proposed design process as shown in Figure 2.1.
2.3.3.1 Problem Definition
"Design for safety" begins with an identified need. Problem definition involves
identifying the need regarding the safety of a product, and it should be conducted in
conjunction with the classification of the project and the elaboration of the product
specification in the project evaluation phase of the design process. Specification of the
need is accomplished in the feasibility study process.
After the general need for safety is established, more specific requirements should be
produced for practical realisation. Both the operational and design requirements
regarding safety and reliability should be specified and they may have to be made at
different levels (i.e., the system and subsystem levels) as required. The extent to which
safety requirements are defined is also relevant to the level of innovation which has a
significant impact on the course of safety assessments.
The following typical items may need to be specified in the problem definition phase.
.	 Sets of rules and regulations made by the national authorities and
classification societies.
Deterministic requirements for the life of the product, reliability, availability,
etc..
.	 Criteria referring to probability of occurrence of serious system failure events
and the possible consequences (i.e., Frequency-Consequence Curve).
2.3.3.2 Risk Identification
As the design process proceeds, the design moves from the prospect evaluation phase to
the preliminary design phase. In this phase, as the configuration of the product at both
the component and subsystem levels is defined, risk identification process is initiated.
Risk identification is a process of identifying all potential hazardous conditions or
events, and respective causes and possible consequences. Experience has shown that a
large proportion of critical failures results from overlooking potential system failure
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Figure 2.2 Interrelations of five phases in the "design for safety" framework
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events. Actually, if complete systematic safety analysis had been carried Out and proper
measures had been taken from the early design stages, most disastrous failures of MTO
products could have been prevented.
In the risk identification phase, the combined experience and insight of engineers are
required to systematically identify all potential failure events at each required indenture
level with a view to assessing their influences on system safety and performance.
Various safety analysis methods may be used individually or in combination to identify
the potential risks of a system. Such typical methods are:
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).
.	 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
. Event Tree Analysis (ETA).
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA).
. Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP).
. Modified Boolean Representation Method (MBRM).
. Simulation analysis.
The study of these methods will be undertaken in more detail in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and
6.
2.3.3.3 Risk Estimation
Risk estimation should be carried out in the preliminary design phase of the design
procedure to process the information produced from the risk identification phase. In the
risk estimation phase, the likelihood of occurrence of each identified system failure
event and possible consequences can be assessed on either a qualitative or a
quantitative basis.
In the early stage of the risk estimation process, the likelihood and possible
consequences of each system failure event are usually estimated on a qualitative basis
because the identified events may not be readily quantified. The methods used for
conducting qualitative risk estimation include PHA, FMECA, MBRM, FTA, ETA and
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CCA.
As the design proceeds more and more information regarding safety is collected. After
the minimal cut sets leading to a top event (a system failure event) have been identified
and the failure data of the basic events associated with the minimal cut sets has been
obtained, quantitative risk estimation can be undertaken. The typical methods used in
carrying out quantitative risk estimation include FTA, ETA, CCA, MBRM and
simulation. Construction of the minimal cut sets leading to a top event is one of the
most important steps in the risk estimation phase. Therefore, it will be studied in more
detail in this work.
The probability of occurrence of each basic or primary event associated with the
minimal cut sets of a top event may be obtained either from historical analysis,
FMECA and simulation, or from the data collection programmes and engineering
judgement. The level of possible potential consequences of a top event may be
quantified in economic terms with regard to the loss of lives and property and the
degradation of the environment caused by the occurrence of the top event.
The results produced from the risk estimation phase may be used through the risk
evaluation phase and design review, and may also be used to assist designers in
developing maintenance and operation policies.
2.3.3.4 Risk Evaluation
Risk evaluation is carried out at the evaluation stage of the preliminary design phase of
the design process. It is subject to the requirements defined in the problem definition
phase to maintain the functional performance of the product. Risk evaluation is a
process of defining risks as a function of the estimated measures of the frequency or
likelihood and possible consequences, on the basis of which decisions on the selection
of design alternatives and actions on further risk reduction may be made.
Risk evaluation can be undertaken on a qualitative basis if only qualitative safety
information is available. Qualitative risk evaluation of a system failure event can make
use of the information produced in the risk estimation phase to construct a risk
assessment matrix as will be shown in Chapter 3. The design engineer can then
determine which parts or possible failure conditions have priority for design action.
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If the probabilities of occurrence of the system failure events and the possible
consequences can be quantitatively assessed, a frequency-consequence curve (Figure
2.3) can be produced to represent the risks. The acceptable and unacceptable regions
are divided by a transition region commonly termed by various authorities as As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). If unacceptable risks are identified, design review
actions may need to be taken or the design may have to be reconsidered, if necessary,
to reduce either the frequencies of hazards or magnitudes of their respective
consequences to an acceptable extent.
2.3.3.5 Design Review
Design review can be integrated into the evaluation and selection phases of the
preliminary design process of a MTO product. Since the probability of occurrence of
each serious system failure event is determined by its minimal cut sets which are
associated with some basic individual failure events, effective reduction or elimination
of an unacceptable failure event involves eliminating the cut sets with the highest
probability of occurrence. Measures to be taken may include the provision of protection
systems and alarm devices or use of more reliable components, for example. Reduction
of human error should also be taken into account in the design review. The probability
of human error may be reduced by the introduction of sensing and alarm devices if
applicable or better training. Improved inspection and maintenance policies may also be
useful for reducing the probabilities of occurrence of system failure events.
Design review should be incorporated with a cost-benefit analysis [2.8][2.12]. Cost-
benefit analysis becomes increasingly attractive as more advanced technology is
introduced and the benefits of techno-economic analysis are realised. Cost-benefit
analysis basically involves comparing the cost of safety proposals with their benefits in
economic terms, on the basis of which design decisions can be made. It can make use
of the information produced from the risk estimation and risk evaluation phases and
may be best undertaken using formal decision making tools such as Multiple Attribute
Decision Making (MADM) and Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM)
approaches to study both design and maintenance aspects to achieve an optimal design
alternative and the best maintenance and operation policies.
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Figure 2.3 Frequency-Consequence Curve
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter proposes a "design for safety" methodology for marine and other large
MTO products. This methodology may be effectively used to incorporate safety into the
design process from the initial stages so that unexpected cost and delays due to late
modifications regarding safety can be reduced to a minimum. Such a methodology may
allow consideration of safety as a design criterion for decision making purposes and
also accelerate the verification process.
The proposed "design for safety" methodology could form the basis for further
development of individual safety analysis methods and safety based decision making
tools to face the challenge imposed by the increasing technical standards and the
growing complexity of MTO products.
Further work required in the areas of "design for safety" of MTO products includes:
Implement the proposed "design for safety" methodology.
Investigate the existing safety analysis methods and their interrelations within
the "design for safety" process.
.	 Synthesise some of the safety analysis methods to create more flexible and
applicable mixed safety analysis tools.
Develop novel safety analysis methods to make safety analysis more flexible
and efficient.
Develop techno-economic modelling techniques to integrate safety analysis
and economic modelling in order to optimise design aspects and operation
policies.
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CHAPTER 3
Safety Analysis Methods Applied
to the "Design for Safety" Process
SUMMARY
"Design for safety" is a process of identifying hazards, estimating them and finally
evaluating them in terms of two basic parameters, namely the probability of occurrence
of each hazard and possible consequences. These two parameters can be assessed using
either a top-down or a bottom-up approach on either a qualitative or a quantitative
basis, depending on the nature of the particular engineering system and the safety
assessment techniques in hand.
This chapter describes the concepts of qualitative and quantitative safety analysis, and
bottom-up and top-down safety modelling approaches. The typical safety analysis
techniques are studied with respect to the proposed "design for safety" framework. An
analysis of the input requirements and the outcomes of the safety analysis methods is
carried out to identify their possible inter-relationships within the safety analysis
process in order to make full use of the advantages of each method. The selection of
these safety analysis methods is discussed in the context of MTO products. Problems
concerned with failure and repair data collection programmes are studied and some
typical failure and repair data sources are described.
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3.1 Introduction
In performing the safety analysis of a MTO product, it is almost impossible to treat the
system in its entirety. The logical approach may be to break down the system into
functional entities comprising subsystems and components. Safety modelling of these
functional entities can be carried out to fit such a logical structure, then the
interrelationships can be examined and finally a system safety model can be formulated
to calculate the safety parameters.
The formulation of the system safety model can be difficult for a large and
sophisticated MTO product and thus requires approximations and judgement. It may be
best done by someone who knows the system operation thoroughly. The safety analysis
methods may be applied individually or in a combined way to carry out either a
qualitative or a quantitative safety analysis.
It is very beneficial to effectively and efficiently use the safety analysis methods in the
"design for safety" process. In the literature, these methods are only studied in a very
general way. When and how these methods are specifically applied in the design
process and how these methods interrelate are usually not specified. This chapter
specifies how to deal with such problems. This requires an understanding of the
concepts of qualitative and quantitative safety analysis and the concepts of top-down
and bottom-up safety analysis techniques.
In this chapter, qualitative and quantitative safety analysis is described, top-down and
bottom-up event-based safety analysis approaches are studied, and the typical safety
analysis methods are outlined and discussed with respect to each phase of the "design
for safety" process. Then, the interactions of the outlined safety analysis methods are
studied in order to make full use of their advantages, and the selection of such methods
is discussed with reference to the characteristics of MTO products.
Since the quality of safety data significantly affects the results of safety analysis, failure
and repair data collection programmes are also studied and some typical data sources
are recommended.
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3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Safety Analysis
Depending on the requirements of safety analysts and the safety data available, either a
qualitative or a quantitative safety analysis can be carried out to study the risks of a
system in terms of the probability of occurrence of each hazard and possible
consequences. A severe hazard with a high probability of occurrence requires priority
attention and a hazard which is not likely to occur or which results in negligible
consequences usually requires minimal attention.
3.2.1 Qualitative Safety Analysis
Qualitative safety analysis is used to locate possible hazards and to identify proper
precautions (design changes, administrative procedures, etc.) that will reduce the
frequencies or consequences of such hazards.
Qualitative safety analysis should become an integral part of the design process of a
product. It may be performed with one or more of the following objectives:
. To identify hazards in the design.
. To document and assess the relative importance of the identified hazards.
To provide a systematic compilation of data as a preliminary step to facilitate
quantitative analysis.
To aid in the systematic assessment of the overall system safety.
The general steps in a qualitative system safety analysis are to:
i. Identify significant risks.
ii. Display the above information in a table, a chart, a fault tree or other format.
The consequences of a hazard can be classified as one of the four severity categories as
shown in Table 3.1 [3.13]. They range from catastrophic to negligible. The probability
of occurrence of a hazard can be described using the levels ranging from frequent to
remote as shown in Table 3.2 [3.13].
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Table 3.1	 Hazard consequence classification
Categories	 Description	 Equipment	 Personnel
i	 Catastrophic
ii	 Critical
iii	 Marginal
iv	 Negligible
System loss
Major system damage
Minor system damage
Less than minor
system damage
Death
Severe injury or severe
occupational illness.
Minor injury or minor
occupational illness
Less than minor injury
or minor occupational
ifiness
Table 3.2
	
Hazard Probability
Level	 Description Frequency
1	 Frequent	 Likely to happen
2	 Probable	 Several time during lifetime.
3	 Occasional Likely to happen once
4	 Remote	 Unlikely but possible during lifetime
Engineering judgement and past experience are required to carry out a qualitative safety
analysis. Measures can be taken to eliminate or control hazards based on the
information produced from qualitative safety analysis. Table 3.3 forms the basis of
design actions required to deal with identified hazards based on the combined
consequence severity and probability of occurrence [3.13]. For example, a catastrophic
hazard requires some corrective action regardless of the probability of occurrence while
a marginal hazard with a remote probability of occurrence would normally not receive
any corrective action since it would not be considered to be cost-effective.
Table 3.3	 Risk assessment matrix
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote
Catastrophic	 I-i
	
1-2
	
'-3
	
'-4
Critical
	
11-1
	
11-2
	
"-3
	
"-4
Marginal
	
HI-i
	
111-2
	
111-3
	
"-4
Negligible	 'v-i
	
IV-2
	
IV-3
	
IV-4
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where:	 design action is required to eliminate or control hazards classified as I-i,
1-2, 1-3, Il-i, 11-2 and 111-1;
hazard consequences must be controlled or hazard probabilities must be
reduced for hazards classffied as 111-2, 11-3 and 1-4;
hazard control is desirable for hazards classified as 111-3 and 11-4 if
cost-effective; and
no design action is normally required for hazards classified as 111-4, IV-
1, IV-2. P1-3 and P1-4.
3.2.2 Quantitative Safety Analysis
The purpose of a quantitative safety analysis is to help the designer to be aware of the
characteristics of the product, particularly its capabilities with the environment and
other technical design aspects, and to provide the designer with the quantified
probability of occurrence of each critical failure condition and the associated
consequences. Quantitative safety analysis utilises what is known and assumed about
the failure characteristics of each individual component to build a mathematical model
which is associated with some or all of the following information:
.	 Failure rates.
Repair rates.
.	 Mission time.
System logic.
.	 Maintenance schedules.
. Human error.
Typical parameters that need to be obtained in a quantitative safety analysis include
availability, the probability of occurrence of each system failure event and possible
consequences.
Availability
This parameter is very useful, especially when techno-economic modelling is used
for design decision making. The availability of a system is given by:
CHAPTER 3 - Safety Analysis Methods	 Page 44
Up timeAvailability (A (oo)) =
Up time + Down time
Probability of occurrence of a system failure event
A system failure event results from simultaneous occurrence of the basic events
associated with each of the minimal cut sets leading to this system failure. The
probability of occurrence of a system failure event may be calculated on the basis
of the identified cut sets and failure probability data of the associated basic events.
The probability of occurrence of a basic event for a period of time r can be
obtained from the following expression if the failure follows an exponential
distribution:
P(t) = 1 -
where t is the period of time of interest, P(t) represents the probability of
occurrence of the basic event at t, and is the failure rate.
Consequences
As described in Chapter 2, the possible consequences of a system failure event can
be quantified in terms of the possible loss of lives and property damage, and the
degradation of the environment caused by the occurrence of the failure event.
They are normally quantified by experts with respect to the particular operating
situation.
Consistency checking is required to validate the results produced from quantitative
analysis. The following studies are always useful for obtaining the reliable results
[3.30].
Sensitivity analysis.
.	 Comparison with prior analysis if possible.
.	 Model checking.
CHAPTER 3 - Safety Analysis Methods 	 Page 45
3.3 Top-down and Bottom-up Safety Analysis Approaches
System "design for safety" is a complex subject. It is not so much a question of looking
at an individual piece of equipment and determining how its safety can be improved;
rather it is to look at interactions of the components in the system and determine how
the' overall safety can be improved. To achieve this, safety analysis methods may be
applied to carry out safety analysis on the basis of hardware elements or hazardous
events.
Efficient use of the safety analysis methods in the "design for safety" process involves
the study of the characteristics of each safety analysis method and the "design for
safety" process in terms of the way in which safety analysis is carried out. A "design
for safety" process may be classified as either top-down or bottom-up by studying the
way in which risks of a system are identified. The safety analysis methods can also be
classified in such a way.
3.3.1 Top-down Approach
A top-down event-based "design for safety" process of a product starts with the study
of previous accidents and incident reports of similar products. The top events required
for further study are determined and the causes leading to them are then identified
deductively until all the causes are identified at the required level of resolution. A Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) is a typical top-down safety analysis method which can be
integrated into a top-down "design for safety" process.
In a top-down event-based "design for safety" process, both qualitative and quantitative
analysis can be carried out to estimate and evaluate risks regarding the demand for
safety. A design review can then be undertaken, by making use of the information
produced, to close the loop of the "design for safety" process. The diagram of a top-
down "design for safety" process is shown in Figure 3.1. The phases in this diagram are
in harmony with the proposed "design for safety" methodology shown in Figure 2.2.
For MTO products with a comparatively low level of innovation, a top-down safety
approach may prove convenient and time-saving because it only deals with failure paths
leading to particularly serious system failure events by studying the relationships of the
subsystems and components and the safety data from previous accidents and incident
reports of similar products. Obviously, experience, good judgement and understanding
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Figure 3.1 A top-down "design for safety" process
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of the system are very important for an efficient use of this approach.
However, for the design of MTO products with a comparatively high level of
innovation, there will often be a lack of knowledge or experience regarding the
determined design solutions and their possible effects on product safety. In such a case,
the top-down approach may have following problems:
.	 Failure data from similar products may not be available.
.	 Lack of certainty that all system failure events and respective failure causes
have been identified.
. The deductive properties of a top-down approach may not address all the
complex interactions present in a large MTO product in an analytically
ngorous manner.
Therefore, a bottom-up event-based safety analysis approach may be required.
3.3.2 Bottom-up Approach
In a bottom-up "design for safety" process, a system to be analysed can be divided into
subsystems which can be further broken down to the component level in order to
identify all possible hazards. The hazard identification can be initially carried out at the
component level, progressed up to the sub-system level and finally to the system level.
All combinations of possible failure events at both the component and the subsystem
levels may be studied to identify all the possible system failure events. The analysis at
the sub-system level may make use of the information produced at the component level.
Finally, risk evaluation and design review can be conducted.
A bottom-up "design for safety" framework incorporating three specific safety analysis
methods, namely FMECA, the Modified Boolean Representation Method (MBRM) (it
will be studied in more detail in Chapter 4) and the Monte Carlo simulation analysis is
presented as shown in Figure 3.2. In this framework, FMECA is carried out to identify
all possible failure events of a system at the component level in the risk identification
phase, and the MBRM and the Monte Carlo simulation method are used to identify the
minimal cut sets leading to each system failure event and to estimate the probability of
occurrence of each such failure event. The information vroduced from the risk
estimation phase can then be evaluated together with a design review.
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Figure 3.2 A bottom-up "design for safety" framework
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The use of an inductive bottom-up safety analysis approach yields a higher level of
confidence that all of the failure events of a system and their respective causes are
identified. Therefore, compared to the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach has
the following advantages:
.	 Omission of system failure events and their respective causes is less likely.
.	 It may be more convenient to be incorporated into a computer package.
.	 It may be more suitable to be applied to original MTO product design as
discussed above.
It may however be more time-consuming although the provision of powerful computers
may overcome such a shortcoming.
3.4 Safety Analysis Methods Applied to the "Design for Safety"
Process
3.4.1 Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA)
A preliminary identification of the system elements or events that lead to hazards is the
first step of a safety analysis. If it is extended in a more formal manner to include
considerations of the event sequences which transfer a hazard into an accident, as well
as corrective measures and consequences of the accident, the study is called a
Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA).
PHA is a qualitative approach which involves a mixture of inductive and deductive
logic. It is conducted on the basis of information such as casualty statistics and
comprehensive knowledge of similar systems. A PHA may provide an essential
foundation for further analysis of individual hazards, with particular reference to Fault
Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis [3.33]. The detailed description of PHA is
described in many references [3.9J[3.13][3.15]. The typical steps of a P1-IA are
described as follows:
i. Identification of hazardous events.
ii. Identification of hazardous event causes.
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iii. Identification of hazardous event effects.
iv. Classification of risks.
v. Determination of preventive measures.
PHA may be very useful in the problem definition and risk identification phases of the
"design for safety" process. It is strongly suggested that PHA be carried out in the
initial stages of the MTO product design process.
3.4.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault Tree Analysis (F1'A) is probably the most widely applied technique for risk
identification and risk evaluation. Such an analysis is a process of deductive reasoning
which can be applied to the safety assessment of a system of any size. It is particularly
suitable for the safety analysis of large MTO products for which the associated top
events can be identified by experience, from previous accidents and incident reports of
similar products, or by some other means.
A FTA is a systematic engineering technique that provides a diagrammatic
representation of the relationships between specific events or component failures and an
undesirable top event. It provides an engineering capacity to identify potential problem
areas, to evaluate their overall system impact, and to numerically assess the level of
safety inherent in the system design. In a fault tree analysis, an event with a
catastrophic nature or an event that cannot be tolerated, such as total loss of a system,
is usually selected as a top event for investigation. The selected top event is placed at
the top of the logic diagram, and the failure events that lead to the top event are located
immediately below in successive levels of indenture. The pathways through the fault
tree diagram represent all the failure modes which give rise to the top event. These
pathways are known as "cut sets" or "implicant sets". After some simplification rules
have been applied, the irreducible pathways can be obtained and these irreducible
pathways are referred to as "minimal cut sets" or "implicant sets".
Careful consideration must be given to the selection of the top event; it must be
sufficiently defined to constrain the fault tree to the specific conditions to be
investigated. Intimate knowledge of the system design is required to perform a fault
tree analysis as the analyst must be familiar with the various modes of system
operations and the types of component failures that can occur. Since a fault tree
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construction is event-based, human error (caused by operators, design or maintenance),
hardware or software failures, environmental conditions or operational conditions can
be taken into account [3.33].
The steps in F1'A are outlined as follows:
i. Identification of top events.
ii. Representation of each top event by means of a fault tree.
iii. Evaluation of the probability of occurrence of each top event.
iv. Determination of critical failure modes.
Detailed description of FTA and its applications can be found in various published
documents such as [3.2][3. 13][3.15].
The top events of a system to be investigated in FTA may also be identified through a
PHA or may correspond to a branch of an event tree or a system Boolean
representation table. The information produced from FMECA may be used in
construction of fault trees.
FTA may be carried Out fl the risk identification and risk estimation phases of the
"design for safety" process to identify the minimal cut sets associated with serious
system top events and to assess the probability of occurrence of each top event in order
to assist in design decision making.
3.4.3 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is probably the most widely
applied hazard identification method. It can be carried out at any indenture level
required to examine each failure mode of an item and its possible consequences. A
FMECA may Consist of the following steps [3.26]:
i.	 Define the constraints and assumptions of the analysis.
ii. Break down the system to its indenture levels such as the sub-system level
and the component level.
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iii. For each item at the indenture level analysed, identify all possible modes of
failures and respective causes.
iv. For each identified failure mode, identify or provide the following
information:
(i) All the distinctive operating conditions under which failure may occur.
(ii) The failure rate of the identified failure mode.
(iii) The effects (consequences) on the safety and operability of the higher
indenture levels (including the level analysed).
(iv) The possible means by which failure may be identified.
(v) Design provisions and/or actions in operation to eliminate or control the
possible resulting effects.
(vi) The severity class of the resulting identified effects where such a class
may be defined by one of the following linguistic variables:
1. Catastrophic:	 Involving death and/or system loss.
2. Critical:	 Involving severe injury and/or major system
damage.
3. Marginal:	 Involving minor injury and/or minor system
damage.
4. Negligible:	 Involving no injury and negligible damage
to the system.
(vii) Failure consequence probability defining the likelihood that the failure
effects of the identified failure mode will occur, given that the failure
mode has taken place.
v. Criticality analysis
Criticality analysis allows a qualitative or a quantitative ranking of the
criticality of the failure modes of items as a function of the severity
classification and a measure of the frequency of occurrence.
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If the probability of occurrence of each failure mode of an item can be
obtained from a reliable source, the criticality number of the item under a
particular severity class may be quantitatively calculated as follows [3.26]:
N
C = E, L, I
1=1
where E = failure consequence probability of failure mode i,
L, = likelihood of occurrence of failure mode i,
N = number of the failure modes of the component, which fall
under a particular serverity classification,
t = duration of applicable mission phase.
After all criticality numbers of the item under all severity classes have been
obtained, a criticality matrix can be constructed which provides a means of
identifying and comparing each failure mode to all others with respect to the same
severity class. Such a matrix display shows the distributions of criticality of the
failure modes of the item and provides a tool for assigning priority for corrective
action. Criticality analysis can be performed at different indenture levels.
Information produced at low indenture levels may be used for criticality analysis
at a higher indenture level.
To maximise the usefulness of a FMECA as a decision making tool, it should be
initiated at the earliest stage of design and updated and expanded to lower
indenture levels as the design progresses.
A FMECA is an inductive process which involves the compilation of reliability data,
where available, for individual items. Information produced from FMECA may be used
to assist in construction of fault trees, and especially in construction of Boolean
representation descriptions as will be described in Chapter 4.
FMECA can be integrated into the risk identification phase of the "design for safety"
process. As described above, some corrective actions, or in other words design changes,
can be undertaken on the basis of FMECA.
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3.4.4 HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP)
A HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study is an inductive technique which is an
extended FM1ECA and which can be applied by a multidisciplinary team using a
checklist to stimulate systematic thinking for identifying potential hazards and
operability problems, particularly in the process industries [3.15]. In recent years,
HAZOP studies have become increasingly recognised as an essential part of the process
plant design. The HAZOP methodology is probably the most effective of all hazard
identification techniques used in the chemical process industries. Its distinctive features
are:
i. A focus on state variables rather than mechanical components.
ii. An emphasis on an expert team approach.
iii. An explicit consideration of operator effects.
iv. A good foundation for subsequent quantitative risk analysis.
A HAZOP study investigates the proposed scheme systematically for every conceivable
deviation, and looks backwards for possible causes and forward for the possible
consequences. It is normally based on a word model and the flow sheet or diagram of
the system to be examined. HAZOP study planning is determined by the level of detail,
depending on the time and merits. A good knowledge of the system is essential.
HAZOP studies involve normal plant operation, foreseeable changes in normal
operation, startup and shutdown, suitability of plant materials and failures of equipment
and instrumentation. A HAZOP study may involve the following eight basic steps
[3.25]:
i. Define the scope of the study.
ii. Select the correct analysis team.
iii. Gather the information necessary to conduct a thorough and detailed study.
iv. Review the normal functioning of the process.
v. Subdivide the process into logical, manageable sub-units for efficient study
and confirm that the scope of the study has been correctly set.
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vi. Conduct a systematic review according to the established rules for the
procedure being used and ensure that the study is within the special scope.
vii Document the review proceedings.
viii. Follow up to ensure that all recommendations from the study are adequately
addressed.
The HAZOP methodology may stand a better chance of being a comprehensive detector
of failure modes than other alternative methods used in risk identification of chemical
process plants [3.5], and it is relatively easier to incorporate into a computer package
than the other hazard identification techniques [3.36]. The form of HAZOP notes
closely parallels the requirements of fault tree analysis as a HAZOP study yields a clear
identification of top events and a detailed description of failure sequences and
associated operating conditions. FMECA, cause-consequence analysis and Boolean
representation analysis can also make use of the information produced from HAZOP
studies. It is strongly suggested that HAZOP studies be conducted in the initial stages
of the process plant design process.
HAZOP studies can be integrated into the risk identification and risk estimation phases
of the "design for safety" process. The detailed description of this methodology can be
found in [3.5][3. 17][3.25][3.26][3.48].
3.4.5 Decision Table Method (Boolean Representation Method (BRM))
Decision table analysis was initially introduced as an automatic fault tree construction
technique in the 1970s [3.3][3.1O][3.12][3.15][3.19][3.28][3.32] because its logical
approach reduced the possibility of omissions which could easily occur in fault tree
construction. A decision table is a Boolean representation model [3.26].
An engineering system can be described in terms of components and their interactions.
A component can be described by a set of input events and a set of output events. Each
output event specifies the state of the output and a set of input events specifies the
states of inputs. Each event may have several states. For instance, output pressure from
a valve may be assigned to one of the five states such as too high, high, normal, low
and too low, each of which corresponds to a range of values. The interactions of
components can be modelled by studying the system process diagram.
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After components and their interactions have been modelled, the Boolean representation
modelling can be started initially at the component level, progressed up to the
subsystem level if necessary, and finally to the system level in order to obtain the final
system Boolean representation description. Given sufficient information about a system
to be analysed, this approach can allow a rapid and systematic construction of a
Boolean representation table of the system on the basis of the Boolean representation
models of the components and their interactions.
The final system Boolean representation table contains all the possible system top
events and the associated cut sets. Although the construction of such a table is not
diagrammatic, as FTA can be, it can allow a less cumbersome representation of failure
modes for components having multiple states, and it can also allow systems with
feedback loops to be easily modelled [3.15][3.19][3.44]. This method is extremely
useful for analysing systems with a comparatively high degree of innovation since their
associated top events are usually difficult to obtain by experience, from previous
accidents and incident reports of similar products, or by other means.
Decision table modelling is an inductive bottom-up method and can be integrated into
the risk identification and risk estimation phases of the "design for safety" process to
inductively identify system top events and associated causes. On the basis of the
obtained system Boolean representation table, both qualitative and quantitative analysis
can be carried out to estimate the probabilities of occurrence of each identified top
event and associated Cut Sets. The information produced from FMECA may be directly
used to assist in the construction of the system Boolean representation table [3.44].
This inductive bottom-up method may be very suitable to the safety analysis of most
MTO products, and it will therefore be studied in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.4.6 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
If a failure occurs it may propagate through the system and result in some possible
consequences. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is often used to deduce such consequences,
step by step, that involve the complex relationships among the components or
subsystems of the system given the occurrence of an initiating event. Event trees are
diagrammatically constructed by using forward logic, that is, inductive bottom-up logic
[3.13]. Quantitative analysis can be carried out to assess the probability of occurrence
of each possible resulting consequence on the basis of the constructed event trees.
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ETA provides a systematic and logical approach to identify the consequences and to
assess the probability of occurrence of each possible resulting sequence caused by the
initiating failure event [3.15][3.39]. Such an analysis can be integrated into the risk
identification and risk estimation phases of the "design for safety" process.
3.4.7 Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA)
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) is a marriage of fault tree analysis (to show
causes) and event tree analysis (to show consequences). CCA is a diagrammatic
approach. Construction of cause-consequence diagrams starts with a choice of a critical
event. The "consequence tracing" part of a CCA involves taking the initial event and
following the resulting chains of events through the system. The "cause identification"
part of a CCA involves drawing the fault tree and identifying the minimal cut sets
leading to the identified critical event. CCA is extremely flexible as it can work forward
using event trees and backward using fault trees. The inputs and outputs of cause
diagram and consequence diagram of CCA are shown in Figure 3.3.
The detailed description and applications of this approach are the same as discussed in
FTA and ETA in this chapter.
3.4.8 Digraph-based Analysis (DA)
Digraph-based Analysis (DA) is becoming increasingly attractive, especially in the
process industries, because relatively little information is needed to set up cligraphs and
perform safety analysis [3.18]. In a digraph-based analysis, the nodes correspond to the
state variables, alarm conditions, or failure origins, and the edges represent the causal
influences between the nodes. The direction of deviation of the nodes can also be
represented by signs on the branches on the Directed Signed DiGraph (DSDG) [3.18].
DA is a bottom-up event-based qualitative technique. From the constructed digraph, the
causes of a state change and the manner of the associated propagation can be easily
found out [3.38]. Digraph representation provides explicit causal relationships among
variables and events of systems with feedback loops.
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Figure 3.3 The cause and consequence diagram of cause-consequence analysis
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The digraph approach may be very efficient for identifying possible causes of process
disturbances [3.18]. The rules generated from DA can be used as knowledge of an
expert system for plant operations.
DA may be integrated into the risk identification phase of the "design for safety"
process, especially in chemical process plant designs.
3.4.9 Simulation
Generally, simulation techniques can be classified as two categories, namely
quantitative simulation and qualitative simulation. These two kinds of simulation
techniques are briefly described as follows.
3.4.9.1 Quantitative Simulation
FTA, ETA, CCA and BRM discussed above are deterministic methods. In other words,
given that the model is correct, for given reliability data there is only one answer. Such
deterministic methods are usually limited to deal with simple AND/OR logic and
constant failure rates and straightforward mean down times [3.36]. For dealing with
failure events with different distributions and taking into account other factors such as
maintenance and repairs, computer-based simulation, sometimes known as Monte Carlo
simulation analysis, may provide a quick and cost-effective way to conduct a
quantitative safety analysis using probability distributions.
There are a variety of algorithms for carrying out quantitative simulation analysis when
simulation techniques are used together with other formal safety analysis methods such
as FMECA, FTA, ETA, CCA and BRM. For example, on the basis of the cut sets
associated with a top event of a system obtained using the fault tree technique, failures
of each cut set can be determined by comparing each cut set with simulated basic event
failures, and the probabilities of occurrence of the top event and associated cut sets can
be assessed using the Monte Carlo simulation method. Such a simulation permits basic
events associated with each Cut set to be specified by a range of statistical distributions
such as Normal, Weibull and Exponential.
Simulation analysis is increasingly being used in safety analysis of engineering
products. This method may be used in the risk estimation phase of a "design for safety"
process. It will be studied in more detail in Chapter 6.
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3.4.9.2 Qualitative Simulation (Qualitative Reasoning)
Qualitative simulation (qualitative reasoning) analysis was initially developed in the
field of Artificial Intelligence. As will be stated in more detail in Chapter 5, this method
can be modified to be applied to failure propagation analysis and to modelling the
behaviour of a system.
Qualitative reasoning analysis is an inductive process. It can be combined with FTA
and BRM to form mixed approaches to efficiently and conveniently model a system for
safety analysis. This method can be used in the risk identification and risk estimation
phases of the "design for safety" process.
3.4.10 Subjective Reasoning Analysis (SRA)
As described in Chapter 1, the safety of an engineering system is affected by many
factors such as design, installation and operations. Therefore, in some cases, it could be
very difficult for the safety engineer to precisely obtain the parameters of basic failure
events to carry out quantitative analysis using the probabilistic safety analysis methods
outlined above (from 3.4.1 to 3.4.9) since a great deal of uncertainty is involved.
However, Subjective Reasoning Analysis (SRA) may prove relatively easier to deal
with such problems with uncertainty. SRA involves the use of fuzzy set modelling and
subjective descriptors such as "Very good" and "Very low ", which are commonly used by
safety analysts. Such an analysis is extremely useful to model systems which are
operated in a very changeable environment. SRA may be effectively used as an
alternative approach in the risk identification and risk estimation phases of the "design
for safety" process. This method will be studied in more detail in Chapter 7.
3.4.11 Human error
Human error was involved in the majority of well-known major incidents such as the
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters. Therefore, the contribution of human error
to system failures should be taken into account in safety analysis. In assessing the
safety of a MTO product it is necessary to ensure that facilities are provided to reduce
the probability of human error and consequential effects.
Human error study is a complex subject which may involve the following factors:
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i. Environmental factors - physical, organisational and personal.
ii. Internal error - training, experience, toleration by supervisor and lack of
supervision.
iii. Technical error - lack of sufficient instruction, poor concentration, feasibility
of the product design, and unforeseen causes.
iv. Unknown or undetermined causes.
Human error rates for various forms of activities may be needed to carry out
quantitative safety analysis involving human error. Human error rates are often difficult
to obtain from failure and repair data collection programmes. The difficulties come
from the following causes [3.36]:
Low probabilities of human error require a large amount of experience.
.	 Most of the data collection programmes concentrate on recording the events
rather than analysing the causes.
Many large organisations have not been prepared to commit the necessary
resources to collect human error data.
If there is no human error data available from failure and repair data collection
programmes, human error assessment models may be used to assess human error rates
with respect to the factors such as the complexity of the task, the level of training and
experience of personnel involved. There are currently several such models developed by
separate groups of analysts working in this field [3.36]. The examples of such models
are:
. HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) developed by
J. C. Williams [3.36].
THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) developed by A. D.
Swain and H. E. Guttmann [3.36].
• TESEO (Empirical Technique To Estimate Operator Errors) developed by G.
C. Bellow and V. Colombari [3.36].
When several models are available for quantifying a human error event, the need arises
to compare them and to decide which is the most suitable for the task in hand. The
factors for comparison may include accuracy, consistency, usefulness and resources
[3.36].
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In some cases, there may not be sufficient resources for using human error assessment
models, and simple human error rates in some particular situations may need to be
assigned. Such simple human error rates may be obtained from various publications
such as [3.35J[3.36][3.49].
Human error should be considered in the "design for safety" process and should be
reduced to a minimum extent, especially in those cases where the consequences of
human error are critical. Generally, the probability of human error may be reduced by
following measures:
The introduction of safety warning devices such as sensors and alarms for the
timely detection of the condition and the generation of an adequate warning
signal so that personnel can evaluate the area and take corrective action.
Improving training, supervision and communication.
.	 Increasing the level of automation.
3.4.12 Discussion
The following are some general observations on the range of safety analysis tools that
are available:
i. The use of the methods outlined above can offer considerable benefits to
MTO product design. The safety of a MTO product can be demonstrated on
either a qualitative or quantitative basis using these techniques, and safety
aspects may then be improved to suit the requirements of both owners and
regulatory authorities.
ii. The above outlined safety analysis methods are the typical ones which can be
applied to the "design for safety" process of MTO products. Besides these
methods, there are some other safety analysis methods which may also be
used in some particular situations. These include:
•	 Markov techniques [3.6J{3.27].
•	 Network modelling techniques [3.6][3.27].
•	 Critical item analysis [3.11J[3.41].
•	 Limit state reliability analysis [3.2][3.20}[3.33][3.42].
iii. Each of the safety analysis methods outlined above may be used in different
ways or in different formats by safety analysts. For example, a FMECA of a
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system may be carried out using the United States Military Standard [3.26] in
an organisation, and it may be carried out using the guide published by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [3.16] in another
organisation.
iv. The safety analysis methods outlined above are being extensively developed
in various possible application areas. For example, the research on
applications of FTA is being undertaken in the areas such as evaluation of
fault trees using the gate-by-gate method [3.9], and evaluation of fault trees
based on fuzzy logic [3.34].
v. Various computer codes for the safety analysis methods outlined above are
available [3.14] [3.26].
vi. The safety analysis methods outlined above are increasingly applied in the
"design for safety' process of MTO products as more and more computer-
based safety analysis tools are made available and as the importance of the
safety analysis for MTO products is realised.
vii. Further developments of the safety analysis methods outlined above are still
required to make safety analysis more flexible, effective and accurate to
satisfy the requirements of designing safer and more reliable MTO products.
viii. It has also been realised that some of these safety analysis methods may be
more beneficially used in a combined manner for effective and efficient safety
analysis [3.46].
3.5 Failure Data Collection Programmes
It is essential to obtain reliable statistical failure and repair data of components in order
to carry out quantitative safety analysis using the described probabilistic safety
assessment techniques. Generally, such failure and repair data of components can be
obtained from the following sources [3.42][3.27]:
i. Field experience.
ii. Life testing under controlled conditions in laboratory.
iii. Field experience and laboratory testing of similar components.
In addition, repair data may also be compiled from the agreed judgemental estimates of
experts [3.27].
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The collection of failure and repair data based on field experience and accelerated life
tests of MTO products is precluded as the former may not be possible due to the
characteristics of MTO products and the latter is a very expensive and labour
demanding operation. Hence, extensive use is made of failure and repair data collected
from laboratory tests and field reports on similar components (generic data collection
programmes).
It should be noted that for some components there is fairly close agreement between
different data banks and in other cases there is a wide range of failure rates [3.36]. The
latter may be due to a number of reasons as, for example:
•	 Some failure rates involve the replacement of components during preventive
maintenance whereas others do not.
.	 Failure rates are affected by so many factors that a variation in values exists.
Although nominal environmental and quality levels are described in some
databases, the range of parameters covered by these broad descriptions is
large.
Great care should be taken to use failure and repair data obtained from data banks to
reflect the environment to which the product is designed. When no data for a
component failure mode can be obtained, it may be possible to express the failure in
terms of fundamental and quantifiable parameters and to analyse it using limit state
reliability analysis [3.42], although even here there is uncertainty about the relevant
distributions.
How critical the reliability of the failure and the repair data is depends on the aims of
the safety analysis. If the safety analysis aims at obtaining the best absolute estimate of
system safety, as may be required by statutory requirements, the failure and repair data
is obviously critical. In such cases, validation of the data becomes as important as the
validation of the safety assessments themselves, and verification procedures should be
implemented to ensure that the obtained failure and repair data of components is
reliable. Modification of the obtained failure and repair data may also be required.
However, when the estimates of the system safety are used for comparison purposes,
the criticality of such data is greatly reduced. Safety analysis is then used to provide the
sensitivity of the system safety and to indicate the relative benefits of design changes
on system performance.
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The following sources may be useful for obtaining failure and repair data to carry out
quantitative safety analysis.
FARADIP.THREE [3.36]. This database is a summary of all the other
databases and shows, for each component, the range of failure values. The
failure data of various components such as alarms, mechanical items and
instruments is included in this database.
ii. US Military Handbook 217. This data source is produced by the Rome Air
Development Centre under contract to the US Department of Defence and is
an electronic failure data bank.
iii. Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data - NPRD3(1985). This document is
produced by the Rome Air Development Center. It contains field data
information of electromechanical, mechanical, hydraulic and pneumatic parts.
iv. Handbook of Reliability Data for Electronic Components Used in
Telecommunications Systems HRD4 (1986). This document is produced, from
field data, by British Telecom's Materials and Components Centre.
v. Electronic Reliability Data - INSPEC/NCSR (1981). This book, published
jointly by the Institute of Electrical Engineers and the National Centre of
Systems Reliability (Warrington) in 1981, consists of simple multiplicative
models for semiconductor and passive electronic components with tables from
which to establish the multipliers according to the environment, temperature
and other parameters.
vi. OREDA- Offshore Reliability Data (1984). It is a collection of offshore
failure rate and failure mode data with an emphasis on safety-related
equipment. It covers a great range of components and equipment.
vii. Green and Bourne - Reliability Technology, Wiley, 1972. This book contains
failure rate data obtained mostly from US and UK atomic energy sources.
viii. UK Atomic Energy SRD Data Bank. It contains the generic reliability data of
various components and is maintained by the SRD (Systems Reliability
Department) at the UKAEA (UK Atomic Energy Authority at Cuicheth),
Warrington, Cheshire.
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x. Lloyds Data Bank [3.23113.24]. It mainly covers the failure data in the
shipping industries.
ix. Others. The reliability data of the various electronic and nonelectronic
components may also be obtained from various published papers and books
such as [3.35J[3.36].
3.6 Selection of Safety Analysis Methods
As described in Chapter 2, "design for safety" is an iterative process involving five
phases, namely problem definition, risk identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation
and design review, converging to safety design objectives defined in the problem
definition phase. Each phase in the "design for safety" process may involve the use of
the safety analysis methods outlined in this chapter.
It has been realised that use of the safety analysis methods in an intergrated manner
may make safety analysis comparatively efficient and convenient since safety
information and the advantages of each method may be more efficiently explored by
doing so [3.46]. In such an integration, one method may be used to process the
information produced using another method. The example of such an integration is that
a system top event is identified using PHA, the associated minimal cut sets are
identified using FTA, and the probabilities of occurrence of the system top event and
the associated cut sets are assessed using simulation analysis.
To make full use of the safety analysis methods, an analysis of their input requirements
and outcomes is required.
The possible inter-relationships of various safety analysis methods are identified as
shown in Figure 3.4. This network of safety analysis methods and data flows constitutes
a general framework within which the safety of a product may be assessed as the
design evolves.
The outlined safety analysis methods, classified as either top-down or bottom-up event-
based as described before, may be applied to study the system states, operational
conditions, environmental conditions and other design considerations which contribute
to the likelihood of occurrence of the hazardous conditions associated with a MTO
product and define the magnitude of possible resulting consequences. The selection of
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Figure 3.4 Information flow diagram of safety analysis methods
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the outlined safety analysis methods, or the decision as to which methods are more
appropriate for the safety analysis of a particular product, is dependent on the following
considerations:
i. The level (system, subsystem or component level) of the product breakdown
at which the risk identification is carried out.
ii. The degree of complexity of the inter-relationships of the items at the
investigated indenture level of the product breakdown.
iii. The degree of innovation associated with the product design (the availability
of product failure data for safety analysis).
The applicability of each safety analysis method has been discussed with reference to
the phases of the "design for safety" process. When, however, there is a lack of
knowledge or experience regarding the design solution and its possible effects on the
product safety, inductive bottom-up methods, although more time-consuming, should
yield a higher level of confidence that all hazardous system states and respective failure
modes are identified. Otherwise, top-down methods may prove more convenient and
efficient. If, however, it is difficult to describe the basic failure events of a product
using the probabilistic risk analysis methods, Subjective Reasoning Analysis (SRA)
may be carried out to assess the safety of the product.
Top-down and bottom-up methods may also be used in an integrated manner. For
example, a top-down fault tree analysis method may be combined with a bottom-up
modified Boolean representation method to form a mixed approach in which fault tree
analysis is carried out to focus on the specific areas of interest and the Boolean
representation analysis is carried Out to study the details of the particular identified
areas [3.46].
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies the safety analysis methods with respect to the ways they are used
in the "design for safety" process of MTO products. The typical safety analysis
methods are outlined and the range of them is discussed within the context of their
inter-relationships. Failure and repair data collection programmes are studied and some
typical data sources are described.
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The safety analysis methods outlined in this chapter may be applied individually or in
combination in the "design for safety" process.
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CHAPTER 4
Modified Boolean Representation
Method (MBRM)
SUMMARY
Since possible system failure events of most large MTO products may not be obtained
by experience or from previous acidents and incident reports of similar products, and
since the "design for safety" of large MTO products requires that all failure causes
associated with such possible system failure events be identified, the top-down approach
is not always satisfactorily applied in the risk identification and risk estimation phases
and a more objective and flexible bottom-up approach may be more effective.
This chapter proposes an inductive bottom-up risk identification and estimation
methodology combining FMECA and the Modified Boolean Representation Method
(MBRM). This methodology can be used to identify all possible system failure events
and respective causes particularly in those cases where multiple state variables and
feedback loops are involved, and to assess the probabilities of occurrence of the
identified system failure events and the associated cut sets. The MBRM is developed
and presented together with its use in modelling cause-effect relationships. The overall
model and the algorithms are described and tested in association with the associated
computer software. The possible applications of this methodology in association with
other system modelling methods are discussed, An illustrative example is presented to
demonstrate the proposed methodology.
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4.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 2, the "design for safety" of a MTO product is a process of
identifying the possible failure events (top events) and associated consequences,
assessing them, and finally evaluating them. In such a process, risk identification and
risk assessment are very difficult and important steps which always merit a great deal
of attention by safety engineers and researchers.
As described in Chapter 3, risk identification Consists of identifying, given the system
description and functional requirements, potential hazardous conditions or events, for
which all the possible respective causes and corresponding consequences must be
identified by studying the causal relationships between the basic human, hardware and
environmental events. The risk identification phase in the "design for safety" process is,
without question, the most critical. Risk identification requires the combined expertise
and insight of engineers and scientists to cover all aspects of the system process and
operation to systematically decompose the system and analyse the interactions of
primary and intermediate events on system safety and performance.
On the basis of the information produced from the risk identification phase, risk
estimation can be carried out. Risk estimation is a process of estimating the likelihood
of occurrence of the identified failure events and the severity of respective potential
consequences. Information produced from the risk estimation phase may help designers
to minimise the possibilities or possible consequences of critical failures and to provide
a safe and reliable product design. Mission time, the interrelations of the components,
failure rate and repair rate of each component are usually used in the risk estimation
analysis of a system.
Assumptions are always necessary for the convenient application of identifying and
estimating risks. The following typical assumptions are often used to estimate the
probability of occurrence of each identified system failure event.
i. Failures of a component or a subsystem don't affect other components or
subsystems at the same analysis level.
ii. A continuous variable can be expressed by two or more discrete states such
as high, normal and low, each of which corresponds to a certain range of
values.
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iii. Failure events can be represented by probability distributions.
iv. There is no preventive maintenance carried out during missions and failed
components are repaired same-as-new.
Various safety analysis methods can be applied to identify and estimate risks. FTA and
FMECA are usually used to carry out such an analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, for a
system with a comparatively low level of innovation, the undesired system states may
be obtained by experience or from previous accidents and incident reports of similar
systems, and the respective causes may be identified deductively using FTA which may
make use of the information produced from FMECA. However, FTA, as a top-down
deductive method, suffers from the disadvantages described in section 3.3.1 as well as
the following ones:
The representation of variables with multiple states can prove to be
comparatively complex. For example, the representation of a temperature
variable T with five possible states (i.e, 1. high, 2. too high, 3. normal, 4.
low, 5. too low) may require five gates in ETA, but such a variable may be
represented simply by 7', (i = 1, 2, ..., 5) using the Boolean representation
method as will be described later, where T, represents the occurrence of state
i ofT.
ii. ETA may not completely benefit from the information produced using
FMECA to obtain the minimal cut sets associated with the system top events
and neither may it directly make use of the information when a complex
engineering system is analysed.
Furthermore, when there is a lack of experience of similar system design solutions and
when the complexity of the system and constituent elements increases, a top-down
approach like ETA may prove unsuitable and a bottom-up approach may be more
appropriate.
FMECA is a bottom-up approach and is usually carried Out on the basis of the
evaluation of hardware elements. However, FMECA does not close the loop between
risk identification and estimation. In FMECA, how combinations of occurrence of
failure modes affect system performance and safety is not studied. Some combinations
of occurrence of failure modes result in definite occurrence of system failures. Such
combinations of failure modes are required to be studied. Therefore, an inductive
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approach is required to efficiently process the information produced from FMECA and
to study combinations of failure modes to close the loop. The Modified Boolean
Representation Method (MBRM) is such an approach which can be used to automate
the construction of the system Boolean representation table which contains all undesired
system events and associated causes. Due to its inductive nature, the modified Boolean
representation method can fully benefit from the information produced from FMECA.
Additional benefits of the modified Boolean representation method over FTA are that
systems with feedback loops can be easily modelled and variables with multiple states
can be easily dealt with.
4.2 A Proposed Risk Identification and Risk Estimation Framework
Incorporating the MBRM and FMECA
A methodology for the risk identification and risk estimation of engineering systems is
proposed as shown in Figure 4.1. This methodology combines FMECA and the MBRM
to systematically identify and assess all system failure events and their respective
causes.
Having completed the risk identification phase using FMECA at the component level,
the Boolean representation descriptions of the components of the subsystems of a
system can be constructed. The failure modes identified in the FMECA of a component
can be used as the input attributes of the Boolean representation table. To reduce the
degree of complexity of the Boolean representation modelling, only the failure modes
with severity classes 1, 2 and 3 are used to construct the component Boolean
representation table. Experience and a good understanding of the system is very
important for the efficient construction of the component Boolean representation table.
The component Boolean representation table describes, in the form of a table, the
conditions which must exist for the occurrence of the identified component output
states. The last column of the Boolean representation table describes the states of the
output of the component being modelled while other columns prescribe the states of the
input attributes. Each row represents a possible condition for an occurrence of the
component's output State.
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Figure 4.1 An inductive bottom-up risk identification and risk estimation
framework incorporating the MBRM and FMECA
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Constructed from the results of the FIvIECA, a component Boolean representation table
normally has some degree of redundancy. The rules of simplification can be applied to
absorb and merge redundant rows and redundant attributes to generate the irreducible
Boolean representation table of the component. After all the Boolean representation
tables of the components of a subsystem have been constructed, the construction of the
subsystem B oolean representation table can be started using a process of aggregation.
Intermediate variables need to be eliminated by substituting them with primary
variables regarding the interactions of the components. A Component Relationship
Matrix (CRM) described in the next section can be constructed from the system process
diagram to describe the component relationships for the purpose of eliminating
intermediate variables. After the elimination, the rules of simplification described in the
next section should be applied again to produce the irreducible Boolean representation
table of the subsystem.
After all the Boolean representation tables of the subsystems have been constructed, the
Boolean representation modelling can be progressed up to the system level, and the
same procedures repeated to ultimately obtain the irreducible Boolean representation
table for the system. The rules of deduction of extra prime implicants as will be
described in section 4.3.4 can then be applied to the irreducible system Boolean
representation table to obtain the final system Boolean representation table. The final
system Boolean representation table contains all the prime implicants associated with
the system output states. A prime implicant can be considered to be the equivalent of a
cut set in fault tree analysis but for systems with multiple state variables.
If the risk identification phase is completed using FMECA at the subsystem level, the
Boolean representation analysis can be carried out directly at that level. Both qualitative
and quantitative analysis can be carried out on the basis of the obtained final system
Boolean representation table.
In the following sections, FMECA, the components relational model, the rules and
procedures for obtaining the final Boolean representation table for a system, and the
algorithms for qualitative and quantitative analysis are described. For the simplification
of the description, Boolean representation modelling at the component level is
progressed directly up to the system level.
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4.3 Modified Boolean Representation Method (MBRM)
A component can be modelled by a Boolean representation table which is an extended
version of a truth table and which describes how each combination of input events
specifies the output event or the state of the output. As described in the last section,
Boolean representation modelling can make direct use of the information produced from
FMECA to possibly define the input attributes and output states. The Boolean
representation table of a component can be constructed by studying all possible
combinations of the input variable states. After all the Boolean representation tables of
the components have been constructed, Boolean representation modelling can be
progressed up to a higher level (i.e., the sub-system or system level) by studying the
component relationships.
4.3.1 System Modelling
Variables used in Boolean representation modelling can be classified in the following
two categories:
i. Intermediate variable.
ii. Primary variable.
The output from a component within the system is called an intermediate variable. Any
variable which is an input from the system environment or an internal mode of a
component is called a primary variable. An internal mode of a component represents its
functioning. The examples of internal modes are "Working" and "Failed ". Each primary
variable or intermediate variable may have several states. The investigated system states
are top events.
An engineering system can be described in terms of components and their interactions.
Furthermore, a component can be described in the form of a Boolean representation
table involving primary and intermediate variables. The component relationships within
the system can be described in the form of a Component Relationship Matrix (CRM) as
follows:
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M 11 M 12 M 13 . M1
M21 M22 M23 . M2
CRM = •	 •
M 1
 M 2 M 3 M
In a CRM, if the element M 1 is equal to 0, it means that the output of component i is
not an input to component j; if M1 , is equal to 1, it means that the output of component
i is the input to component j; and if is equal to 1, it means that there is a self-
feedback for component i.
Given the process diagram of a system, the components can first be labelled by integer
numbers, and the CRIvI can then be constructed. Given the diagram of a process system
shown in Figure 4.2, the CRM is constructed as follows:
Figure 4.2 A process system diagram
010001
001000
000100
CRM= 0 0 1 0 0 1
001000
100000
When the software as will be described in this chapter is used to process and
manipulate the Boolean representation tables of the components to obtain the
irreducible table of the system, it is is required to construct CRM as the input data to
describe the relationships of the components of the system. The construction of the
Boolean representation table starts with the component Boolean representation model
for which the output states are top events.
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When a component has more than one output variable, Boolean representation
modelling should be conducted for each of the output variables, and one or more
dummy components should be provided in the system process diagram for the CRM
construction [4.6][4.18]. More than one Boolean representation description may be
required to model a component.
4.3.2 Rules for Boolean Representation Manipulation
Based on the binary logic relationships,
the rules for manipulation of Boolean representation tables involving variables with
multiple states are defined as follows:
i. Definition
A fl 1 = A,	 (4.1)
A, fl 0= 0
	 (4.2)
A, U 1 = 1
	 (4.3)
A, U 0= A
	 (4.4)
A = 1	 (4.5)
A, fl A (i^j) = 0	 (4.6)
ii. Identities
A '- A = A
	
(4.7)
iii. Commutative law
A	 B, = B fl A
	
(4.8)
iv. Associative laws
A	 B1	 C ) = (A, ( B1 )	 Ck	 (4.9)
A U (B	 C) = (A, U B1 ).- (A, u Ck)	 (4.10)
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v. Absorption laws
A, U (A 1	B1 ) = A1 A1 ( (A 1	B1 ) = A1 ç B1	 (4.11)
A, U * = *
	 (4.12)
where A, represents state I of variable A, A represents state j of variable A, B
represents state j of variable B, and * stands for "Don't care" which means a variable
could be in any state.
The rules for Boolean representation simplification are absorption and merging. Two
examples of their applications are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1	 Absorption
A	 B	 CO3,,	 A	 B
N * High -> N * High
N N High
Table 4.2	 Merging
A	 B ICouq'ut 	 A	 B
F F	 High ->	 F * High
F W High
F N High
where the number of the states of variable B is equal to 3, and F, W and N stands for
"Failed", "Working" and "Normal ", respectively.
4.3.3 Elimination of Intermediate Variables
The input entries of a final system Boolean representation table should be primary
variables. Therefore, intermediate variables should be eliminated by substitution with
primary variables. During the elimination process, some intermediate variables may be
used to replace other intermediate variables. Gradually, all intermediate variables are
eliminated and a Boolean representation table in which all the entries are primary
variables can be obtained. At this stage, a simplification of the Boolean representation
table can be carried out. If the number of the entries of a Boolean representation table
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is large the simplification process may prove time-consuming. Therefore, it is suggested
that the simplification rules be applied after each intermediate variable is eliminated. An
example of elimination of intermediate variables is presented as shown in Tables 4.3
and 4.4.
If	 Y=	 ABE1+A1B1
and	 E = C1 D1 + C1D1
Then Y = AB, (CD1 + C1 D1 ) + A.B1
= AB1 CD1 +A1 BCD1 +AB1
where A, B, C and D are primary variables, and E is an intermediate variable.
Table 4.3 The tables concerned with variables Y and E
A B E Y	 C D E
F W N High and N N N
F N * High	 F W N
Eliminating intermediate variable E, then
Table 4.4 The Boolean representation tabJe after elimination
A B C D
F W N N High
F W F W High
F N * *	 High
An input variable should only occupy one column in a Boolean representation table.
However, it may happen that an input variable may occupy more than one column
during the elimination of intermediate variables. This is called duplication of variables.
Duplication of variables has been found to arise only in the construction of Boolean
representation tables of systems in which one or more of the components has multiple
outputs. Duplication of variables can be eliminated by applying the following rule in
association with rules (4.6) and (4.7):
(4.13)
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During the elimination of intermediate variables, if the combination of a variable in a
row is 0, that row is deleted. In the example shown in Table 4.5, the combination of
variable C in row 2 is 0. Therefore, row 2 is eliminated.
Table 4.5 An example of elimination of duplicated input variables
Row A B C C D C
1	 N F * * N F
2	 N N F N F F	 ->
3	 N F * F F F
4	 N N F F W F
A B C D C0
N F * N F
N F F F F
N N F W F
The difference between the Boolean representation descriptions of systems with and
without feedback loops is that the former has the output variable in the input attributes
of the Boolean representation table, and the latter does not. For a system with feedback
loops, the output variable in the input attributes of the Boolean representation table can
be eliminated by applying the rules (4.6), (4.7) and (4.13). An example is shown in
Table 4.6 where row 2 is eliminated.
Table 4.6 Elimination of the output variable appearing in the input
attributes
Row A B C0	 A B C0
1
	
N F F
	
F	 N F F
2
	
F N N
	
F	 ->
3
	
F F *
	
F	 F N F
4.3.4 Deduction of Prime Implicants
A Boolean representation table can be simplified to an irreducible form using the
described rules. However, the irreducible table is not guaranteed to contain all of the
prime implicants since variables with multiple states may be involved. An example is
given as in Table 4.7:
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Table 4.7 An irreducible Boolean representation table
Row A	 B Icow
1	 N F High
2	 F	 * High
3	 W * High
where the number of states of variable A is equal to 3.
Obviously, Table 4.7 is an irreducible table. However, there is one more prime
implicant [A = *][B = F], which is not contained in Table 4.7. As will be described
later, such an extra prime implicant can be produced from the existing irreducible table.
Quine's algorithm theory can be used to produce the extra prime implicants from the
obtained irreducible table [4.6J[4.18]. Such a method is called consensus operation
since it creates new terms out of the terms already in the table by mixing and matching
their input events. The theory for obtaining the extra prime implicants from the
obtained irreducible table is described as follows.
If there is an event variable A and a set of n prime implicants o, o,
associated with all the possible states (A 1 , A 2,	 , and A) of variable A in the
irreducible Boolean representation table, [Jc 1 is also a prime implicant provided that it
exists. This can be proved as follows:
Suppose Y represents the total prime implicants associated with all the possible
states of variable A. Then
Y
	 (4.14)
where n is the number of the states of variable A.
From the equations (4.1), (4.4) and (4.7), the following equation can be obtained.
A1a1	 (4.15)
Therefore
Y	 (AioLuAg[Jai,) = 40UA1Ioj	 (4.16)
i=1	 j=1	 1=1	 i=1	 j=1
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From rule 4.7, A 1 ftc 1
 = ftcY1Z41 is obtained.
i=1 j=1
	 j=1	 i=1
Since
= 1
	 (4.17)
Then
Y
	 (4.18)
Therefore fl 1 is also a prime implicant.
After the extra prime implicants have been created out of the obtained irreducible
Boolean representation table, they should be added to the obtained irreducible Boolean
representation table, and the rules for simplification should be applied again to obtain
the final Boolean representation table. An example is shown as follows.
Suppose an irreducible system Boolean representation table is obtained as shown in
Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 An irreducible system Boolean representation table
Row	 A	 B	 E	 F	 CO3
1	 N	 F	 F	 F	 High
2	 *	 N	 F	 F	 High
where the number of the states of variable B is equal to 2.
Deducing the extra prime implicant, Table 4.9 is obtained.
Table 4.9 Deduction of the extra prime implicant.
Row	 A	 B	 E	 F
1	 N	 F	 F	 F	 High
2	 *	 N	 F	 F	 High
3	 N	 *	 F	 F	 High
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where row 3 is the new prime implicant
The final system Boolean representation table can be obtained by applying the rules for
simplification.
Table 4.10 The final system Boolean representation table
Row	 A	 B	 E	 F
1	 N	 *	 F	 F	 High
2	 *	 N	 F	 F	 High
It should be pointed Out that it is meaningless to study extra prime implicants in fault
tree analysis because only one state for a variable appears in the minimal cut sets. For a
system in which multiple state variables contribute to system failures, the failure cause
expressions are prime implicants rather than minimal cut sets in the fault tree analysis.
If the state of each variable in a system is 1, the final Boolean representation table
would be exactly the same as obtained in the fault tree analysis.
4.3.5 System Safety Analysis
Both qualitative and quantitative safety analysis can be carried out on the basis of the
final system Boolean representation table.
Qualitative analysis
In the obtained Boolean representation table, a prime implicant consisting of n primary
events is called an n-event prime implicant. One-event prime implicants are significant
contributors to the associated top event unless their probabilities of occurrence are very
low. If there are no one-event prime implicants, two or three-event prime implicants
leading to the top event should be given more attention rather than other higher-order
prime implicants. Common cause failures should also be studied if there are some
common causes in higher-order prime implicants.
Quantitative analysis
Boolean representation analysis deals with variables with multiple states. The traditional
quantitative safety analysis theory which usually deals with variables with single failure
state cannot be directly applied to the final system Boolean representation table.
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Therefore, a modified quantitative safety analysis method is required to assess the
probability of occurrence of each system top event. Such a method is developed as
follows:
The simultaneous occurrence of the basic events associated with any of the prime
implicants C 1 , C 2, C 3, and CN will result in the occurrence of the top event
T. Thus, the probability of occurrence of the top event T can be calculated as
follows:
P(T) = P(CIUC2U	 UN)
= (P(C1)+P(C2)^	 P(CN))—(P(ClnC2)+P(ClnC3)
+	 P(C1flC1)11^j...) ... +(_1)N P(C 1 (C2 •• flCN)
N	 N
=	 P (C1) - E P(C1	 c1 ^	 + (_1)N_Ip (C 1	C2
1=1	 i=li^j
fl CN)	 (4.19)
where N is the number of the prime implicants associated with the top event T.
The rules (4.5) and (4.7) can be applied to simplify the intersections of the prime
implicants in the above formula. If any of the terms (say C 1	C2 = J) in the
expression (4.19) is expressed in terms of the associated basic events Ek! , Ek2,
andE, then
P (ik) = P (E	 E2 fl •..	 E)
	 (4.20)
where m is the number of the basic events associated with 1k•
Usually, the basic events EkI , Ek2, Ek3 , ..., and Ek,,, are assumed to be
independent, that is, the occurrence of a given basic event is in no way affected by
the occurrence of any other basic events. Thus,
P(Ik )=P(Ekl)P(Ek?)	 P(Ek.,,,)	 (4.21)
If each basic event E( i = 1, 2, ... , m) is assumed to follow an exponential
distribution, then the probability of its occurrence at time t can be calculated by:
P(E,) = 1 - e	 (4.22)
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where	 is the failure rate of the basic event E.
After P(EkI ), P(Ek2), , and P(E) have been obtained, P(!k) can be calculated.
The probability of occurrence of the top event P(T) can then be obtained using
formula (4.19).
4.4 Software
A computer model has been developed with respect to the described MBRM. The
programme is written in MODSIM JJTM which is an object-oriented simulation language
and which can also be used as a general purpose programming language. A brief
description of MODSIM JI B' can be seen from Appendix 2. The selection of this
language is justified by the possible future implementation of event-based simulation to
predict and assess system performance.
The software has been designed to satisfy the functional requirements of simplification,
elimination, safety parameter calculation and an efficient man/machine interface.
Simplification
The following functions are involved in the simplification module:
i. Absorption
ii. Merging
The characteristics of the simplification module are:
i. The number of the states of each input variable is currently limited to 5
although it can easily be expanded.
ii. There is no limitation on the number of input variables.
iii. The result obtained can easily be monitored through a simple interactive
interface.
Elimination
The elimination is based on the rules developed in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
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Deduction of extra prime implicants
Deduction of extra prime implicants is based on the rules described in section
4.3.4. After extra prime implicants have been deduced, the rules for simplification
are applied again to obtain the final system Boolean representation table.
utS
The input data includes:
i. Names of component variables.
ii. Boolean representation descriptions of components.
iii. The number of the states of each variable.
iv. Failure rates of the failure modes associated with each component.
V. CRM.
Quantitative analysis
This software is limited to assess the probability of occurrence of a system top event
for which the associated basic events follow exponential distributions.
Consistency checks
The consistency checks are designed to make sure that the input data is correct.
4.5 An Example
An hydraulic hoist transmission system of a marine crane is shown functionally in
Figure 4.3. This system is used to control the crane motions such as hoisting up and
hoisting down loads as required by the operator [4.9J[4.15]. It consists of five
subsystems, namely an hydraulic oil tank, an auxiliary system, a control system, a
protection system and an hydraulic servo transmission system. Each subsystem is
associated with several failure modes. The occurrence of each failure mode associated
with each subsystem may result in certain possible consequences, with the severity
class depending on the nature of the failure mode and the interactions of the
subsystems.
pipelines
control valves
function valves, etc
thermostat r
filters :.:.• :.'•
levelswitch . :
heater,etc: .
	:
Hydraulic servo transmission syslenT 5
pipelines
shaft
filters
motors
pumps
Actuating system
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Control system
	
3
	
Hydraulic oil tank. 
•. 1
Protection system	 4
brake control valves
protection switch
emergency valve
pipelines
various protection valves
Auxiliary system	 2
filters .
clogging indicator
pipelines .. .. .
Figure 4.3 The diagram of an hydraulic hoist transmission system of a
marine crane
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4.5.1 Risk Identification Using FMECA
The following assumptions are set for the convenience of analysis:
i. The system will not be operated at any time above the rated maximum
pressures and capacities.
ii. Structural failure of any subsystem causing loss of hydraulic oil will be
considered as a possible failure mode of that subsystem.
iii. All piping connections are properly made and wifi not leak.
iv. All parts of the hydraulic systems will be properly purged of air at
commissioning.
v. The electrical circuitry will be adequately and properly protected against the
ingress of water or other harmful fluids.
vi. All maintenance activities are expertly and properly cathed out and no faults
which affect operation and safety are introduced.
vii. Failure rates of the failure modes of the subsystems are assumed to be
constant.
viii. When a failure mode is defined as a major leak, this means that the leak of
all fluid would result from a disconnected pipe or a burst casing.
ix. Pipes and hoses are not considered as components. A burst in any pipe or
hose is considered as a major leak in the next downstream component.
The results of the FMECA for the subsystems of this marine crane hoist transmission
system are shown in Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15. The failure rate of each
failure mode in Tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 is obtained from [4.9].
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Table 4.11	 FMECA of the hydraulic tank
Name	 Hydraulic oil tank
Function	 Supplying the oil for hydraulic control system, servo
___________________ transmission_system_and_protection_system
Failure rate
	
51 (failures per million hours) 	 ______________ _______
Failure	 Failure	 Failure mode	 Effects	 on	 Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
numberrate	 _____________ __________________ _____________ ______
1	 0.443	 oil	 reduce efficiency.	 self-	 4
temperature	 annunciating
too high or
too low
2	 0.103	 level gauge	 could result in	 self-	 3
failure	 insufficient	 oil annunciating
supply.	 &	 by
maintenance
3	 0.059	 major leak	 no flow for the	 self-	 3
system supply.	 annunciating
4	 0.395	 minor leak	 none,	 self-	 4
________ ________ ______________ __________________ annunciating ______
Table 4.12	 FMECA of the auxiliary system
Name	 Auxiliary system
Function	 Filtering, cooling and supplying the hydraulic oil
Failure rate
	 106 (failures per million hours)	 _____________________
Failure	 Failure	 Failure mode Effects 	 on	 Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
numberrate
	 ______________ __________________ _____________________
1	 0.284	 failure	 pump servo may by	 3
allowing	 stick.	 maintenance
contaminant
into system
2	 0.011	 filter blocked loss of servo by	 3
pressure.	 maintenance
3	 0.085	 blocking	 loss of servo	 self-	 3
indicator	 pressure.	 annunciating
fails	 to
operate
4	 0.566	 minor leak	 none,	 self-	 4
annunciating
&	 by
maintenance
5	 0.011	 major leak	 loss of servo self-	 3
pressure	 and	 annunciating
motion.
6	 0.043	 no	 output no	 flow	 for self-	 2
from control	 system.	 annunciating
pump	 &	 by
maintenance
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Table 4.13	 FMECA of the hydraulic servo transmission system
Name	 Hydraulic servo transmission system
Function	 Producing hydraulic power for hoisting
Failure rate	 265 (failures per million hours) 	 ______________ _______
Failure	 Failure	 Failure mode Effects	 on Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
numberrate	 _____________ _________________ _____________ ______
1	 0.094	 major leak	 loss of hoisting	 self-	 1
pressure;	 in	 annunciating
lowering motion,
load could fall.
2	 0.522	 minor leak
	 none	 self-	 4
annunciating
&	 by
maintenance
3	 0.013	 shaft failure	 loss of hoisting	 self-	 1
motion;	 no	 annunciating
output.	 &	 by
maintenance
4	 0.311	 no	 output	 loss of hoisting	 self-	 1
from	 the	 pressure;	 no	 annunciating
package	 output.	 &	 by
motor	 maintenance
5	 0.026	 hydraulic	 loss of hoisting	 self-	 1
short circuit	 pressure;	 in	 annunciating
lowering motion, &
	 by
load could fall, 	 maintenance
6	 0.026	 motor	 load holds.	 self-	 3
seizure	 annunciating
&	 by
maintenance
7	 0.008	 pipe burst	 major leak will	 self-	 1
happen; hoisting	 annunciating
pressure	 will
lose; in lowering
motion,	 load
_________ _________ _______________ could_fall. 	 _______________ _______
Table 4.14	 FMECA of the control system
Name	 Control system
Function	 Controlling the servo hydraulic transmission system
Failure rate
	
36 (failures per million hours)	 ______________ ______
Failure	 Failure	 Failure mode Effects	 on	 Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
number rate
1	 0.015	 major leak	 loss of hoisting	 self-	 2
pressure;	 in	 annunciating
lowering motion,
load could fall.
2	 0.3 10	 minor leak	 none,	 self-	 4
_________ _________ ________________ ____________________ annunciating _______
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Table 4.14	 FMECA of the control system (Continued) _____
Failure	 Failure Failure mode Effects 	 on Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
numberrate	 ______________ _________________ _____________ ______
0.365	 no	 output	 loss of hoisting	 by	 3
when	 pressure;	 in maintenance
required	 lowering motion,
load could fall.
4	 0.155	 control	 when	 de- by
output	 for energised	 by maintenance
"lower"	 slack
motion can rope/lowering
not	 be	 limit	 hoist,
closed when	 possibility of fall
required	 or damage of
snagged load.
5	 0.155	 control	 jib and boom by
output for could	 be maintenance
"hoist	 up"	 damaged.
motion can
not be
closed when
_________ _________ required	 ____________________ ______________ _______
iaiie 4.1	 FMLCA or e protection system
Name	 Protection system
Function	 Protecting the various consequences caused by hazards
Failure rate	 92 (failures per million hours) 	 ______________ _______
Failure	 Failure Failure mode Effects	 on Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
numberrate	 ______________ _________________ _____________ ______
1	 0.132	 failure	 of	 lost hoist motion.	 self-	 3
switch when	 annunciating
energised	 &	 by
maintenance
2	 0.066	 failure	 of	 possibility	 of	 by	 1
return	 for damage of jib.	 maintenance
hoisting up
when	 de-
energised
3	 0.530	 minor leak	 possibility of fall	 self-	 4
of snagged load,
	 annunciating
4	 0.046	 major leak
	 when brakes are	 self-	 1
applied,	 pump	 annunciating
goes	 to zero
stroke;
"emergency
release"	 and
"wave following"
_________ _________ ________________ disable. 	 _______________ _______
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Table 4.15	 FMECA of the protection system (Continued)
Failure	 Failure	 Failure mode Effects	 on Detecting	 Sev.
mode	 mode	 system	 method
number rate	 ______________ __________________ _____________ ______
5	 0.066	 failure	 of load could be	 by
emergency	 hoisted up or maintenance
stop	 lowered	 down
not as required
even	 in
emergency
situation.
6	 0.066	 failure	 of when	 de- by
hoisting up energised, pump maintenance
limit
	
	 remains at stroke
and motor runs.
otherwise	 no
effect.
7	 0.066	 failure	 of when	 de-	 by
hoisting	 energised	 by	 maintenance
down	 limit hoist, pump
limit/slack	 is not returned to
rope	 zero stroke.
prevention.
8	 0.028	 low	 boost hoisting pump is	 by
pressure	 allowed	 to	 maintenance
switch fails
	 continue running
to open at low pressures
with a risk of
cavitation
_______	
I	 damage.	 ____________ ______
* Sev. : Severity Class
For the convenience of constructing the Boolean representation tables of the
subsystems, the following notation is given to the failure modes with severity classes 1,
2 and 3, and the output states of the subsystems.
Hydraulic oil tank
HM1: major leak in the hydraulic oil tank
HM2: level gauge failure
H0 :	 the output variable of oil supply tank
H:	 no oil supply from the oil tank
H2 :	 supplying oil from the oil tank
Auxiliary system
AM 1: failure allowing contaminant into system
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AM2: filter blocked
AM3. blocking indicator fails to operate
AM4. major leak
AM5. no output from the control pump
A0 :	 the output variable of the auxiliary system
A1: no output (including supplying uncontaminated oil)
A2: supplying contaminated hydraulic oil
Control system
CM1: major leakage
CM2: no output when required
CM3: control output can not be closed for "lowering motion"
CM4: control output for "hoisting up" motion can not be closed when required
C0 :	 the output variable of the control system
C1: no output from the control system when required
C2: control signal for "hoisting up" can not be closed when required
C3: control signal for "lowering motion" can not be closed when required
Hydraulic servo transmission system
SM1: major leak
SM2: shaft failure
SM3: no output from the package motor
SM4: hydraulic short circuit
SM5: motor seizure
SM6: pipe burst
S:	 the output variable of the hydraulic servo transmission system
S 1 :	 hoisting up continuously not as required
S 2	 lowering continuously not as required
S 3 :	 no output from the package motor of the hydraulic servo transmission
system
Protection system
PM 1: failure of switch when energised
CHAPTER 4 - Modified Boolean Representation Method	 Page 98
PM2: failure to return for hoisting up when de-energised
PM3: major leak
PM4: failure of emergency stop
PM5: failure of hoist up limit
PM6: failure of hoist lower limit/slack rope prevention
PM7: low boost pressure switch fails to open
P0 :	 the output variable of the protection system
P1: no protection for emergency stop
P2: no protection for "hoist up" limit
P3: no protection for "hoist lower" limit/slack rope
P4: no low boost pressure protection
4.5.2 Construction of the Boolean Representation Tables and Assessment of the
Probabilities of Occurrence of the System Failure Events
The information produced from the FMECA of a subsystem can be utilised to construct
the Boolean representation table by studying each possible combination of input
attributes which are the possible failure modes with severity classes 1, 2 and 3. The
Boolean representation tables of the five subsystems are constructed as shown in Tables
4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20, respectively. In the constructed Boolean representation
tables, N stands for "Failure noi happening" of a ariab1e s.aie ariei F stanàs or
"Failure happening
Table 4.16 Hydraulic oil tank
HM 1 HM2 H0
F	 F	 H1
N	 *	 H2
*	 N	 H2
Table 4.17	 Auxiliary system
AM1 '2 AM3 AM4 AM5 H0 A0
*	 F	 F	 *	 *	 *	 A1
*	 *	 *	 F	 *	 H1	 A1
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Table 4.17	 Auxiliary system (Continued)
1	 '2	 3	 4	 AM S	 110	 A0
*	 *	 *	 *	 F	 H1 A2
F	 N	 *	 N	 N	 '2 A2
F	 *	 N	 N	 N	 H2 A2
Table 4.18	 Control system
CM 1 CM 2 CM3 CM4 A0 L
*
	 F	 *	 *	 *	 Cl
*
	 *	 *	 *	 A1
F	 *	 *	 *	 A2 C1
*	 *	 F	 *	 *	 C2
*	 *	 *	 F
	
*
	
C3
Table 4.19	 Protection system
A0 C0 PM 1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 PM 6 PM7 P0
*	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 P1
A1	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 P1
*
	
C2 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
A1	 *	 F	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 P2
A1	
-3
	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 P3
A2	 c	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 P3
A1	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 P4
Table 4.20	 Hydraulic servo transmission system
A0 C0 P0 SM 1 SM2 SM 3 SM4 SM 5 SM6 So
*
	
C 2
	 	
*	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 SI
*
	
C l	P2	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
	
SI
A2	 *	 P2	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 1
*
	 (	 P3	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 S2
*
	
C i	 P3	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
	
S2
A1	 c	 p3	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
*
	
Ic	 p3	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 S2
*
	
Ic	 P3	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 S2
*
	
p	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 S2
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Table 4.20	 Hydraulic servo transmission system (Continued)
A0 C0 Pe SM 1 SM 2 SM 3 SM4 SM5 SM6 S
	
*	 *	 p3	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 S2
	*	 *	 p	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 52
	
*	 *	 ,	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
'3	 "2
	
*	 *	 p1	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 S2
	
*	 *	 p1	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 S2
	*	 *	 p	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 S2
	
A1	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 S3
	
A1	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *	 *	 S3
	
A1	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 *
	
A1	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 S3
	
A2	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 F	 *	 S3
	
A2	 *	 p	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
The failure events of the hydraulic hoist transmission system are the same as those of
the hydraulic servo transmission system. Therefore, the construction of the system
Boolean representation table stans from the hydraulic servo transmission system. The
CRM is constructed as follows to describe the subsystems relationships.
01000
00111
CRM= 0 0 0 1 1
00001
00000
After the CRM, the subsystem Boolean representation tables and the failure data of the
variables have been prepared in the input file, the developed software can be used to
produce the final Boolean representation table of the hydraulic hoist transmission
system shown in Table 4.21 and to calculate the probability of occurrence of each
system top event.
Table 4.21	 The final system Boolean representation table
	
HM	 AM	 CM	 PM	 SM
	12	 12345	 1234	 1234567	 123456
	
S
	
**
	
*****
	
** *	 SI
	**
	
*FF* *	 ****	 *F**F**	 SI
	FF
	
* *
	
* * **
	
******	 S
	**
	
*FF**	 *	 F* * * * *	 SI
	FF
	
* * * F*	 *	 F* * * * *	 Si
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Table 4.21	 The final system Boolean representation table (Continued)
HM
12
FF
N*
*N
AM	 CM	 PM	 SM
12345	 1234	 1234567	 123456
* * * *F
FN*NN
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*
*
* *F*
*
**F*
*******
*******
*******
*******
Is
*** *F* 1-
* * *	 SI
* * * *F *	 SI
* * * *F*	 SI
* * * *F*	 Si
**
FF
FF
N*
N*
**
FF
N*
*N
**
FF
*N
N*
*N
**
FF
N*
**
FF
N*
**
FF
*FF* *
***F*
****F
FN*NN
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*****
****F
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*****
* * * *F
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
* * *
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
* * *
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*****
* * *
***F	 *******	 ******	 S2
***F	 *******	 ******	 S2
***F	 F****F*	 ******	 S2
***F	 F****F*	 ******	 52
***F	 F****F*	 ******	 S2
***F	 F****F*	 ******	 S2
***F	 F****F*	 ******
	
FF*****	 *F****	 S2
F**	 FF*****	 *p****	 S2
F**	 FF*****	 *F****	 S2
F**	 FF*****	 *F****
F**	 FF*****	 *F****
	
S2
****	 F******	 F*****	 S2
****	 F******	 F*****	 S2
****	 F******	 F*****	 S2
****	 F******	 F*****	 S2
****	 F******	 F*****	 52
****	 F******	 *F****	 52
****	 F******	 *F****	 S2
****	 F******	 *F****	 52
****	 F******	 *F****	 S2
****	 F******	 *F****	 S2
****	 F******	 **F***	 S2
****	 F******	 **F***	 S2
****	 F******	 **F***	 S2
****	 F******	 **F***	 S2
****	 F******	 **F***	 S2
F******	 ***F**	 S2
F******	 ***F**
Is
S2
S2
S2
S2
S2
52
S2
S2
52
S2
52
S2
S2
S2
S2
S2
S2
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TabJe 4.21	 The final system Boolean representation table (Continued)
AM	 CM	 PM	 SM
12345	 1234	 1234567	 123456
HM
12
*N
N*
*N
**
FF
N*
*N
**
FF
*N
N*
*N
**
**
FF
**
FF
**
FF
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
* ** * *
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
* * *
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*FF* *
* * *F*
*FF**
***F*
*FF* *
* * *F*
****
** * *
****
****
****
****
****
* * *F
*
* * F*
*
* *F*
* *F*
F* * * * * *
F**** **
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
F* *** * *
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
F* *****
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
F* * * * * *
*******
*******
*******
*******
* * F * *
***F**
* * *F* *
**
* * * *F*
*** *F*
* * * *F *
* * **F*
* * * *
*****F
*****F
F* * * * *
F*****
F* * * * *
**F***
**F** *
* * * **F
*****F
**
FF
**
FF
**
FF
**
FF
FF
N*
N*
FF
*FF**
***F*
*FF**
***F*
*FF* *
* * * F*
*FF* *
***F*
* * * *F
FN*NN
FN*NN
F*NNN
F*NNN
*****
****
****
****
****
****
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
*******
F*****
F* *** *
* *F* * *
* *F* * *
** *
* * *
* * *F* *
* * *F* *
* *
* * * *F *
* * *
* * * *F*
* * *
******
S3
S3
S3
S3
S3
S3
S3
53
S3
S3
S3
S3
53
53
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The failure probabilities for S, S 2 and S 3 at time t = 10000 hours are equal to 0.101,
0.015 and 0.039, respectively.
The possible consequences resulting from the occurrence of S, S 2 and 53 can be
described as follows:
S: Possibility of damage to the boom, ranging from minor distortion to total
collapse (buckling). Possible rupture of the hoisting rope resulting in a
dropped load. A dropped load may result in a total destruction of the lifted
load, damage to the surrounding structure and other goods within the
operating radius and possible death or severe injury to personnel.
S2: A dropped load resulting in the probable consequences described in S1.
S3: A dropped load resulting in the probable consequences described in S1.
The safety information produced above can be used by the designer to determine where
design actions are required to eliminate or control serious system failure events, and
can also be utilised to prepare maintenance policies as will be described in Chapter 8.
4.6 Discussion and Application
Compared to the fault tree method, the MBRM has the following advantages:
i. It can deal with engineering systems with multiple state variables and
feedback loops.
ii. Top events of a large engineering system with a relatively higher level of
innovation can be identified.
iii. Omissions of failure causes are less likely than in fault tree analysis.
iv. The information produced from FMECA can be used directly for Boolean
representation modelling.
In addition, the MBRM can be used together with other formal safety analysis
techniques such as fault tree analysis, qualitative reasoning analysis and the Monte
Carlo simulation. The use of the MBRM is greatly extended by such combinations.
These combinations are briefly discussed as follows:
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The inductive MBRM can be combined with the inductive qualitative
reasoning approach to form a mixed modelling methodology in which
qualitative reasoning is applied at the component level and the MBRM is
used at the system level [4.19]. This will be studied in more detail in the next
chapter.
ii. The MBRM can be used together with the fault tree analysis as discussed in
Chapter 3. This would involve partial "top down" fault tree analysis to focus
upon areas of interest and partial "bottom up" Boolean representation analysis
to explore the areas at a greater level of detail [4.21].
iii. The MBRM can also be used together with the Monte Carlo simulation
techniques. The probabilities of occurrence of each top event and each
associated cut set can be simulated on the basis of the obtained Boolean
representation table [4.16]. This will be attempted in Chapter 6.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
A generalised modified Boolean representation modelling methodology is developed in
this chapter. In the methodology, the information produced from a FMECA is directly
and efficiently used to construct the Boolean representation tables of components of a
system. After all the Boolean representation tables of the components have been
constructed and the CRM has been produced, the rules for simplification, elimination of
intermediate variables and deduction of extra prime implicants are applied to obtain the
final system Boolean representation table. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can
then be carried out to assess the probabilities of occurrence of the system top events
and the associated prime implicants.
The modified Boolean representation method can be combined with other formal safety
analysis techniques. This will be demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER 5
Qualitative Reasoning
Applied to Safety Modelling
SUMMARY
This chapter reviews some typical qualitative reasoning methods originally developed in
the field of Artificial Intelligence (A.!.), and discusses their applicability and limitation
with respect to safety modelling. Based on De Kleer's method, a modified qualitative
reasoning method is proposed to describe the behaviour of a system.
The proposed qualitative reasoning method can be applied to failure propagation
analysis. A "Level Structured Digraph", which may be effectively used in the prediction
of failure propagation, is proposed together with a failure propagation analysis model
incorporating the qualitative reasoning method.
The proposed qualitative reasoning method is then combined with the MBRM to form a
flexible mixed safety modelling methodology. In the mixed modelling methodology, the
qualitative reasoning method is used to obtain the precise input-output relations of each
component at the component level and the MBRM is then employed to process the
information obtained to produce a description of the total system behaviour. The overall
model and associated algorithms are described and tested together with the
corresponding computer software. An illustrative example is used to demonstrate the
proposed mixed modelling methodology.
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5.1 Introduction
Qualitative reasoning about the behaviour of a system is dealt with in Artificial
Intelligence (A.I.) literature [5.3][5.6][5.8]. In general, the qualitative modelling of the
behaviour of a system starts with the description of the structure and produces
interpretations which describe the behaviour. Qualitative reasoning concerns reasoning
about the behaviour of a system in nonquantitative terms using words and concepts
rather than numbers. This is in harmony with the fact that human beings can reason
very successfully about physical systems where the knowledge they have is not
quantitative but qualitative [5.18]. Qualitative reasoning may be extremely helpful when
the values of system parameters are not completely known [5.18].
Very often in design, a quantitative representation of the behaviour of a system may not
be possible because, for example, some parameters in the describing differential
equations may not be completely and exactly identified. On the other hand, the
description of an engineering design, particularly in the early stages, is often more
qualitative than quantitative and there is often a partial or total absence of numerical
information for quantitative safety analysis. Therefore, a system may have to be
described qualitatively.
The possible behaviour of a system can be predicted from its respective constraint
equations using qualitative reasoning. A set of constraint equations (qualitative
equations and filtering equations) describing the relevant structural relationships in the
system may be derived by examination of the physical structure. The possible
behaviour of the system may then be produced by generating a set of possible
interpretations from the derived constraint equations and initial conditions [5.18].
Qualitative reasoning of the behaviour of a system is an inductive process in which the
behaviour of each component, including the tendency of states and state transitions in
detail, can be explored and the behaviour of the system can then be predicted with
respect to the relationships between the components. The information explored at the
component level may be used to conduct the analysis at the system level. The
qualitative reasoning technique may be effectively applied to failure propagation
analysis [5.18] [5.20].
As described in Chapter 4, the MBRM is also an inductive approach and is capable of
dealing with variables with multiple states. There are many similarities between the
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qualitative reasoning method and the MBRM. In the later sections, the two approaches
are compared and integrated to form a flexible mixed safety modelling methodology in
which the MBRM is used to process the information produced using the qualitative
reasoning method at the component level in order to produce a description of total
system behaviour. The methodology may even be used to model a system for which
complete input-output relations of the components are difficult to obtain using the
MBRM.
5.2 Literature Survey of Qualitative Reasoning
Qualitative reasoning of the behaviour of a system is intended to yield a corresponding
abstraction of its behaviour. Qualitative constraints used in a qualitative reasoning
analysis are similar to the corresponding quantitative differential equations. A diagram
of the abstract levels of modelling physical systems is shown in Figure 5.1.
The three principal qualitative reasoning methods developed in the A.I. field can be
summarised as those developed by Forbus, Kuipers and De Kleer.
5.2.1 Forbus' Approach
Forbus' qualitative process theory provides a representational framework for a certain
class of deductions about the physical world [5.6]. His qualitative process theory asserts
that processes are the mechanisms that directly cause changes. Reasoning about
processes, their effects and limits forms an important part of the commonsense physical
reasoning.
Forbus uses the idea of a process as something that acts through time to change the
parameters of objects in a situation. Simple examples of processes include flows of heat
or fluid; boiling; motion and compression.
Forbus' qualitative theory is process-based. A process description may include
individuals, preconditions, quantity conditions and influences [5.6]. Forbus' qualitative
theory gives a general framework for process system modelling.
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Physical system
1
Differential
equations
> Actual behaviour
1
Numerical or analytical solutions 	 Quantitative
behaviour description
"I
Qualitative	 Qualitative reasoning
constraints	
_________________________
behaviour description
Figure 5.1 The abstract levels of modelling physical systems
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5.2.2 Kuipers' Approach
Kuipers' qualitative reasoning is regarded as constructing qualitative constraint
functions, solving these functions and interpreting the results in qualitative terms. Each
physical parameter in Kuipers' qualitative reasoning model is a continuously
differentiable real-valued function of time, and its value at any given point in time is
specified qualitatively in terms of the relationship with a totally ordered set of landmark
values which may be either numerical (e.g. zero) or symbolic where a landmark value
is a chosen value within which a process variable changes. Kuipers' approach allows
new landmarks to be discovered during the qualitative reasoning process. As the
qualitative reasoning proceeds, Kuipers' dynamic approach can discover and add new
landmark values to the sequences.
Inputs to a Kuipers' qualitative reasoning analysis may include following information of
a component or a system.
i. A set of symbols representing the functions in the component or system.
ii. A set of qualitative constraints applied to the function symbols.
iii. An ordered set of landmark values for each function.
iv. Upper and lower range limits for each function.
v. Initial time point.
After the input data is prepared, Kuipers' qualitative reasoning algorithm QSIM can be
used to qualitatively reason about the system behaviour [5.8]. After an initial state is
placed on ACTIVE whose successors need to be determined, QSIM repeatedly takes an
ACTIVE state and generates all possible success states, filtering out states that violate
some consistency criteria [5.8]. Because the next state may not uniquely be
determined, QSIM builds a tree of states representing the possible behaviours of the
mechanism. Kuipers' qualitative reasoning repeats the reasoning process until ACTIVE
becomes empty or the resource limit is exceeded [5.8].
Kuipers' method is function-based.
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5.2.3 De Kleer's Approach
In De Kleer's approach, the behaviour of a physical system can be described by the
values of the variables such as forces, velocities, positions, pressures and temperatures
at each time interval. The essence of his qualitative reasoning physics is regarded as
modelling a physical situation, solving the qualitative equations, and then interpreting
the results in qualitative terms. Every physical situation is some type of physical system
or machine made up of individual components, each component contributing to the
behaviour of the overall system with respect to the relationships with other components.
De Kleer's qualitative reasoning produces a description of the behaviour of a system in
terms of the allowable states and the values of the system's variables, and the direction
in which these variables are changing [5.3]. Quasi-static approximation is used to
ignore behaviour of short enough duration. The quantity space of a qualitative variable
consists of only three values: +, - and 0. ax is used as abbreviation for dx/dt. The
behaviour of a component is divided into different regions within each of which
different qualitative equations are involved [5.3].
In De Kleer's approach, a state diagram shows the state transition of the behaviour of a
system. Constructing the state diagram is analogous to solving a set of simultaneous
differential equations characterising the behaviour of a physical system. The structure of
a state transition diagram can be used to answer questions about whether something
could happen.
A programme called ENVISION has been developed by De Kleer. ENVISION takes a
description of the physical structure of a system and a library of component models,
constructs the model for the overall system, solves the model and produces
explanations. ENVISION can be used to construct all possible behaviour and all cause
and effect relations.
De Kleer's method is device-based.
5.2.4 Applications of Qualitative Reasoning
Qualitative reasoning methods have the ability to predict the qualitative behaviour of a
system from the qualitative models based on incomplete knowledge of the process
parameters and functionalities [5.1]. The possible applications of qualitative reasoning
methods have been extensively discussed in the literature, especially in the areas of
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expert system construction and chemical plant design. For instance, Oyeleye and
Kramer have used a qualitative reasoning method to predict the steady-state
measurement patterns generated as a result of process malfunctions [5.13]. The possible
applications of qualitative reasoning methods have also been studied in the areas of
safety analysis. Waters and Ponton have discussed the possible applications of
qualitative reasoning in a mixed top-down and the bottom-up safety analysis framework
in which partial top-down fault tree analysis is used to focus upon areas of interest and
partial bottom-up qualitative reasoning is used to explore the areas at a level of detail
[5.20]. The mixed approach may be useful for a user to choose the balance between the
two techniques in order to exploit the advantages of each [5.20].
In addition, qualitative reasoning methods can also be used for performance monitoring
and fault diagnosis. A method, which uses the knowledge derived from a qualitative
model of the monitored system to predict the system's temporal behaviour for fault
diagnosis, has been developed to assess any departure from the expected behaviour
[5.111.
5.2.5 Applicability and Limitation of Qualitative Reasoning
Qualitative reasoning theory can be used to draw several types of basic qualitative
deductions, including describing what is happening in a physical situation, reasoning
about the combined effects of several processes and predicting when processes will start
and stop. The resons why qualitative reasoning theory seems to be useful are [5.10]:
i. Sometimes a system may not be suitably described using a quantitative
model.
ii. It can guide quantitative modelling.
iii. It can be used for human reasoning.
iv. It can make computers "clever", that is, it can give expert systems some
commonsense knowledge.
The complexity of qualitative reasoning, to a certain extent, depends on the number of
dimensions. Consequently, the difference between low dimensionality problems
considered in the A.I. literature and high dimensionality problems that arise in real
industrial processes must be considered. However, some of the representational
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techniques used in qualitative reasoning may effectively be applied to system safety
modelling.
A qualitative reasoning is a bottom-up process and uses a clearer notation of system
states than top-down approaches [5.20]. It may be effectively applied to the prediction
of failure propagation since its principle is quite similar to the one used in the
traditional failure propagation analysis [5.17].
The possible applications of qualitative reasoning in safety analysis have been
extensively discussed [5.3][5.6][5.8], but not many practical applications are available
in the literature. The reason probably lies in efficiency. The complexity of high
dimensionality problems limits the applicability even further.
Consequently, direct applications of the qualitative reasoning technique are likely to be
of limited value as a practical safety modelling tool. However, this method can be
modified and used together with other formal safety modelling methods to effectively
exploit its advantages.
5.3 Proposed Qualitative Reasoning Framework for Safety Modelling
It can be noted from the above study that De Kleer's method is a device-based and
quasi-steady-state approach and Kuipers' method is a dynamic function-based approach.
In De Kleer's method, the behaviour of a system is determined from that of each of the
constituent components rather than from more "structural" knowledge of the system.
However, Kuipers' method requires every variable to be represented as a continuous
function of time. Kuipers' method is probably more formalised than De Kleer's but is
more complex and less well suited to quasi-steady state problems. Since a device-based
and quasi-steady state approach is often used to give reasonable answers for less work
in system safety modelling [5.18], De Kleer's method is chosen for further exploration.
De Kleer's method is still too complex and it is difficult to directly apply the method to
system safety modelling. Therefore, a simple and effective qualitative modelling
approach is required.
Based on De Kleer's method, a qualitative reasoning framework is proposed as shown
in Figure 5.2. In the proposed framework, the qualitative equations and filtering
equations for the components of a system are first derived, and the qualitative reasoning
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Figure 5.2 A proposed qualitative reasoning framework
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for the behaviour of the components is then undertaken. The information developed at
the component level can be used for the analysis at the system level.
Each component of a system can be viewed as a simple information processor. The
overall behaviour of a system can be produced by studying causal interactions between
the components. A component model characterises the possible behaviour a component
can generate. A component model can be described by a set of qualitative equations
and respective filtering equations. Qualitative equations can be obtained from either
commonsense knowledge or differential equations. In general, the rules for transferring
a quantitative differential equation to a qualitative one are described as follows:
i. [E 1 E2] => [E1][E2]
ii. [O][E ] => [0]
iii. [+][E] => [El
iv. [-][E] => -[El
where [E] represents the qualitative value of the variable E.
For example, the flow rate through an orifice is given by [5.3]:
Q=CAI2P7	 P>o
where Q is the flow rate through the orifice, C is the discharge coefficient of the orifice,
A is the cross-section area, P is the pressure across the valve, and p is the the mass
density of the fluid. The above model can be transformed as follows:
[QI = [C1[A ][	 7p = [+][+]['17] = [P]
The qualitative equation )Q = P is then obtained.
Care should be taken to introduce qualitative equations. It has not been determined yet
as to how many qualitative equations are actually necessary for effective reasoning
about the behaviour of a system [5.18][5.20]. There is a motivation for having all the
equations independent (i.e. no redundant equations involved).
The interpretations of a component can be produced by solving the qualitative
equations. The interpretations produced can be used to assist in the construction of fault
trees or Boolean representation modelling for safety analysis [5.18].
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The proposed qualitative reasoning model of a component is described as follows:
Component:
Initial conditions:
Normal:	 Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Failed:	 Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
The qualitative equations of a component are constructed under two distinct conditions
which are Normal and Failed. The quantity space for each variable in qualitative
equations consists of three values: +, - and 0. The symbol + represents the case when
the quantity is positive, the symbol 0 represents the case when the quantity is zero, and
the symbol - represents the case when the quantity is negative.
The algebra of the qualitative reasoning is described as follows:
<1> for the qualitative equation i3x = aY + az
XIY	 z
+ + +
+
	
+
	 0
+ 0	 +
0
	
0
0
-	 0
#	 +
-
	 +
where # stands for "undetermined".
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<2> for the qualitative equation ax = a
	 az
ax a
	 az
+ + +
-	 +	 -
o	 +	 0
o	 0	 +
o	 0	 -
o	 0	 0
-	
-	 +
o	 -	 0
It is noted that the states of ax in <1> can not be determined when a and az have
different signs. This ambiguity problem can only be solved by adding the proper
filtering equations.
Filtering equations can be determined by comparing the relative importance of two
variables affecting the component behaviour. For example, if a is a more important
factor than az, then [-1 = [-1 + [+J and [+] = [+] + [-1 can be obtained as the filtering
equations.
By studying the behaviour of the components and their relationships, the system
behaviour can be qualitatively predicted. Obtaining the total set of interpretations for a
complex system may be time-consuming {5.18][5.20].
5.4 The Applications of the Qualitative Reasoning Method to Failure
Propagation Analysis
5.4.1 A "Level Structured Digraph" for Failure Propagation Analysis
The aim of a failure propagation analysis is to determine all the failure propagation
paths and the associated consequences. Failure propagation analysis is very important
for improving the safety of a product by safer operation. For example, during operation
of a MTO product, if a sensor shows some parameter beyond the range or an alarm is
activated, the operator can use the knowledge produced from the failure propagation
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analysis to identify the possible consequences and can then decide what actions need to
be taken to avoid potential accident situations.
A failure always propagates from one level to another in a system. Therefore, a 'Level
Structured Digraph" for failure propagation analysis is proposed as shown in Figure 5.3
and described as follows.
Failure propagation analysis can be carried out at different levels within a system. Each
level in the failure propagation model may contain a structured representation of the
system under particular operational considerations. Each structure may contain a set of
components. The failure propagation analysis can operate on an individual structure of
the hierarchical failure propagation model and track along all feasible paths and the
associated consequences. The information produced at a lower level may be used as
input data for the analysis at the next level. The failure analysis is initially started from
the failure point indicated by an alarm or a sensor.
If high resolution is not required, failure propagation analysis may be confined to the
lower levels of the hierarchal structure to prevent slow analysis caused by the inclusion
of an excess of detail.
In the framework shown in Figure 5.3, special details have not been specified such as
how to model the system for failure propagation analysis with respect to the different
analysis methods and system structures and also how to select the number of levels and
the resolution at each level. This framework is considered to be general enough to
accommodate many failure analysis methods and various systems. In the next section,
the proposed qualitative reasoning method is embedded into this framework to conduct
failure propagation analysis.
5.4.2 Failure Propagation Analysis Model Incorporating the Qualitative Reasoning
Method
A failure propagation analysis model incorporating the qualitative reasoning method is
proposed as shown in Figure 5.4. The qualitative reasoning framework (Figure 5.2) can
be applied to construct such a failure propagation model. Given initial conditions, the
state transitions of the variables in the system can be analysed. How failures propagate
in the system may also be investigated.
Level2
Level I
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Figure 5.3 A Level Structured Digraph" for failure propagation analysis
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Assumptions and simplifications are necessary for the convenience of modelling
complex MTO products for failure propagation analysis. The aim of making
assumptions and simplifications is to allow the failure propagation analysis to be carried
out effectively and economically. The following typical assumptions and simplifications
may usefully be made for building a failure propagation analysis model.
i. Components or subsystems at the same analysis level are considered to be
independent.
ii. Alarms and sensors are considered to be fault free.
iii. At each point in time, only one alarm is activated or only one sensor shows
some parameter beyond the acceptable range.
iv. All failures are persistent.
5.4.3 An Example
Figure 5.5 shows a heat exchanger of a diesel engine cooling water system. Suppose
the temperature of output sea water is a constant and not considered in the modelling.
If alarm 1 is activated, the initial conditions can be obtained which are 37, = ^
(increasing), S, = 0 (unchanging) and T, = 0 (unchanging). The heat exchanger can be
modelled as follows:
Component
Initial conditions:
Normal
Failed
Heat exchanger
T1 =+	 )S1,=O	 T=O
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
where T0 is the outlet temperature, 7', is the inlet temperature, S, is the flow rate of sea
water to the heat exchanger and T is the temperature of sea water to the heat
exchanger.
If the heat exchanger is in "Normal" condition, we can deduce from the above model
that, under the given initial conditions, T0 is +. The diagram of the variable changes is
shown in the Figure 5.6. Internal system status can clearly be seen. T0 can be taken as
an input for the analysis at the next level.
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Figure 5.5 An example of failure propagation analysis
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Figure 5.6 The diagram of the variable changes
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5.5 Comparison and Integration of the Qualitative Reasoning Method
and MBRM
5.5.1 A Mixed Modelling Approach for Safety Analysis
As described in Chapter 4, the usual way to model a component using the MBRM is to
study the logical combinations of the input attributes leading to the possible output
states. However, it may be difficult at times to choose input-output relations to produce
a precise Boolean representation model. It is at this point that the information produced
from qualitative reasoning may be used to assist in the construction of the precise
Boolean representation models for components.
Two methods are compared as follows:
i. Both methods work in an inductive way.
ii. In both methods, a variable is described in terms of several discrete states.
iii. Both methods have strong inferencing power.
iv. An interpretation in qualitative reasoning is, by nature, similar to a prime
implicant in the modified Boolean representation.
v. Both methods are device-based.
It is noticeable that there are a lot of similarities between the qualitative reasoning
method and the MBRM. A mixed modelling philosophy is therefore proposed in which
the qualitative reasoning method is used to obtain the precise input-output relations of
each component at the component level and the MBRM is used to process the
information obtained, to produce all the prime implicants associated with all possible
top events.
The proposed mixed modelling methodology can make use of the advantages of both
the qualitative reasoning method and the MBRM. It may be used as an automatic
modelling tool for safety modelling. Given the components and their relationships in a
system, the final system Boolean representation description can conveniently be
produced.
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5.5.2 Software
A software written in MODSIM II' has been developed to obtain the interpretations for
components. Only three states (i.e. +, 0 and -) of each component can be dealt with.
Interpretations of each component are obtained by processing the corresponding
qualitative equations and filtering equations. The software described in chapter 4 has
been combined with this one to form a qualitative reasoning software which can be
used to study the obtained interpretations of components and their relationships to
obtain the system failure events and respective prime implicants. The flowchart for the
software is shown in Figure 5.7.
In this chapter, component models are constructed by users rather than obtained from
the model library. It would be worthwhile for ease of analysis to build a model library
which can contain the qualitative models of components so that given a component's
description a qualitative model can be directly obtained by referring to the model
library.
5.5.3 An Example
A cooling water system for a marine diesel engine is functionally shown in Figure 5.8.
This system is used to supply cooling water for a marine diesel engine system.
The following assumptions are made for the convenience of analysis.
• Each component in the system normally works under an equilibrium state,
i.e., if all inputs a(input 1), (input 2), ---, (input n) are 0, then d(output) is 0.
• Each component in the system can only work under either Normal (N) or
Failed (F) condition.
H, S, C, M, F and V represent the internal modes of Heat Exchanger, Sensor,
Controller, Set Point Monitor, Water Filter and Valve, respectively (as shown in Figure
5.8). The notation of other variables for this cooling water system is described as
follows:
Temperature of sea water to the control valve
Sm:	 Input to the control valve
Output of the controller
Output of the temperature sensor
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Figure 5.7 The function of the qualitative reasoning software
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Figure 5.8 A cooling water system for a marine diesel engine
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T0:
	 Temperature of fresh water from the heat exchanger
S: Flow rate of sea water to the heat exchanger
TI:
	 Temperature of sea water to the heat exchanger
T: Temperature of fresh water to the filter
7;:	 Temperature of fresh water to the heat exchanger
P:
	 Input to the set point monitor
T0 (k—i): Temperature of fresh water from the heat exchauger becai c€ 'it 1
Time interval number
5,,,, S,, S, 7;, S and 7; are intermediate variables and the others are primary variables.
The components of the cooling system are modelled as follows using the described
qualitative reasoning method.
Filter (L)
L = Normal (N):
L = Failed (F):
Heat exchanger (H)
H = Normal (N):
H = Failed (F):
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
=
none
= +
none
= T, - S,, +
T,[±]—T,[±]=O; S[±]—T1[±]=[±];
T1[±] —S[±] = 0
none
Sensor (S)
S = Normal (N):	 Qualitative equations:	 =T0(k-1)
Filtering equations: 	 none
S = Failed (F):	 Qualitative equations: 	 Ss = 0
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Filtering equations: 	 none
Controller (C)
C = Normal (N):	 Qualitative equations: = ass
(for proportional controller)
none
as = 0
none
Filtering equations:
C = Failed (F):	 Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Set point monitor (M)
M = Normal (N):
M = Failed (F):
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
Qualitative equations:
Filtering equations:
aSm = as + a;'
aSm 1±] =
	 [±] + 1D 1±]
aSm = 0
none
Valve (V)
V = Normal (N):	 Qualitative equations: 	 as = aSm
aT = aT
FIltering equations:	 none
V = Failed (F):	 Qualitative equations:	 as = -
aT:
Filtering equations:	 none
The Boolean representation tables of the components of the cooling water system can
automatically be generated from the obtained qualitative models using the developed
software, and are shown in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.
Table 5.1 The Boolean representation table of the water filter
L	 aT•	 T,
F *	 +
N +	 +
NO	 0
N -	
H aT as	 aT
F
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
*
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
*
0
0
0
+
+
+
0
0
0
+
+
+
0
0
0
+
+
+
*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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Table 5.2 The Boolean representation table of the heat exchanger
aT0
+
0
+
+
0
+
+
0
+
0
+
0
+
+
+
+
+
Table 5.3 The Boolean representation table of the sensor
S
	
T0 (k—I)
	
as
F *
	
0
N +	 +
N 0
	
0
N
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Table 5.4 The Boolean representation table of the controller
C as3 as
F *
	
0
N + +
N 0
	
0
N
Table 5.5 The Boolean representation table of the set point monitor
M as a
F
	
*
	
*
	
0
N 0
	
0
N 0
N 0
	
+ +
N
N
	
0
N
	
+ +
N +	 0 +
N +
N +	 + +
Table 5.6 The Boolean representation table of the valve
V asm as
F *
N +	 +
N 0
	
0
N
V
	
aT,,	 aT,
F *
N +	 +
N 0
	
0
N
where * stands for "Don't care".
The final Boolean representation table can then be produced as shown in Table 5.7
using the software developed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 5.7 The final system Boolean representation table
No. H L àTa V M C S	 T0 (k—I) P aT
N N +	 00
N N -	 00
N N +	 00
*	 *	 *	
-	 0
*	 *	 0	 0 +
* F *	 0 +
* F *	 00
*	 *	 0	 00
F * *	 0 +
F *	 *	 00
*	 F	 *	 0-
F	 *	 *	 0-
*	 *	 0	 0-
*	 *	 *	 * +
*	 F	 *	 0-
F	 *	 *	 0-
*	 *	 *	 *	 0
*	 *	 *	 *	 -
*	 *	 0	 0-
*	 *	 *	 *	 -
N N +
N N -
N F *
N N -
N N -
N N -
N NO
N NO
N N -
N NO
N N +
N N +
N N +
N N -
N F *
N F *
N NO
N N +
N F *
N F *
N N +
N N -
N N -
N N +
N F *
N N -
N NO
N N -
N N -
N N *
N NO
N F *
N NO
N N -
N N -
N N
N N
N N
N N
N *
N *
N *
N *
N *
N *
N *
N *
N *
N F
N *
N *
N F
N F
N *
N F
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N *
N N
N *
N N
* N
N N +
N N *
* N *
N *	 -
N N +
N F *
N N +
N N -
N N +
N F *
* NO
*	 *	 0
N N *
*	 *	 +
*	 *	 0
0-
+ +
+ -
0-
*	 -
0 *
*	 -
0 *
+ -
0-
+ -
+	 -
+ *
0-
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Table 5.7 The final system Boolean representation table (Contit
No. H L aT	 V M C S aT0(k-1) P aT
iued)
aT0
16 N N -	 N N *N 0
17 N N 0	 N N * * *	 + +
18	 N N 0	 N N * * *	 + 0
19 N N 0	 N N * F *	 + *
20	 N N 0	 N *	 * F *	 0 -
21	 N N -	 N N * F *	 + *
22 N F *	 N N * F *	 + -
23	 N N -	 * N * F *	 0 -
24	 N N 0	 N *	 F * *	 0 -
25	 N N -	 * N F * *	 o -
26 N N 0	 N N F * *	 + *
27	 N F *	 N N F * *	 + -
28	 N N -	 N N F * *	 + *
29	 N N -	 F N * F *	 0 *
30	 N N -	 F F	 *	 *	 *	 * -
31	 N N -	 F N * * 0	 0 *
32	 N N 0	 N F * * *	 * -
33	 N N -	 F N F * *	 0 *
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
N * -
N N +
N N +
N N +
N *	 -
N N +
N N +
N N -
N N +
N NO
N N +
N * 0
* N +
* N +
N F *
N * 0
N F *
N N N N -
N N N * +
N N N *
N N * N +
N N N N *
N N N *
N N * * +
N N * F *
N N N * +
F N N NO
N N F * *
N N N NO
N N N F *
N N N N -
N N N N -
F N N F *
N N N * -
O +
+ +
+ +
- +
-0
O +
- +
-0
O *
O +
+ +
O *
O *
00
-	 +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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Table 5.7 The final system Boolean representation table (Contir
No. H L	 T11 V M C S	 T0 (k-i) P aT
18	 N * 0	 N N * N -	 - -
19	 N F *	 N N * * +	 0 +
20	 * N +	 N N N F *	 - -
21	 N * 0	 N N * N +	 - -
22 * N 0	 N N N N -	 0 *
23 N * 0	 N N N N *	 - 0
24 * N +	 N N N F *	 - 0
25	 N N +	 F N * * 0	 0 *
26 N N +	 F N * F *	 0 *
27	 * * *	 N N N N +	 - +
28 N N +	 N N * F *	 Q +
29	 * N +	 N N * N 0	 0 0
30 N * 0	 N N N F *	 0 +
31	 * N +	 N N * N 0	 0 +
32	 *	 N -	 N N F * *	 - +
33	 N N +	 N N * F *	 0 0
34 N F *	 N N * * 0	 0 +
35	 * F *	 N N N N -	 0 *
36	 * * 0	 N N N N -	 0 *
37	 * N 0	 N N F * *	 - 0
38	 * N 0	 N N N F *	 - *
39	 * N 0	 F N F * *	 0 0
40	 N * 0	 N N F * *	 - -
41	 N * 0	 F N * F *	 0 *
42	 * F *	 N N * * *	 + +
43	 N * 0	 F N * * 0	 0 *
44 N F *	 N N * F *	 0 +
45	 * N +	 F N F * *	 0 *
46 * N +	 N N F * *	 0 +
47 * N 0	 N N F * *	 0 +
48	 * F *	 N N N F *	 - *
49	 *	 F *	 N *	 N N *	 - 0
50	 N F *	 N *	 * * 0	 0 0
51	 *	 N +	 N N F * *	 0 0
52	 *	 p	 *	 N N F *	 *	 -	 -
53	 *	 F	 *	 N N	 *	 N *	 -	 -
iued)
aT0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
N
N
N
N
*
*
N
N
*
*
N
*
*
*
*
*
F
F
F
F
F
*
F
F
N
F
F
F
F
N
F
F
F
*
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
0
*
*
*
*
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Table 5.7 The final system Boolean representation table (Continued)
No. H L ai	 V MC S	 T0 (k—i) P aT
Jo
F *
F *
N *
F *
F N
N N
F *
N F
N *
F *
F F
F *
F F
F F
F F
N F
*	 *
* F *
*
	
* 0
* F *
* F *
F * *
F * *
*
	
* 0
*
	
*	 *
F * *
F * *
*
	
*	 *
F * *
*
	
*	 *
*
	
*	 *
*
	
*	 *
*
	
*	 *
*
	
*	 *
0-
0-
00
0 *
0 *
0 +
0 *
* +
00
0-
* +
0 *
*	 *
*	 -
*	 *
* 0
*	 *
The last column of the above Boolean representation table describes the states of the
output of the system and other columns prescribe the states of the input attributes. Each
row represents a possible condition for an occurrence of the system's output state. Both
qualitative and quantitative safety analysis can be carried out to assess the probability
of occurrence of each system failure event on the basis of the above Boolean
representation table. The possible consequences of each system failure event can also
be assessed with respect to the particular environment in which the marine cooling
system is working. The improvement of design aspects and maintenance policies may
then be made.
5.6 Concluding Remarks and Further Trends
This chapter has reviewed the development on qualitative reasoning from the A.I in the
domain of safety analysis. De Kleer's method is found to be most suitable to be applied
to safety modelling. Based on De Kleer's method, a modified qualitative reasoning
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method is proposed. The proposed qualitative reasoning framework can be applied to
failure propagation analysis with respect to a failure signal indicated by an alarm or a
sensor.
It is concluded that although the direct application of the qualitative reasoning method
to safety modelling is unlikely to be widely used as a practical modelling tool on its
own it is worthwhile to intergrate it with other formal safety modelling methods to
explore the advantages of each. A mixed modelling approach is therefore proposed in
which qualitative reasoning is used at the component level and the Boolean
rtpresentation modelling at the system level. This mixed modelling approach allows a
bottom-up approach to be taken even in those cases where it is difficult to obtain
complete input-output relations for all the components of the system, as the qualitative
descriptions of components can form the basis for generating the rest of the required
input-output relations. This mixed modelling approach can also be used in a "design for
safety" knowledge based system as shown in Figure 5.9 in which qualitative reasoning,
Boolean representation analysis, component modules and a failure database may be
involved in building the knowledge base.
Further study in the areas of qualitative reasoning may address the following areas:
Implementation of the proposed qualitative reasoning method for system
performance description.
.	 Integration of further aspects of the qualitative reasoning method with other
formal safety analysis methods.
.	 Construction of a model library.
Building a "design for safety" knowledge-based system incorporating the
qualitative reasoning method.
Algorithms for
hazard identification
and estimation
Search algorithms
(failure propagation and
failure cause identification)
Consistency checks
Inference engine
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user
H---e
Model	 I Component modell 	 I Qualitative
renewal	 library	 j'j reasoning
___ ___	 :.
Failure	 L...J Hazard	 I	 Booieqn representation
I database !	 j estimation r	 ?èaiio simulation
I
Knowledge base
Knowledge base
Hazard evaluation
(redundancies alarms,
protection systems, etc)
Decision
Figure 5.9 A "design forsafety" knowledge-based system incorporating
the qualitative reasoning approach
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CHAPTER 6
Simulation Models
Applied to the Assessment of Safety
SUMMARY
As described in Chapter 3, the Cullen and Carver reports recommend that more formal
safety analysis be used to help preventing major accidents in large MTO products [6.4].
One such technique is computer simulation. As a consequence, attention is being
increasingly directed towards the development of simulation methods and their
applications.
In this chapter, various simulation techniques are studied. The techniques and steps
used in the verification and validation processes are described in some detail. Various
ilated issues such as the requirements and assumptions for simulation modelling are
also addressed. After a brief review of the work on simulation modelling developed for
safety analysis, two simulation models are developed to simulate system availability
and component/subsystem failures, and the probability of occurrence of each system top
event.
The two simulation models developed in this chapter make use of the information
produced using FMECA and the MBRM. An illustrative example is presented to
demonstrate the use of the proposed computer simulation models and the interactions
between simulation modelling and other formal safety analysis methods.
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6.1 Introduction
As MTO products become more and more complex, simulation technology becomes
increasingly useful in the prediction of their safety. Simulation techniques can be
effectively used together with other safety modelling methods to improve the prediction
of the safety of MTO products both at the design stage and in operation [6.28].
Computer simulation or (more accurately) the study of the response of system models
using computers is becoming a flexible standard tool for the practising engineer,
although it is recognised that a major difficulty in the application of computer
simulation to safety prediction is in the deveopcnen cf s'jsvc	 ci
In Chapter 4, the MBRM was used to calculate the safety parameters for MTO
products. In such a deterministic analysis, the probability of occurrence of a top event
is calculated given the failure rate of each basic event. However, as discussed in section
3.4.9.1, simulation may prove to be a more flexible and suitable method to calculate
safety parameters of a complex system, especially when different distribution types of
component failures and repairs are involved, and also when covert and revealed failures
[6.27][6.28] as well as maintenance activities are taken into account.
Good safety simulation modelling depends on the selection of suitable simulation
techniques and simulation languages, and the effective application of verification of
validation programmes. Therefore, various aspects of a simulation process needs to be
studied in detail.
Safety simulation analysis can be used to assess system availability,
component/subsystem failures and system top events. Component/subsystem failures
can be predicted by studying the information produced from FMECA and system top
events can be studied on the basis of the minimal cut sets or prime implicants produced
using ETA or the MBRM. In this chapter, two simulation models are developed as
follows:
i. The computing of system availability and the prediction of
component/subsystem failures on the basis of information developed from
FMECA.
ii. The computing of the probabilities of occurrence of system top events on the
basis of the final system Boolean representation table obtained using the
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MBRM.
The information produced from the simulation analysis for system availability, failures
of each component/subsystem and the probability of occurrence of each system failure
event may be used for design and maintenance decision making.
6.2 System Modelling
6.2.1 Classification of Simulation Techniques
Depending on the nature of the problem being modelled, a simulation model may be
classified as one of the following three types [6.28]:
i. Continuous.
ii. Discrete.
iii. Combined discrete-continuous.
A continuous model is one whose states vary continuously with rime, so that the effects
of the events and the intervals between event times are infinitesimal. In such a
simulation model, a system is usually described by a set of differential equations, and
the operation paths (functions that satisfy the equations) are usually determined solely
by the initial and boundary conditions. This type of simulation is widely used in
mechanics, electrical engineering and economics [6.16].
A discrete event model mimics a system or process whose behaviour of interest
changes values or states at discrete moments in time. Discrete stochastic models come
in a variety of shapes and sizes, but may be divided into two broad categories -
discrete-time event and continuous time-discrete event simulation [6.16]. In a discrete-
time event simulation, a system is studied only at selected moments in time. Any
changes of states are noticed only at observation points. It is obvious that a continuous
event simulation can be approximated to any degree of accuracy by choosing a
sufficiently small fixed time increment. However, in a continuous time-discrete event
simulation, the time parameter is continuous and the observation period is a real
interval, usually taken to start at zero for convenience. The characteristic feature of a
continuous time-discrete event simulation is that its performance is completely
determined by the sequence of event times t t2, .. ., i1 , .. . and by the discrete
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changes in the system states which take place at those moments. Obviously, it is not
necessary for a continuous time-discrete event simulation to make small, fixed
increments in the model's time variable and to change the system states as required at
each increment in time. The continuous time-discrete event simulation model can
advance its internal time directly from one discrete occurrence to the next.
A system behaviour may depend on both discretely and continuously changing state
variables, in which case continuous system simulation and discrete event simulation
techniques may be combined. Such a simulation is defined as a combined discrete-
continuous simulation. Three types of interactions, which may occur between discretely
changing and continuously changing state variables, are described as follows:
i. A discrete event may cause a discrete change in the value of a continuous state
variable.
ii. A discrete event may cause the relationship governing a Continuous state
variable to change at a particular time.
iii. A continuous state variable achieving a threshold value may cause a discrete
event to occur or to be scheduled.
Modelling of a discrete behaviour differs significantly from that of a continuous system.
Discrete event modelling is based on logical expressions defining the conditions
required for events to occur while modelling of a continuous system usually involves
the solution of algebraic and differential equations of the behaviour being investigated
[6.28]. From the above descriptions about the types of simulation models, it can be
concluded that a continuous time-discrete event simulation may be more suitable to be
applied to safety analysis than others since safety analysis of a system is usually
concerned with discrete state changes.
A Monte Carlo simulation can be used as a continuous time-discrete event simulation
involving the use of random variables. Monte Carlo simulations have been used
extensively for fault tree and block diagram analyses [6.9]. A Monte Carlo simulation
consists of building, usually with a computer program, a probabilistic model of the
system under investigation [6.9]. The model is repeatedly run and on the assumption
that each simulation run is independent the performance of the synthesised system is
recorded. The probability of occurrence of a system failure can then be determined. For
example, if 25 of 100 trials for the synthesised system lasted longer than 10000 hr and
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75 failed prior to that time, it could be concluded that the probability of occurrence of
the system failure at 10000 hr is approximately equal to 0.75. In general, a Monte
Carlo simulation is easy to carry out and can be conveniently applied to systems which
are too complex or too large to solve by other deterministic methods. Techniques for
constructing continuous discrete event simulation models using Monte Carlo techniques
will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
6.2.2 Random Variables
A simulation of a system or process involving random variables requires a method of
generating or obtaining random numbers [6.14]. Examples of random variables which
can be modelled by distribution sampling within a simulation model are component
repair and failure times, the number of individuals within a given compartment at a
given time and the mass of a lifted load.
Given the probability distribution type and the distribution parameters describing the
statistical character of a variable, random numbers can be generated to sample instances
of the variable from the defined distribution. Depending on the nature of the modelled
variable, the sampled probability distribution may be either continuous or discrete. The
distribution types can be found in various sources [6 . 9][6.11][6.14][6 .20][6.21]. The
typical ones are briefly listed as follows:
Continuous distributions
• Uniform
• Exponential
• Gamma
• Weibull
• Normal
• Xogno
• beta
•	 X'riangu
CHAPTER 6 - Simulation Models	 Page 146
Discrete distributions
• Bernoulli
• Discrete Uniform
• Binomial
• Geometric
• Negative Binomial
• Poisson
Most events can be approximately modelled using the above distributions. For example,
compiled statistics of operational data may show that the repair time of a certain type
of a component follows a normal distribution with a given mean and a standard
deviation and the failure time of a component follows an exponential distribution.
A random variable R with a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] is a foundation
on which all other distributions can be successfully modelled. Its distribution function
is:
1 0 x^0
FR(x)=P(R<x)=	 x 0<x^1
1.	 1	 x>1
and the density function is:
fR(x)—{ 
1 x in [0,1]
-	 0 notin[0,1]
On the basis of a uniform distribution, the following two basic methods of generating a
series of random numbers in computer simulation are used:
i. Generation of random numbers.
ii. Generation of pseudo-random numbers.
Real random numbers have proved to be not suitable for computer simulation.
Therefore, they are not discussed further.
Pseudo-random numbers, which are transformed to account for the shape and attributes
of the desired distribution, are not really random but can be used instead of real random
numbers in solving certain problems [6.6][6.11]. The output of a pseudo-random
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number generator is always the same for the same input data. Pseudo-random number
generators are widely used in computer simulation. The advantages of pseudo-random
numbers are described as follows [6.21]:
• Flexibility: For a new stochastic (statistical) process only input data needs to
be changed, and the random number generator itself doesn't. Once the
generator is certified, it can be used with different input data to produce
independent random numbers.
• Ease of computing: A small number of program statements are sufficient to
compute a new pseudo-random number, without additional memory
requirements.
Most general purpose programming languages provide procedures for sampling from a
uniform distribution to produce pseudo-random numbers, and special purpose
simulation languages normally provide procedures for sampling pseudo-random
numbers from a wide range of discrete and continuous distribution types (so-called
random number generators).
6.2.3 Verification and Validation
Simulation of the safety of a system is conducted on the basis of the system models
which describe the system behaviour. When simulation models are constructed,
verification and validation programmes are always necessary, yet sometimes they are
neglected [6.11].
A verification programme is used to determine whether a simulation model performs as
intended. It usually implies debugging the computer program, which can be quite an
arduous task for a large-scale simulation model. A validation programme is used to
determine whether a simulation model (as opposed to the computer program) is an
accurate representation of the real-world system being studied [6.14].
Verification programmes are especially difficult for computer models in which random
variables are involved. It must confirm that the logic of the conceptualised model has
been correctly implemented in the computer model and this is achieved by the
Continuous process of testing the coded algorithms and tracing the flow of information
within the computer model. Verification programmes can be simplified not only by
effectively structured programming practice but also by the use of effective debugging
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utilities and the use of strongly typed programming languages in which each of
expressions, assignments and parameters is type checked at compilation time for
consistency.
The following techniques may be useful in a verification process:
Write and debug the computer program in modules.
. Have more than one person read the computer program.
.	 List the states of the simulated system, including the contents of the events,
the state variables, etc.
.	 Run the program under simplifying assumptions for which the true
characteristics of the model can be easily observed.
Display the simulation output on a graphics screen as the simulation actually
progresses.
The validation process is as important as the verification process for a system
simulation. A validation programme should be of continuous concern throughout the
development of a simulation model. All levels of the system should be tested for
reasonableness. Omissions of real system elements in the model because of irrelevance
or insignificance should also be validated [6.1 111. The following three steps may be
useful in a validation process:
i. Develop a rational model.
In order to develop such a model, simulation modellers should make use of
all available information, including:
.	 conversation with expert,
existing theory,
.	 observation of the system, and
. common knowledge.
ii. Check all assumptions and simplifications:
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Since a simulation model of a complex real-world system is always only an
approximation, regardless of how much effort is put into developing the
model, assumptions and simplifications are always needed. Assumptions and
simplifications should be tested during the initial stages of the model
development process. When pseudo-random number generators are developed
and used to model random variables, statistical tests should be conducted to
prove that the randomness and the uniformity of the generated sequences of
random numbers are satisfactory. When theoretical distributions are assigned
to random variables, goodness-of-fit statistical tests with collected data may
need to be conducted to validate such assumptions. Sensitivity analysis should
also be carried out to make sure that assumptions and simplifications are
properly made.
iii. Study of simulation output data.
Simulation output data should be studied to determine if they are reasonable.
If a system similar to the one being studied exists, the results of the
simulation model of the existing system should be compared with those
produced from the simulation model being developed.
Mistakes in a simulation model can be either in programming or in system modelling.
The validation process is much easier if the programmer and designer for system
modelling are the same person.
6.2.4 Simulation Languages
With respect to the characteristics of system safety simulation, the typical requirements
for simulation languages are described as follows:
. Random number generator.
.	 Features for keeping track of simulation time.
Dynamic data structures such as queues and stacks.
Presentation graphics utilities.
.	 General requirements such as readability, initialisation and error checking.
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There are high level languages such as FORTRAN, COBOL, BASIC, PASCAL and C,
which can be used to code just about everything. All of them are general-purpose
languages but none are particularly suitable for safety simulation.
Safety analysts are mainly users and not computer specialists. Therefore, specialised
simulation languages are required in which the developed program contains statements
similar to the theoretical concepts of a simulation model. Some advantages of
programming a simulation model using a simulation language rather than a general high
level language are as follows:
Simulation languages provide a natural framework in which the model and
the program are integrated together, and the verification and validation phases
are also merged.
They provide better error detection because many potential types of error can
be checked and identified during compilation.
They provide most features needed for simulation, resulting in a decrease in
programming time which can often be significant.
.	 Simulation models are easier to change when written using a simulation
language.
Generally, two basic approaches, event-scheduling and process-interaction approaches,
are used in continuous time-discrete event simulation [6.1]. In the event-scheduling
approach, a system is modelled by identifying the characteristic events and then
determining a detailed description of changes of state. There is no simulation time
recorded during simulation execution. However, in the process-interaction approach, a
system is modelled by processes (a time-ordered sequence of events) which delineate
everything, as it moves through the corresponding process. In the process-interaction
approach, a system may contain many processes interacting with each other at a given
time. There is a passage of simulated time for the process-interaction approach. In the
simulation models developed in this chapter, the event-scheduling approach is used.
Choosing a general purpose language or a simulation language may depend on the
following criteria [6.14]:
Availability of the language.
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.
	 Cost of installing and maintaining the language.
S
	 Number of simulation studies likely to be carried out.
.
	 Types of systems that will be simulated.
.
	 Ease of learning the language.
.
	 Computer storage requirements of the language.
.
	 Computer time efficiency of the language.
.
	 Flexibility and power of the language.
The computer simulation models described in this chapter are written in MODSIM II'.
The characteristics of this simulation language have been briefly discussed in section
4.4.
6.2.5 Steps in a Continuous Time-discrete Simulation Study
A simulation study is not strictly a sequential process. The proposed steps, that may
constitute a typical well-formulated continuous time-discrete event simulation study,
and the relationships between them are shown in Figure 6.1. It should be noted that not
all simulation studies will necessarily contain all these listed steps and some simulation
studies may contain steps that are not depicted in Figure 6.1. The proposed steps are
briefly discussed as follows:
i. Problem formulation: Every study must begin with a clear statement of the
objectives.
ii. Data collection and system modelling: Data should be collected on the system
of interest and used to estimate input parameters.
iii. Model validation: Validation should be carried out through the entire
simulation study.
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Problem formulation
Data collection
and system modelling
validation
computer program
construction
Verification
Production runs
Analysis of
output data
Documentation
Figure 6.1 Steps in a time-discrete
 event simulation study
CHAPTER 6 - Simulation Models	 Page 153
iv Computer program construction: The simulation modeller must decide
whether to code a model in a general-purpose language or in a specially
designed simulation language.
v. Verification: Sensitivity study and program verification may be involved.
vi. Production runs: Production runs are made to provide the results of the
system analysis.
vii. Analysis of output data: Output data should be analysed to avoid making
serious mistakes leading to fallacious conclusions and ultimately poor
decisions.
viii. Documentation: It is important to document the assumptions which went into
the model as well as the computer program itself.
6.3 Brief Review of Simulation Methods Applied to Safety Analysis
Many simulation models have been developed for safety, reliability and availability
analyses, but few have been reported in the literature [6.13]. The characteristics of
some typical examples are briefly described as follows:
Taha et al [6.24] developed a simulation language (SIMNET) that permits a
general safety model to accommodate any system which is described in terms
of minimal cut sets. In this simulation model, the algorithms based on
minimal cut sets are used to assess system failure events.
ii. Clark et al [6.2] proposed a new simulation technique which combines
discrete simulation with fault tree analysis.
iii. Gonzales-Vega et al [6.8] developed a simulation model to analyse logistics
policies for complex systems. This model takes into account system
configuration, repair facilities, inventory policies and delays for transportation
and inspection.
iv. Fritz [6.7] reported a large simulation model which may be used to study
system availability and maintenance manpower requirements.
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v. Pizzano [6.18] developed a Monte Carlo simulation model in FORTRAN to
determine system failures by processing complex logic statements. Any model
changes require substantial modification of the FORTRAN code.
vi. Pritsker et al [6.19] developed several simulation models in which design
changes require substantial revision of the program code.
vii. Landers et al [6.13] described a simulation model for use in the engineering
design process, focusing on mission reliability analysis in which the reliability
of a system is simulated on the basis of a given reliability block diagram.
viii. Deans et al [6.3] developed a reliability simulator to predict system
performance for the establishment of operational and maintenance policies.
The above simulation models can be grouped as follows:
Examples [i,	 iii, iv] illustrate the degree of complexity.
Examples [v, vi] demonstrate the inflexibility of system-specific models and
the limitation of programming languages.
Examples [vii, viii] illustrate the degree of incomplete description of an
engineering system and the degree of independence from other formal safety
analysis methods such as FMECA.
Although some existing simulation packages such as MIRIAM, RAMP and @RISK
[6.22] can in theory be integrated with the developed methodologies developed in this
thesis, it is in practice very difficult to do so since the methodologies developed in this
thesis are implemented using MODSIM. Therefore, two simulation m.odels are proposed
in this chapter to make the simulation process more straightforward and clearer.
6.4 Proposed System Simulation Models
Simulation can be used together with other formal safety analysis methods. In this
chapter, the proposed component/subsystem failure simulation model can make use of
the information produced from FMECA, and the proposed simulation model for the
prediction of the probability of occurrence of a system failure event is constructed on
the basis of the minimal prime implicants obtained using the MBRM.
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6.4.1 Assumptions and Simplifications
Assumptions and simplifications are necessary for modelling systems. The following
assumptions and simplifications are often used in the construction of simulation models:
Failed components are repaired same-as-new and the rest of the components
are not affected by such repairs.
.	 All components are same-as-new after a full maintenance activity.
.	 The failure time and repair time of each component follow some types of
distributions.
.	 Each component may have multiple failure states.
.	 A system is capable of being maintained.
6.4.2 The Proposed System Availability and Component/subsystem Failure
Simulation Model
In the proposed simulation model for the prediction of system availability and failure of
each component/subsystem of a system, it is assumed that only failure modes with
severity classes 1 and 2, or those described as catastrophic and critical, may cause the
system to stop. The failure data for each failure mode of each component/subsystem
can be obtained from a FMECA.
Redundancy is considered in this simulation model. Given the Reliability Block
Diagram (RBD) of a system being investigated, the components/subsystems can first be
labelled by integer numbers. Then, a Redundancy Relationship Matrix (RRM) which
describes the state of redundancy of each component/subsystem can be constructed. A
RRM is constructed in the following form:
R 11 R 12 R 13 . R1
R 21 R R 23 . R
RRM =	.	 . .
R 1 R 2 R 3 . R,.,
If component i is parallel to component k in the system reliability block diagram, R
and R are equal to 1, otherwise equal to 0. The RRM for the reliability block diagram
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shown in Figure 6.2 is constructed as follows:
Figure 6.2 A system reliability block diagram
10 0 0 0 0 01lo 0	 1	 1 0 O
lo	 1	 0	 1	 o	 ol
RRM=I 0 1 1 0 0 0 I
lo 00 00 ol
Lo 0 0 0 0 oJ
RRM provides a way of representing structural redundancy information. After the RRM
has been constructed the failure data produced from the FMECA can be utilised to
simulate the system availability and to predict failure of each component/subsystem.
The diagram of this availability and component/subsystem failure simulation model is
shown in Figure 6.3.
Typical model inputs are:
Failure	 and repair distributions	 and associated parameters	 of
components/subsystems.
. Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM).
Redundancy Relationship Matrix (RRM).
.	 The number of simulation trials required.
Typical model outputs are:
. Number of failures of each component/subsystem.
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Input failure and repair
data and RRM.
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Time To Next Failure (TTNF)
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Simlime > required?
Algorithm for redundancy
consideration
1
Downtime - downtime+repairtlme
Similme - Sirnllme + repalrtime + 1TNF
Number of failures of each component
Availability
Number of failures
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I is the number of iterations
Figure 6.3 The diagram of a proposed system availability and component/subsystem
failure simulation model
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System breakdown distribution with MTBM.
.	 System availability.
6.4.3 The Proposed Simulation Model for the Prediction of the Probability of
Occurrence of a System Failure Event
A simulation model is developed as shown in Figure 6.4 to estimate the probability of
occurrence of a system top event on the basis of the associated minimum prime
implicants. The minimum prime implicants can be obtained using the MBRM
[6.27][6.28].
After the final Boolean representation table of a system has been generated using the
MBRM, the following steps are necessary for simulating the probability of occurrence
of a system top event:
i. Generate failure and repair distributions of the basic events associated with
the system top event.
ii. Accumulate component failures in a fixed maintenance process.
iii. Use the algorithms described below to determine the system top event
occurrence and prime implicant (Cut set) failures.
iv. Repeat above steps.
v. Output results.
A Minimal Cut Set Matrix (MCSM) is a MxN matrix in which M is the number of
lines and N is the number of input columns (attributes) of the minimal Cut sets or prime
implicants associated with a system top event. If a basic event in column I is associated
with a prime implicant in line i, MCSM1J is equal to 1, otherwise MCSM J is equal to 0.
Current Failure State Vector (CFSV) is a ixN matrix. If component k fails, CFSVk is
equal to 1, otherwise CFSVk is equal to 0. Cut set failures and system failures can be
determined by comparing CFSV with the row vectors in MCSM. A system top event
occurs when the CFSV is not less than a row vector in MCSM, that is, CFSVk ^ MCSM
for k = 1 to N for any row i (i = 1, 2, ..., M). The above algorithms for determining
the system top event occurrence and cut set failures are shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.4 The diagram of a simulation model for the prediction of
the probability of occurrence of a system top event
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Figure 6.5 The algorithm for determining a system top event
occurrence and prime implicant (cut set) failures
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In this simulation model, each basic event failure associated with a system top event is
assumed to be either revealed or covert [6.28]. Revealed failures are those which can be
detected and repaired immediately after they occur. Covert failures are those which
cannot be detected until next full maintenance activity takes place. To detect cover
failures, it is necessary to carry out periodic maintenances and testing of the system
prone to such failures. The ability to detect and remedy covert failures of a system may
be vital to the safety of that system.
Typical model inputs are:
• MCSM.
• MTBM.
. Failure and repair distributions and associated parameters of
components/subsystems.
S
	 The number of simulation trials.
Typical model outputs are:
S The probability of occurrence of the system top event.
S The probability of occurrence of each associated prime implicant (cut set).
64.4. Software
Software has been developed in MODSIM" simulation language to simulate system
availability, component/subsystem failures and the probabilities of occurrence of a
system top event and associated prime implicants (cut sets). The program package
which has been developed to obtain the final system Boolean representation table
(described in Chapters 4 and 5) has been integrated into this software.
The software has been designed to satisfy the functional requirements of simulation of
system availability and component/subsystem failures, and simulation of the
probabilities of occurrence of a system top event and associated prime implicants (cut
sets). The function of the software is shown in Figure 6.6.
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Boolean representation table
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Avaability and component/subsystem	 The probability of occurrence of the top event
failure simulation	 The probability of occurrence of each associated cut SE
I Adjustment of input data and I
display of results through
man-machine interface
Figure 6.6 The function of the developed simulation models
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6.4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, two Monte Carlo simulation models are proposed in a generic sense.
Compared with previous work in the literature [6.7][6.81[6.13][6.18][6.19][6.24J, the
proposed simulation models have the following advantages:
• The models are developed in an Objected-Oriented Programming (OOP)
environment. This makes further modification of the software much easier.
Design change does not require substantial revision of the whole model.
• The models are easily used.
As discussed early in this chapter, the outcomes produced from these two simulation
models can be used by designers and operators to assist in the construction of effective
maintenance schedules and to optimise design aspects.
6.5 An Illustrative Example
The diagram of a hydraulic hoist transmission system of a marine crane can be found in
Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4. The diagram of a hydraulic servo transmission system of the
hydraulic hoist transmission system is shown in Figure 6.7.
6.5.1 System Availability and Component/Subsystem Failure Simulation
The system availability and component/subsystem failure simulation can be carried out
at either the component level or the subsystem level as required.
Component level
The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the hydraulic servo transmission system is
shown in Figure 6.8. The failure modes with severity classes 1 and 2 of the components
of the hydraulic servo transmission system, which can be obtained from the FMECA
[6.17], are shown in Table 6.1.
CHAPTER 6— Simulation Models 	 Page 164
pump
	proportional . .	 directional
	
linear actuator	 control valve
2	 .:	 3..
non-return
valve
4
sequence valve
pilot operated
6
pressure relief
8
shuttle valve valve
8
sequence valve
pilot operated
.9
proportional
Imear actuator
10
motor
11
Figure 6.7 The diagram of a hydraulic servo transmission system
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Table 6.1
	
The failure modes with severity classes 1 and 2
Component FM Failure modes	 Failure rate	 FM	 Sev. Det.
No.__________________________ (per million) rate
1	 1	 failure to prevent debris	 70.00	 0.25	 2	 C
to enter circuit
2	 port	 plate	 separation	 0.1	 1	 C
causing major leak
3	 shaft fails	 0.05	 1	 R
4	 major leak	 0.05	 1	 R
2	 1	 fails to open	 7.00	 0.07	 1	 C
2	 fails to close	 0.16	 1	 C
3	 major leak	 0.08	 1	 R
3	 1	 fails	 to	 switch	 in	 6.00	 0.2	 1	 C
accordance with high
pressure port
2	 major leak	 0.08 1	 R
4	 1	 fails to close	 7.00	 0.15	 1	 C
2	 major leak	 0.08 1	 R
5	 1	 fails to open	 7.00	 0.08	 1	 C
2	 major leak	 0.08 1	 R
6	 1	 major leak	 7.00	 0.08 1	 R
7	 1	 fails to close	 7.00	 0.15	 1	 C
2	 major leak	 0.08 1	 R
8	 1	 fails to close	 7.00	 0.16	 1	 C
9	 1	 major leak	 10.00	 0.04	 1	 R
10	 1	 fails to open	 3.00	 0.05	 2	 C
2	 fails to close	 0.24	 1	 C
3	 major leak	 0.07 1	 R
11	 1	 failure to cause debris to
	 70.00	 0.25	 2	 C
enter circuit
2	 port	 plate	 separation	 0.1	 1	 C
causing short circuit
3	 shaft fails	 0.05	 1	 R
4	 major leak	 0.05 1	 R
R - Revealed	 C - Covert	 Sev. - Severe class	 Det. - Fault detectability
FM - Failure Mode
If each component repair activity is assumed to follow a normal distribution with the
expected value i = 35 hr and the standard deviation = 10 hr, the availability of the
hydraulic servo transmission system and the number of failures of each component for
a time period of 10000 hr with MTBM = 10000 hours are simulated as shown in
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Tables 6.2 and 6.3, respectively.
Table 6.2
	
Availability
Failure hours	 Availability
75	 99.25%
Table 6.3	 The number of failures of each component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
The number of failures of component
0.7 1980
0.04980
0.03760
0.03840
0.02340
0.01200
0.03880
0.02480
0.05420
0.02600
0.72680
Subsystem level
The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of the hydraulic hoist transmission system is
shown in Figure 6.9. The FMECA can be progressed up to the subsystem level based
on the information produced at the component level [6.31]. The failure modes with
severity classes 1 and 2 for the sub-systems of the hydraulic hoist transmission system
(Figure 4.3) can be obtained from section 4.5.1 and are shown in Table 6.4.
If each subsystem repair activity is assumed to follow a normal distribution with the
expected value = 45 hr and the standard deviation a = 10 hr, the availability of the
hydraulic hoist transmission system and the number of failures of each subsystem for a
time period of 10000 hr with MTBM = 10000 hr are obtained as shown in Tables 6.5
and 6.6, respectively.
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Table 6.4	 The failure modes with severity class 1 and 2
Sub-systems I FM Failure mode	 Failure rate	 FM	 Sev. Det.
No.	 (per million) rate
Control	 1	 major leak	 35.9	 0.015	 2	 R
system	 2	 control	 output	 for	 0.155	 1	 C
"lower" motion cannot
be closed when required
3	 control output for "hoist	 0.155	 1	 C
up" motion cannot be
closed when required
Protection	 1	 fails	 to	 return	 for	 92.3	 0.066	 1	 R
hoisting up when
system	 de-energised
	
2	 major leak	 0.046 1
	 R
	
3	 failure of emergency stop 	 0.o66	 1	 C
	
4	 failure	 of	 "hoisting	 0.066	 1	 C&R
down" limit
	
5	 failure of slack rope	 0.066	 1	 C&R
prevention
	
6	 low	 boost	 pressure	 0.028	 1	 C&R
switch fails to open
Hydraulic	 1	 major leak	 265	 0.094 1	 R
servo	 2	 shaft falls	 0.0 13	 1	 C&R
system	 3	 no output from the	 0.311	 1	 C&R
package motor
	
4	 hydraulic short circuit 	 0.026	 1	 C&R
	
5	 pipe burst	 0.008 1	 R
Hydraulic	 1	 no output	 70.0	 0.043	 1	 C&R
oil tank
Auxiliary	 - -	 -	 -	 - -
R- Revealed	 C - Covert	 Sev. - Severe class	 Det. - Fault detectability
FM - Failure Mode
0,V
I
0,
0)
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0
0
0)
I
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a
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Figure 6.10 Subsystem failure distributions with MTBM
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Table 6.5	 Availability
Failure hours	 Availability
129	 99.12%
Table 6.6 The number of failures of each subsystem
Subsystems
Control system
Protection system
Hydraulic servo system
Hydraulic oil tank
Number of failures
0.11340
1.12440
1.70920
0.10240
The failure distributions of the subsystems with MTBM are also produced using
this simulation model and shown in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.10, respectively.
Table 6.7
	
The failure distribution of each subsystem with MTBM
MTBM	 Subsystems Number of	 MTBM Subsystems Number of
(hr)	 failures	 (hr)	 failures
1000 control	 f 1 = 0.0428 2000
protection	 f2 = 0.4474
servo	 f 3 = 0.6656
tank	 f4 = 0.0398
8000 10000control
protection
servo
tank
f 1 = 0.099
f2 = 0.9858
f3 = 1.4958
f4 = 0.0846
control
protection
servo
tank
control
protection
servo
tank
fl = 0.0504
f2 = 0.5188
f3 = 0.7922
f4 = 0.05
fl = 0.0824
f2 = 0.8078
f3 = 1.2692
f4 = 0.0774
fi =0.1134
f2 = 1.1244
f3 = 1.7092
f4 = 0.1024
4000	 control	 f I = 0.07	 6000	 control
protection	 f2 = 0.6758	 protection
servo	 f3 = 1.0054	 servo
tank	 f4 = 0.0644	 tank
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Table 6.7 The failure distribution of each subsystem with MTBM (Continued)
MTBM	 Subsystems	 Number of
	
MTBM	 Subsystems	 Number of
(hr)	 failures	 (hr)	 failures
12000	 control	 f 1 = 0.1364	 14000	 control	 f 1 = 0.148
protection	 f2 = 1.3004	 protection	 f2 = 1.4398
servo	 f3 = 1.9486	 servo	 f3 = 2.1734
tank	 f4=0.1188	 tank	 f4=0.1278
16000	 control	 f 1 = 0.16 1	 18000	 control	 fl = 0.182
protection	 f2 = 1.5866	 protection	 f2 = 1.7176
servo	 f3 = 2.4022	 servo	 f3 =2.6664
Lank	 f4 = 0.1356	 tank	 f4 = 0.1492
20000	 control
	 fl = 0.1916	 30000	 control	 f I = 0.261
protection	 f2 = 1.9128	 protection	 f2 = 2.6186
servo
	 f3 = 2.8956	 servo	 13=4.05
tank
	 f4 = 0.1684	 tank	 f4 = 0.2312
6.5.2 Simulation of the Probabilities of Occurrence of System Top Events
The probabilities of occurrence of the top events s 1 , s and S 3 (described in Chapter 4)
of the hydraulic hoist transmission system for a time period of 10000 hr with MTBM =
10000 hr are simulated as shown in Table 6.8.
The probabilities of occurrence of the top events S 1 , S 2 and S 3 of the hydraulic hoist
transmission system for various MTBM values are also studied. The results are shown
in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.11, respectively.
Table 6.8 Probabilities of occurrence of S 1 , S 2 and S3
Top events	 Probability of occurrence (%)
S 1	 0.0803
S 2	 0.0140
S 3	 0.0366
ri.)
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0
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0
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0000L..0
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Figure 6.11 The probabilities of occurrence of the top events
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Table 6.9
	
The probabilities of occurrence of the top events S, S and 53
MTBM	 Probability of	 Probability of	 Probability of
(hr)	 occurrence of S(%)	 occurrence of S,(%) occurrence of S3(%)
1000
	
0.0775
	
0.0001
	
0.0222
2000
	
0.0775
	
0.0002
	
0.0250
4000
	
0.0776
	
0.0012
	
0.0275
6000
	
0.0792
	
0.0026
	
0.0288
8000
	
0.0792
	
0.0075
	
0.0336
10000
	
0.0803
	
0.0140
	
0.0366
12000
	
0.08 10
	
0.0227
	
0.0374
14000
	
0.08 15
	
0.03 12
	
0.0494
16000
	
0.0830
	
0.0433
	
0.0498
18000
	
0.0899
	
0.0514
	
0.0504
20000
	 0.0929
	
0.0670
	
0.0638
From Figure 6.11, it can be noted that in some sections the probability distributions of
occurrence of top event S and 5 3 increase very slowly as MTBM increases. It implies
that in these sections the probability distributions of occurrence of top event S 1 and S3
are not significantly affected by MTBM. This is because in these sections the
probabilities of occurrence of the basic events associated with the minimal cut sets
leading to top event 5 3 are not significantly affected by MTBM. For example, this
phenomenon produces waviness in the curve of top event S3.
The information produced above can be used in the "design for safety" process. As will
be demonstrated in Chapter 8, the information obtained above can be utilised in
techno-economic modelling and decision making.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that computer simulation techniques can play a very important role in
the development of safety prediction and management methods. A major problem is in
the development of the appropriate modelling methods which are necessary to obtain
simple and flexible models, to which simulation techniques could be easily and
effectively applied. If such a problem is satisfactorily solved, simulation analysis would
enable the safety of complex engineering systems to be predicted effectively and
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efficiently.
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the prediction of the safety of
engineering systems can be made on the basis of the results obtained using various
formal safety analysis methods such as FMECA and the MBRM. Many problems
remain to be solved in the application and integration of simulation techniques with
established formal safety prediction methodologies. To contribute to the solution of
these problems further work will be required in the following areas:
Construction of a methodology for the systematic development of computer
simulation models.
Design of an integrated environment where simulation models may interact
and share system information with other formal safety assessment procedures.
Construction of explicit safety criteria with respect to life, the environment
and material losses, and methodical techno-economic analysis approaches for
satisfying those criteria.
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CHAPTER 7
Safety Analysis and Synthesis
Using Fuzzy Sets and
Evidential Reasoning
SUMMARY
As described in Chapter 3, great uncertainty is involved in safety analysis of large
MTO products. Problems of uncertainty can be treated using two principal types of
method involving probability and possibility. The safety analysis methods described in
Chapters 4 and 6 can be be classified as the probabilistic type since in such methods
probability distributions are used to describe basic failure events. The probabilistic type
of method has been extensively used in various industrial projects. However, in some
cases, this type of method may prove not suitable since it could be very difficult to
precisely determine the parameters of probability distributions of failure events.
However, the other type of the method, the one involving possibility, may prove to be
comparatively more suitable. Possibility safety analysis often involves the use of fuzzy
set modelling and subjective reasoning.
This chapter presents a new methodology for safety analysis and synthesis of a complex
engineering system with a structure that is capable of being decomposed into a
hierarchy of levels. In this methodology, fuzzy set theory is used to describe each
failure event and an evidential reasoning approach is then employed to synthesise the
information produced to assess the safety of the whole system. Three basic paramenters
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- failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure consequence probability are used
to analyse a failure event. These three parameters are described by linguistic variables
which are characterised by membership functions to a set of defined categories. The
fuzzy safety score of the failure event is initially defined by the parameters and
characterised by a membership function to the defined categories. As safety can also be
clearly described by linguistic variables referred to as the safety expressions, the
obtained fuzzy safety score can be mapped back to the safety expressions which are
characterised by membership functions over the same categories. This mapping results
in the identification of the safety of each failure event in terms of the degree to which
the fuzzy safety score belongs to each of the safety expressions. Such degrees represent
the uncertainty in safety evaluations and can be synthesised using an evidential
reasoning approach so that the safety of the whole system can be evaluated in terms of
these safety expressions. Finally, an example is presented to demonstrate the proposed
safety analysis and synthesis methodology.
7.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 3, the safety of a large engineering system is affected by many
factors regarding its design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, operation and
maintenance. Consequently, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to construct
an accurate and complete mathematical modei fot he sttm oct .o ?t r't
safety because of inadequate knowledge about the basic failure events. This leads
inevitably to problems of uncertainty in representation.
Problems of uncertainty in safety analysis can be treated using two principal types of
method involving probability and possibility, respectively. Probability theory deals with
uncertainty which is essentially random in nature but of an ordered kind. Possibility
theory studies problems which are not really probabilistic but cause uncertainty due to
imprecision associated with the complexity of a system as well as vagueness of human
judgement. Possibility theory often uses fuzzy sets and approximate reasoning.
Traditionally, safety analysis is carried out on a probabilistic basis. As described in
Chapters 4 and 6, probability distributions are used to describe basic failure events and
to deal with uncertainty in order to evaluate potential hazards and assess system safety.
In many cases, however, it may be difficult or even impossible to precisely determine
the parameters of a probability distribution for a given event due to lack of evidence or
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due to the inability of the safety engineer to make firm assessments. Therefore, one
may have to describe a given event in terms of vague and imprecise descriptors like
"Likely" or "impossible ", terms that are commonly used by safety analysts, Such
judgements are obviously fuzzy and hence fuzzy set modelling may be more
appropriate to analyse the safety of systems with incomplete information of the kind
described above.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the possible applications of subjective reasoning and
fuzzy set theory in safety analysis have been widely discussed. A few of these may be
briefly outlined as follows:
Bayesian modelling with imprecise prior probabilities [7.5]. An extension of
the standard Bayesian approach based on the theory of imprecise probabilities
and intervals of measures is developed to reflect expert opinions using prior
distributions. The opinions of several experts can be combined using the
approach developed.
ii. Modelling of risk using approximate reasoning and fuzzy sets [7.9].
Linguistic variables are used to assess the risk of an event.
iii. Identification of hazardous events using fuzzy set theory [7.1O][7.11]. A
survey of the possible applications of fuzzy logic is carried out with respect
to the analysis of hazardous events.
iv. Application of fuzzy sets and possibility theory for risk analysis and decision
making [7.1]. Subjective linguistic assignments are modelled for risk analysis
using fuzzy set theory.
v. Use of fuzzy set theory for uncertainty analysis [7.4]. The potential
applicability of fuzzy set theory to uncertainty analysis of accident
progression event trees with imprecise and uncertain branch probabilities
and/or with a number of phenomenological uncertainty issues is examined as
a possible alternative procedure to that used in the current probabilistic risk
assessments.
Example (i) suffers from the numerical stability problems involved in Bayesian
modelling, as indicated in [6]. Examples (ii), (iii) and (iv) mainly focus on safety
assessment of a single failure event, and are not concerned either with safety synthesis
of many events at a single level or with safety synthesis at different levels (component
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level, subsystem level and system level). Example (v) causes the loss of safety
information due to the use of mm-max operations in the process of safety synthesis.
Such information loss could be rather serious in safety analysis of large and complex
engineering systems.
The safety of a system is determined by the constituent subsystems and the safety of
each subsystem is, in turn, determined by the associated components and their possible
failure modes. Figure 7.1 shows a diagram of a framework for safety analysis of an
engineering system. Safety analysis of an engineering system using subjective reasoning
and fuzzy set modelling should be carried out by taking into account such an evaluation
hierarchy. However, the existing work briefly described above mainly focuses on safety
assessment of a single failure event, and is not concerned neither with safety synthesis
of many events at a single level nor safety synthesis at different levels (the component
level, the subsystem level and the system level).
In a hierarchical structure, it is usually the case that safety analysis at a high level
makes use of the information produced at lower levels. There is therefore a need to
develop a framework for hierarchical system safety analysis. Such a framework could
be established by developing an approach using fuzzy set modelling and approximate
reasoning in an integrated manner, and it is largely the aim of this chapter to present
such an approach.
In Figure 7.1, a failure mode at the bottom level can be initially analysed and described
using fuzzy sets. The fuzzy safety score of the failure mode can thus be obtained. On
the other hand, a set of linguistic variables may be used to express various safety
levels. Such linguistic variables may be referred to as safety expressions, which can
also be described using fuzzy sets. The obtained fuzzy safety description of the failure
mode could then be mapped back to the defined safety expressions using the so-called
Best-Fit method [7.14]. In the mapping, each of the safety expressions may be
confirmed to some extent, depending upon the obtained fuzzy safety description of the
failure mode as well as the defined fuzzy descriptions of the safety expressions. The
degree of confirmation to a safety expression representing a safety level could then be
viewed as a degree of confidence with which the safety associated with a failure mode
is evaluated to the given safety level. Such uncertainty can conveniently be handled
using an evidential reasoning approach, which has been developed on the basis of the
Dempster-Shafer theory to deal with hierarchical evaluation problems with uncertainty
[718] [7. 19][7.20] [7.22].
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Figure 7.1 The diagram of a safety analysis for an engineering system
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In this way, the safety associated with all failure modes can be evaluated with respect
to the safety levels defined. Then, these uncertain evaluations of the failure modes
associated with a component can be combined to produce an evaluation of the safety of
the component using the evidential reasoning algorithm. Similarly, the uncertain
evaluations for the components of a subsystem can be synthesised to evaluate
subsystem safety. The safety of the whole system can finally be assessed by
synthesising the safety information of the subsystems.
In this chapter, the proposed methodology combines safety modelling of failure modes
at the bottom level using fuzzy set theory and safety assessment of the whole system
using the evidential reasoning approach.
7.2 System Modelling for Safety Analysis and Synthesis
Section 7.1 has examined how an engineering system may be composed of several
sub-systems which can be further broken down to the component level. In probabilistic
safety analysis, the safety of a system is assessed by analysing each of its constituent
components. For example, such an analysis could be carried out by identifying the
following information for each component using FMECA [7.16].
i. Failure likelihood of occurrence of each identified failure mode.
ii. Possible consequences described by catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible.
iii. Failure consequence probability defining the likelihood that the failure
consequences of the identified failure mode will occur, given that the failure
mode has taken place.
As described in Chapter 3, given the above information, all criticality numbers of a
component under all severity classes can be obtained and a criticality matrix can be
constructed to show the distributions of criticality of component failure modes and to
provide a tool for assigning priorities for corrective action.
From the above, it can be seen that there are three basic parameters (failure likelihood,
consequence severity and failure consequence probability) which are used in assessing
the safety associated with each failure mode of a component. The safety level
associated with a particular failure mode is determined by these three parameters and
the product of these three parameter values is called "safety score" [7.7][7.5] if
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consequence severity can be described numerically. Safety scores are often used in the
judgement of safety where a high safety score represents poor safety and a low safety
score represents good safety. The safety score of a component is the sum of the safety
scores of its failure modes and the safety score of a system can be synthesised by
similarly processing the information produced for each of its components.
In the probabilistic method discussed above, it is implicitly assumed that the
consequence severity of a failure mode is described by linguistic variables, and the
failure likelihood and the failure consequence probability are assumed to take numerical
values. However, the failure likelihood and the failure consequence probability are
affected by so many factors in real life that, in some cases, it may be difficult to define
them precisely in numerical terms as the probabilities may often be made on the basis
of subjective judgements. Such subjective judgements are especially meaningful when
one deals with non-numerical data. In fact, it has sometimes been argued that although
human beings find quantitative prediction of safety difficult they may be comparatively
efficient at qualitative assessments using linguistic variables [7.14]. To describe the
likelihood of occurrence of a failure mode, for example, one may often use linguistic
variables such as "Highly frequent ", "Frequent ", "Reasonably frequent ", "Average ",
"Reasonably low ", "Low" and "Very low ". To describe a failure consequence probability,
linguistic variables such as "Definite ", "Highly likely ", "Reasonably likely ", "Likely ",
"Reasonably unlikely ", "Unlikely" and "Highly unlikely" may be used.
It may also be noted that in the above discussion it is assumed that the consequence
severity, the failure likelihood or the failure consequence probability of a failure mode
only belongs to one of the linguistic descriptions used to describe the respective extent.
For instance, the consequence severity of a failure mode only belongs to one of the
four severity classes - " Catastrophic ', 'Critical , 'Marginal" and "Negligible ". However,
such a description may at times be inadequate. For example, the consequence severity
of a failure mode may be something between "Catastrophic" and Critical" or even
between "Catastrophic" and "Negligible
Fuzzy set theory is well suited to model such subjective linguistic variables. In fuzzy
set theory, linguistic variables used in describing failure likelihood, consequence
severity and failure consequence probability can be characterised by their membership
functions to a set of categories which describe the degrees of failure likelihood, severity
class and failure consequence probability and which are usually graduated from low to
high. For instance, if U = (1, 2, 3, . .. n-i, n} represents a set of categories, the
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linguistic variables "Catastrophic ", "Very low" and "Highly likely" may be modelled by:
"Catastrophic" = ( 1/0,	 , n-3/0, n-2/0, n-1/0.75, n/LU)
"Very low" = ( 1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0,
	
, n/0}
"Highly likely" = ( 1/0, ••, n-4/0, n-3/0, n-2/0.75, n-1/1.0, n/0.25}
where the integers in the numerators of each term within the brackets represent the
categories and the real numbers in the denominators stand for the membership degrees.
The membership values for the components in U belonging to each of the linguistic
variables "Catastrophic ", "Very low" and "Highly likely" can thus be denoted as follows:
I-1Catastrophic = (0, ..., 0, 0.75, 1.0)
P-Very low = ( 1.0, 0.75, 0,	 •. , 0)
P-Highly likely = (0, .	 , 0, 0.75, 1.0, 0.25)
The fuzzy safety score of a failure mode of a component can be estimated by the
product of the fuzzy descriptions of the corresponding failure likelihood, consequence
severity and failure consequence probability. If L, C and E represent the fuzzy sets of
the failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure consequence probability of a
failure mode, the fuzzy safety score S can be defined as follows using fuzzy set
manipulation [7.14]:
S =C oE xL
P-s = P-c 0 E =	 P-
where symbol "o" represents composition operation and "x" Cartesian product operation
in fuzzy set theory as will be stated later.
is the description function of safety score S in terms of membership degrees p (I =
1, 2, . . . , n) representing the extent to which S belongs to element j in U. Each
element in P-s can be obtained using the max-mm method as will be shown in the next
section. It should be pointed Out that the fuzzy safety score of a failure mode obtained
using this method is the maximal possible one because of characteristics of Cartesian
and composition rules.
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In the above, S represents a fuzzy description for the safety score of a failure mode
while the relevant fuzziness is described by j.i ... To express the safety of the failure
mode in a clear way, linguistic variables such as "Poor", "Average", "Good" and
"Excellent" may be used. For instance, it may be quite clear to state that the safety of a
failure mode is to a large extent "Good". Such linguistic variables may be referred to as
safety expressions. The safety expressions may also be characterised by membership
degrees to each element in U so that the fuzzy safety score of the failure mode could
be identified in terms of these expressions. For instance, "Poor" could be defined as
follows:
"Poor" = ( 1/0,	 , n-2/0, n-I/0.75, n/1.0}
Such a definition needs to be consistent with the ones for other linguistic variables.
Thus, if a failure mode occurs "Highly frequently" and if it may cause "Definite" failure
effect classified to be "Catastrophic ", then the safety of the failure mode should be
"Poor ".
When fuzzy descriptions of the failure modes of each component have been evaluated
in terms of the safety expressions, it is desirable, as shown in Figure 7.1, to synthesise
them to assess the safety for each component, then for each subsystem if necessary,
and finally for the system being investigated. A novel synthesis approach is therefore
required for such a hierarchical evaluation propagation without any loss of useful
information generated for each failure mode of each component. The evidential
reasoning approach is one such method which is capable of combining uncertain
evaluations at a single level and implementing hierarchical propagation of such
evaluations between different levels.
Following a brief introduction of fuzzy operations, the rest of this chapter will present
how to describe, evaluate and identify the safety associated with a failure mode of a
component. Then, the evidential reasoning approach will be employed to synthesise
assessments of safety for each component and the system.
7.3 Safety Analysis Using Fuzzy Sets
7,3.1 Fuzzy Operations
Let U be a set and A and B subsets of U where U = {u 1 , u 2 ,	 . , uj. Suppose the
!nembership values for the elements in U belonging to the subsets A and B are denoted
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by PA = (, j.i, •••, ji,) and JB = (p., j.x, •••, tE), respectively. Then, some typical
fuzzy operations such as union, intersection, complement, Cartesian product and
composition of fuzzy sets are described as follows:
i. Complement. Complement of A is defined by:
ii- - I L\
- \A1txfl
where=1
-4, j=1 , 2 ,	 ,n.
ii. Intersection. Intersection of A and B is defined by:
=
where	 = min(JIA, i.ifl, j = 1, 2,	 , n.
iii. Union. Union of A and B is defined by:
MAUB = (PAuB)1
where 
'AUB = max(p, tA), j = 1, 2,	 , n.
iv. Cartesian product. Cartesian product of A and B is defined by:
I-1-AxB = (I.LxB)x
where t,	 = min(.t, tfl. For example, if I1A = ( 1, 0.5, 0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and J.'B
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1), then
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 1
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
J.LAXB	 0000 0 0 0
0000 0 0 0
0000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
v. Composition. Given the membership functions for set C and for the Cartesian
product of sets A and B, the composition of them is denoted by:
J.'c oAxB = (JoAxB)1x
where ji = max(min(jt, AB), , min(g, u)'), j = 1, 2, . , ii.
Suppose p, = (1, 0.5, 0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0). Pc oAxB can be calculated as follows
using the max-mm method.
Failure likelihood
Categories
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
0
0
0
0
0
0.25
1
0
0
0
0
0.25
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.5
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.5
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.25
0
0
0
0
1
0.25
0
0
0
0
0
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C 0AXB = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1)
where, for example, j.t	 = max(min(1, 0.5), min(0.5, 0.5), min(0.1, 0.1),
min(0, 0), min(0, 0), min(0, 0), min(0, 0)) = 0.5.
7.3.2 Fuzzy Safety Description
As discussed early in this chapter, linguistic variables can be used to describe failure
likelihood, consequence severity and failure consequence probability. A linguistic
variable may then be characterised by a membership function to a set of categories
with regard to the particular condition. It is often recommended that the number of
categories be restricted to no more than seven in order to remain within the practical
bounds of human discrimination [7.5]. The use of categorical judgements has been
quite successful in many practical situations [7.3][7.14]. It is usually convenient for
engineers to use categories to articulate safety information. The typical linguistic
variables for failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure consequence
probability of a failure event may be defined and characterised as shown in Tables 7.1,
7.2 and 7.3. From Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, it can be noted that the membership values
for each linguistic variable are asymmetric. This is because the conditions for the
definition of the safety expressions, as will be described in section 7.3.3, need to be
satisfied. It is obviously possible to have some flexibility in the definition of
membership functions to suit different situations.
Table 7.1
11L
Linguistic variables:
Highly frequent:
Frequent:
Reasonably frequent:
Average:
Reasonably low:
Low:
Very low:
0
0
0
0
0
0.25
1
0
0
0
0
0.25
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.5
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.75
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.5
0
0
0
0.75
1
0.25
0
0
0
0
1
0.25
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 7.2
	
Consequence severity
Categories
Linguistic variables:	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Catastrophic:	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.75	 1
Critical:	 0	 0	 0	 0.75	 1	 0.25	 0
Marginal:	 0	 0.25	 1	 0.75	 0	 0	 0
Negligible:	 1	 0.75	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Table 7.3
J.1E
Linguistic variables:
Definite:
Highly likely:
Reasonably likely:
Likely:
Reasonably unlikely
Unlikely:
Highly unlikely:
Failure consequence probability
Categories
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
From above fuzzy descriptions of failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure
consequence probability, it may be observed that the linguistic variables are not
exclusive, so that the sum of the membership degrees for the linguistic variables
belonging to a category may be greater than 1. For example, the sum of the elements in
column 1 of Table 7.1 is 1.25. This is because there are intersections among the defined
linguistic variables describing failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure
consequence probability. Inclusive expressions may make it more convenient for the
safety analyst to judge a failure mode.
Given a failure mode i, the failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure
consequence probability, denoted by L . , C, and E, respectively, may be characterised by
their membership functions with respect to the seven categories. Such membership
functions need to be assigned by safety analysts with reference to the above three
tables.
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The safety score S, of the i th failure mode of a component can be expressed by S, =
C, o E x L. The membership function of 5, is thus described by j.t = jc or,xi.
7.3.3 Fuzzy Safety Evaluation
The safety score S, characterised by
	
provides a fuzzy description of the safety of the
ith failure mode of a component. However, the safety may be expressed more clearly in
terms of linguistic variables. For instance, it is commonly understood that the safety of
a failure mode of a component can be expressed by degrees to which it belongs to such
linguistic variables as "Poor ", "Average ", "Good", and "Excellent ". Each of these linguistic
variables may be referred to as a safety expression. To evaluate s in terms of these
linguistic variables, it is necessary to characterise them using membership values with
ispect to the seven categories defined. These safety expressions need to be defined to
be exclusive for each category. The reasons for doing so are stated as follows:
i. Exclusive expressions can more clearly represent safety than inclusive ones
although it may be slightly more difficult for the safety analyst to make direct
judgement using the former.
ii. It makes it easier for the obtained fuzzy safety score to be mapped back to
one (or all) of the defined exclusive safety expressions.
iii. It facilitates the implementation of the evidential reasoning approach to
synthesise the safety of a large complex system.
The extent to which each safety expression belongs to each of the seven categories is
defined by a membership value. The sum of membership values for each expression
with respect to the seven categories is assigned to be the same. The purpose of doing
so is to make a rational projection of the obtained fuzzy safety score description back
to the defined safety expressions. In addition, following conditions also need to be
satisfied to confine the safety expression space within the certain extent:
L	 Spoor = CCatastrophic 0 EDefinite >< L Highly frequent
jL	 SAverage	 C Critical 0 E Reasonably likely X L Reasonably frequent
iii. SCOOd	 CMarginal 0 EReasonably unlikely x Reasonably low
CNegligible 0 EHighly unlikely x L Very low
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The above equations are commonly understood in the design process. For example, if
the likelihood of occurrence of a failure mode is highly frequent and its occurrence will
definitely result in catastrophic consequences, the safety of the failure mode should be
considered to be poor. The aim of having the above equations is to confine the safety
expressions to a certain extent. Considering the above requirements, the four safety
expressions are defined, on the basis of Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, as shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4
	 Safety expressions
l's,	 Categories
Linguistic variables:	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
1. Poor:	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.75	 1
2. Average:	 0	 0	 0	 0.5	 1	 0.25	 0
3. Good:	 0 0.25	 1	 0.5	 0 0	 0
4. Excellent:	 1	 0.75	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
The four defined safety expressions in Table 7.4 have the following characteristics:
i. "Poor" is described only by the membership values with regard to categories
6 and 7.
ii. "Excellent" is described only by the membership values with regard to
categories 1 and 2.
iii. The membership functions of "Good" and "Average" are not symmetric with
respect to categories 3 and 5, respectively, and actually they lay slightly more
weight on category 4.
7.3,4 Safety Identification
Using the Best-Fit method [7.14], the obtained fuzzy safety score description S of
failure mode i of a component can be mapped back to one (or all) of the defined safety
expressions (i.e., "Excellent", "Good", "Average" and "Poor"). The method uses the
distance between S, and each of the safety expressions to represent the degree to which
is confirmed to each of them. For instance, the distance between the obtained fuzzy
safety score description S, and the expression "Poor" is defined as follows:
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7
d 1 (S,, Poor) = (	 (-t, - P-Ioor)2)2
1=1
Similarly, we can define:
	
7	 1
d 2(S1 , Average)	 (	 (ji. - JAyerage )2) 2
j=1
	
7	 1
	
d 3(S ,
 Good) = (	 (	 - J.1bood))2
1=1
	
7	 -
2 2
	
d14(S Excellent) = (	 (j.i -
1=1
It should be pointed out that each d, (j 1, 2, 3, 4) is an unscaled distance. The closer
S is to the j th expression, the smaller d1 is. More specially, d, is equal to zero if S, is
just the same as the j th expression in terms of the membership functions. In such a
case, S, should not be evaluated to other expressions at all due to the exclusiveness of
these expressions. To embody such features, new indices need to be defined based on
d11 (j = 1, 2, 3, 4).
Suppose d (1 ^ J ^ 4) is the smallest among the obtained distances for S, and let a,
2' a13 and a14 represent the reciprocals of the relative distances between the identified
fuzzy safety description S, and each of the defined safety expressions with reference to
d. Then, a, (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be defined as follows:
d 
1	 j=1,2,3,4
/d1
If d1 , = 0 it follows that a1 is equal to 1 and the others are equal to 0. Then, c (j = 1,
2, 3, 4) can be normalised by:
=	 a1	 j=1, 2, 3, 4.
m1
Each f3, (j = 1, 2. 3, 4) represents the extent to which S belongs to the jth defined
safety expression. It can be noted that if 5, completely belongs to the j th expression
then is equal to 1 and the others are equal to 0. The sum of values of these indices
for S, is equal to 1, that is, 	 = 1. Thus	 could be viewed as a degree of
confidence that S, belongs to the j th safety expression.
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The following example shows the developed method for the obtained safety score
description to be mapped back to the defined safety expressions. Suppose i.i. = (0, 0, 0,
0, 0.1, 0.5, 1). Then, dq and cç,, (I = 1, 2, 3, 4) can be calculated by:
d11 = J02 + 02 + 02 + 02 ^ 0 . 1 2 ^ 0 .252 + (j	 0.269,
d 2 = 1.457, d 3 = 1.604, d 4 = 1.680 and
a11 = 1.000, a12 = 0.185, a = 0.168, a14 0.160
1312, 13 . 3 and f3 4 can then be calculated by:
J3, = 0.661, P12 = 0.122,	 0.111, f314 = 0.106
Thus, S is identified to belong to "Poor" with a confidence level of 66.1 percent, to
"Average" with 12.2 percent, to "Good" with 11.1 percent and to "Excellent" with 10.6
percent. Such an evaluation may be summerised by the following expectation:
S (s1 ) = ((0.661, "Poor"), (0.122, "Average "), (0.111, "Good"), (0.106, "Excellent"))
7.4 Synthesis of Safety Evaluation by Hierarchical Evidential
Reasoning
7.4.1 Evidential Reasoning Scheme
As discussed above, the safety of a component is determined by the associated failure
nodes. If a component only has one failure mode whose safety is absolutely evaluated
as "Good", then the safety of the component will be "Good". Generally, a component
nay have several failure modes. If the safety levels associated with the failure modes
are all absolutely evaluated as "Good ", then the safety of the component should also be
"Good". However, such certain and consistent evaluations can hardly be expected in real
life safety analysis. Problems may then arise as to how uncertain and inconsistent
evaluations of safety analysis of all the failure modes of a component may be
synthesised in a rational way so as to attain an (often uncertain) evaluation of the safety
of the component. The problems may be generalised as one of determining how the
safety of a system with a hierarchy as shown in Figure 7.1 could be evaluated. As
rgued before, a hierarchical evaluation process may be expected to provide a
asonable way of dealing with such problems [7.18][7.191[7.20][7.22].
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This evaluation process is based on the Dempster-Shafer (simply D-S) theory which is
well suited for handling incomplete assessment of uncertainty. The D-S theory can
model the narrowing of the hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence. In other
words, it will become more likely that a given hypothesis is true if more pieces of
evidence support that hypothesis. In Figure 7.1, whether the safety of a component is
"Excellent", "Good ", "Average" Or "Poor" would be regarded as a hypothesis. The
obtained safety evaluation of a failure mode may be viewed as a single piece of
evidence. If the safety associated with a failure mode is to a certain extent evaluated as
"Good", then the safety of the associated component would be to some degree "Good".
The hierarchical evaluation process provides a systematic way of synthesising such
uncertain safety evaluations of multiple failure modes to produce an evaluation for a
component.
To apply the D-S theory, the mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of all hypotheses
have to be satisfied. It is therefore necessary that all the linguistic variables for
expression of system safety be defined as distinct grades. In other words, if one of the
variables is absolutely confirmed, all the others must not be confirmed at all; if more
than one variable is confirmed simultaneously, the total degree of confidence must be
one or smaller than one. The linguistic variables defined in section 7.3.3 satisfy the
requirements of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. This enables us to employ the
evidential reasoning algorithm developed to synthesise the uncertain safety evaluations
generated for failure modes using fuzzy sets.
7.4.2 Algorithm
Suppose H represents a set of linguistic variables for safety expressions and H1 the jth
linguistic variable such as "Good". Then, H is defined by:
H = (H 1 , .	 ,H,	 J'N)
where N is the number of the linguistic variables defined. In section 7.3.3, for example,
H is defined by:
H = {Poor, Average, Good, Excellent)
Suppose there are Lk failure modes associated with the kth component. Let e denote
failure mode i associated with component k, denoted by ck . The set of the failure
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modes for the component can then be defined by:
Ek = {ekj, • • • ,	 • • , e/J}
Let Xkj be the normalised relative weight of failure mode i in evaluation of the safety of
component k where 0 ^ X ^ 1. The way of assigning X, can be found in [7.18][7.20]
and will be outlined in the next section. Suppose m,, = m(HJ /ekl ) (m, ^ 1) is a real
number, referred to as a basic probability assignment, which represents a degree to
which the obtained safety evaluation of the i th failure mode supports a hypothesis that
the safety of the kth component is confirmed to H1 . Then, ml, may be obtained as
follows:
m, = Xkj if
where j3 is given with respect to the kth component, as discussed in section 7.3.4.
As 0 ^ ki ^ 1 and	 = 1, then	 ^ 1. Suppose mu = m(HIek,) is the basic
probability assignment to H, which is the remaining belief unassigned after commitment
of belief to all H (I =1, , N), that is, ml,' = 1 - 7_1 ml,. A basic probability assignment
matrix M(ck /Ek ) for evaluation of the safety of the component Ck through the associated
failure modes Ek may then be formulated by:
	
mk'l	 • • m 1	 	 m1	 (ek ii
	
M (Ck lEk ) = mk	 m	 . m[ mf	 e
mf	 m1	 (ek }
Suppose m is a degree of confidence to which the safety of the kth component is
evaluated to H1 . Then, m can be obtained by synthesising the basic probability
assignments as listed in M(ck /Ek ) using the evidential reasoning algorithm as described
below.
Suppose 'P is a subset of H. Define a subset e () of Ek and a combined probability
assignment ml(i) as follows:
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eJ(S) = (ek i	}, I ^ £ < Lk ;	 mJI) =
where m('l'/ejk(I)) is a combined probability assignment to P confirmed by e () . Then, the
algorithm can be stated as follows:
(H1 ): m/(1 ^l) = K/k(1+1)(m/k()in,j+j ^	 + mi(I)m,L+l), j1,	 , N
rtr.	 H	 _v•	 H	 Hti-i . mJ(1+l) -
-INN
K (1+1) = [i -
r=1j=1
Jt
i=1,	 , L—1
7.4.3 Hierarchical Propagation
It can be proven from the algorithm that mJLk) is the overall probability assignment to
q' (cii ) confirmed by Ek and m Lk ) = 0 for any 'i'cH other than P = H1 (j=1, , N) and
H [7.18], or
m=m(HJIEk)=mujk), j=1,,N, and m=m(H/Ek)=mj)
m(M-'/Ek) = mlk(Lk) = 0 for any Pci-I but P^H1 u = I,	 , N) and H
Consequently, the safety of the kth component can be evaluated in terms of the safety
expressions defined in H by the following expectation:
S(ck )	 ((ms, H1 ), j=1,	 ,N}
that is, the kth component is evaluated to H1 with a degree of confidence of mLk,
N. Such an evaluation is generated by synthesising the given safety
evaluations of the relevant failure modes.
CHAPTER 7 - Fuzzy Set Modelling and Evidential Reasoning	 Page 197
In a similar way, the safety evaluation of each component could be obtained. A further
problem is then to produce an evaluation on the safety of a subsystem which is
composed of several components. Suppose there are L, components associated with the
ith subsystem. The set of the components in subsystem I is defined by:
F1 =	 , C,	 , C1}
At this stage, the safety evaluations of components have been generated. So, the fact
that the safety of the kth component is confirmed to H1 to an extent of m (j=1, . , N)
could be viewed as a piece of evidence while the safety of the lth subsystem may be
assumed to be evaluated to any of H1 (j=1, . . , N). Suppose rnj is a degree of
confidence that the safety of the / th subsystem is confirmed to H1 . The problem then
becomes how to obtain m' from m (j=1, . , N; k=1, .. , L,). This problem can be
solved in the same way as described in the last subsection if Cik is treated as e, m as
and mj as m.
The safety of the I th subsystem can then be evaluated by:
S(s,)= f(mj, Hi ), j=1, . . ,N)
Let m 1 be a degree of confidence to which the safety of the whole system is confirmed
to H. Then, m 1 can be obtained from mj, (j = 1, 2, . . . , N; 1 1, 2, . . , S, where S
is the number of the subsystems) using the evidential reasoning algorithm. The safety
of the whole system can thus be evaluated by:
Ss) = f(m', H1 ), j=1, .. , NI
7.5 An Example
The hydraulic hoist transmission system of a marine crane is functionally shown in
Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4. Each constituent subsystem is associated with several failure
modes. The precise values of the three variables (the failure likelihood, consequence
severity and failure consequence probability) used to describe the safety associated with
a failure mode of a subsystem may be difficult to estimate as the marine crane is
working in a changing environment. However, it could be comparatively easier to use
fuzzy subjective judgements to describe these three variables in order to evaluate the
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safety of this crane hydraulic hoist transmission system.
7.5.1 Failure Mode Modelling
1. Hydraulic oil tank
Four failure modes of this subsystem are identified. These are:
i. Level gauge failure
ii. Oil temperature too high or too low
iii. Major leak
iv. Minor leak
The safety associated with each of these failure modes is analysed using the
methodology described above.. The detailed analysis for the first failure mode is
presented. The analyses for other failure modes are conducted in a similar manner.
i. Level gauge failure
For this failure mode, the failure likelihood is considered to be approximately
"Reasonably low" and may vary about "Reasonably low ". With reference to Table
7.1, the failure likelihood L 11 is modelled as follows:
L 11 = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
The consequence severity is considered to be approximately "Marginal" and
may vary about "Marginal ". With reference to Table 7.2, the failure likelihood
C 11 is modelled as follows:
C 11 = (1/0,2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
The failure consequence probability is considered to be approximately
"Unlikely" and may vary about "Unlikely ". With reference to Table 7.3, the
failure likelihood E 11 is modelled as follows:
E 11 = (1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
The fuzzy safety score S 11 of this failure mode is calculated as follows:
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S 11 =C 11 oE 11 xL 11 = { 1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/0.8, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0}
The obtained fuzzy safety score of the failure mode can be mapped back to
the defined safety expressions ("Poor ", "Average ", "Good" and "Excellent"). The
safety associated with this failure mode is identified as follows:
S(s 11) = { (0.127399, "Poor"), (0.167771, "Average"), (0.560565, "Good"),
(0.144265, "Excellent ")}
It can be noted that the three parameters, namely the failure likelihood, the
consequence severity and the failure consequence probability of this failure
mode, are estimated approximately as "Reasonably low ", "Marginal" and
"Unlikely ", respectively. Therefore, the evaluation of this failure mode should
be identified to belong to "Good" and "Excellent" to a large extent. This is
confirmed by the above results.
Ak) is a normalised relative weight for the jth failure mode of the kth
subsystem, which can be calculated on the basis of the designer's judgements
on the relative weights of the failure modes associated with the kth
subsystem. 2'kj can be assigned using the method described in [7.18][7.20]. It
is assumed that if all the failure modes of the hydraulic tank are absolutely
evaluated as "Excellent" the hydraulic oil tank is judged as "Excellent" with a
confidence degree of over 99.5 percent. The following formulae can be used
to assign the value of Xkj as shown in [7.18][7.20]:
? =ak--.
where o = 1 - 0.995 = 0.005
= the relative weight of the j failure mode of the hydraulic oil tank
(k = 1),
= the largest value among the weights of the failure modes of the
hydraulic oil tank (k = 1),
ak = a priority coefficient representing the importance of the role the
most importance factor plays in evaluation of the safety of the
hydraulic oil tank (k = 1).
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= 0.46.
ii. Oil temperature too high or too low
L 12 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.3, 4/1.0, 5/0.8, 6/0.1, 7/0)
C 12 = (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 12 = (1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S 12 = C 12 o E 12xL 12 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.25, 4/0.25, 5/0.25, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S(s 12) = ((0.203344, "Poor"), (0.306207, "Average "), (0.295963, "Good"),
(0.194486, "Excellent"))
= 0.92
iii. Major leak
L 13 = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 13 = (1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
E 13 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.9, 4/1.0, 5/0.9, 6/0.1, 7/0}
S 3 = C 13 o E 13xL 13 = (1/0.3, 2/0.9, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 13) = ((0.172777, "Poor"), (0.183395, "A verage"), (0.361116, "Good"),
(0.282711, "Excellent"))
= 0.92
iv.Minor leak
= [1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C14	 [ 1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 14	 (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S 14 = C 14 o E 14xP 14 = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 14)	 ((0.179706, "Poor"), (0.187129, "Average"), (0.328012, "Good"), (0.305152,
"Excellent"))
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14 = 0.23
= 0.24
2. Auxiliary system
Six failure modes of this subsystem are identified and evaluated as follows:
i. Failure allowing contaminant into system
L 21 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.2, 4/0.8, 5/1.0, 6/0.25, 7/0)
C 21 = ( 1/0.1, 2/0.4, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
E 21 = ( 1/0.4, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S 21 = C 21 o E 21 xP 21 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.2, 4/0.8, 5/0.8, 6/0.25, 7/0)
S (s 21 ) = ( (0.140185, "Poor"), (0.545059, "Average"), (0.183801, "Good"),
(0.130956, "Excellent"))
= 0.5
ii. Filter blocked
= (1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
c = (1/0.1, 2/0.4, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
E, = (1/0.4, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S = C 22 o ExP 22 = ( 1/0.25, 2/0.8, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0,0,7/0)
S(s.) = ( (0.176247, "Poor"), (0.184596, "Average"), (0.360054, "Good"),
(0.279 103, "Excellent"))
A22 = 0.25
iii. Blocking indicator fails to operate
L = ( 1/0, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
c = (1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
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E = ( 1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S = C23 o ExP 23 = (1/0, 2/0.3, 3/0.75, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S (sr) = ((0.126268, "Poor"), (0.167319, "Average"), (0.568525, "Good"),
(0.137888, "Excellent"))
A23 = 0.25
iv. Minor leak
L = ( 1/0, 2/0.2, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.5, 6/0, 7/0)
= (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E = ( 1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
= C 4 o ExP 24 = (1/0, 2/0.2, 3/0.6, 4/0.75, 5/0.5, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 24) = ((0.157031, "Poor"), (0.297143, "Average"), (0.352437, "Good j,
(0.166276, "Excellent"))
A24 = 0.25
v. Major leak
L = ( 1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
c = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
E = ( 1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
S=CoExP = ( 1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s) = ((0.176890, "Poor"), (0.187174, "Average"), (0.352436, "Good"),
(0.283500, "Excellent"))
= 0.8
vi. No output from control pump
L = ( 1/0.2, 2/1.0, 3/0.9, 4/0.2, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C = (1/0.1, 2/0.4, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
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E = ( 1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.6, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S = C26 o ExP = ( 1/0.2, 2/0.8, 3/0.8, 4/0.2, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s)	 ((0.164996, "Poor"), (0.179384, "Average"), (0.410346, "Good"),
(0.245275, "Excellent"))
= 0.8
A2 = 0.24
3. Control system
Five failure modes of this subsystem are identified and evaluated as follows:
i. Major leak
L 31 = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 31 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.8, 5/1.0, 6/0.4, 7/0.1)
E 31 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.2, 4/0.8, 5/1.0, 6/0.3, 7/0)
S 3j = C 31 o E 31 xP 31 = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
5(s 31) = ((0.175962, "Poor"), (0.186099, "Average"), (0.346332, "Good"),
(0.291607, "Excellent"))
= 0.8
ii. Minor leak
L 32 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.75, 5/1, 6/0.25, 7/0)
C 32 = (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 32 = (1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S 32 =C 32 oE 32xP 32 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.8, 6/0.8, 7/0.3)
S(s 32) = ((0.272065, "Poor"), (0.377796, "Average"), (0.180610, "Good"),
(0.169529, "Excellent"))
X32=0.2
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iii. No output when required
L 33 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.8, 5/1.0, 6/0.3, 7/0)
C 33 = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 33 = {1/0, 2/0, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.6, 6/0, 7/0)
S 33 =C 33 oE 33xP 33 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.75, 5/0.75, 6/0.3, 7/0)
S(s 33) = ((0.137888,
(0.126268, "Excellent"))
= 0.4
"f d"door	 (0.568525, "Average "), (0.1673 19,	 oo
iv. Control output for lowering motion cannot be closed when required
L = ( 1/0, 2/.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E = ( 1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.7, 4/1.0, 5/0.7, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S = C o ExP 34 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.1, 4/0.1, 5/0.1, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S(s) = ((0.227082,
(0.227082, "Excellent"))
= 0.8
"D	 "\
"G "door i, (0.2729 18, "Average"), (0.2729 18,	 ood ,,
v. Control output for hoisting up motion can not be closed when required
L 35 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.7, 4/1.0, 5/0.7, 6/0.1, 7/0)
C 35 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 35 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.7, 4/1.0, 5/0.7, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S 35 = C 35 o E 35xP 35 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.1, 4/0.1, 5/0.1, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S(s 35) = ((0.227082, "Poor"), (0.272918, "Average"), (0.272918, "Good"),
(0.227082, "Excellent 'fl
= 0.8
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= 0.48
4. Protection system
Eight failure modes of this subsystem are identified and evaluated as follows:
i. Failure of switch when energised
L 41 = ( 1/0, 2/0.3, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.6, 6/0.1, 7/0)
C 41 = ( 1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E41 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.8, 5/1.0, 6/0.4, 7/0.1)
S 41 = C o E 41 xP 41 = ( 1/0, 2/0.3, 3/0.6, 4/0.75, 5/0.6, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S(s41 )	 ( (0.160484,
(0.169858, "Excellent"))
= 0.32
"D	 II\ "G d")oor j, (0.321832, "Average"), (0.347827,	 00
ii. Failure of return for hoisting up when de-energised
L 42 = ( 1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 42 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.2, 6/0.9, 7/1.0)
E 42 = ( 1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.8, 4/1.0, 5/0.8, 6/0.1, 7/0)
42 = C42 0 E 42xP 42 = ( 1/0.2, 2/0.2, 3/0.2, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 42) = ( (0.211166, "Poor"), (0.228852, "Average"), (0.283647, "Good"),
(0.276335, "Excellent"))
= 0.32
iii. Minor leak
L 43 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.75, 5/1, 6/0.4, 7/0.1)
C 43	 (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 43 = ( 1/0.25, 2/1, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
CHAPTER 7 - Fuzzy Set Modelling and Evidential Reasoning	 Page 206
5 43 = C43 o E 43xP 43 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.75, 5/0.75, 6/0.4, 7/0.1)
S(s43)	 ((0.154418, "Poor"), (0.542517, "Average"), (0.171944, "Good"),
(0.131120, "Excellent"))
= 0.16
iv. Major leak
L = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
(1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E	 (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.2, 5/0.75, 6/1.0, 7/0.3)
= C 0 ExP	 (1/0.3, 2/0.8, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s) = ((0.169529, "Poor"), (0.180610, "Average"), (0.377796, "Good"),
(0.272065, "Excellent"))
= 0.64
v. Failure of emergency stop
L 45 = (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C45 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E45 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.75, 5/1.0, 6/0.3, 7/0)
S 45 = C 45 0 E 45xP 45 = (1/0.3, 2/0.3, 3/0.3, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 45) = ((0.169529, "Poor'), (0.180610, 'Average"), (0.377796, "Good"),
(0.272065, "Excellent ')
= 0.16
vi. Failure of hoisting up limit
L = ( 1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0]
C = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
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E = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.6, 6/0, 7/0]
= C46 o ExP 6 = (1/0.1, 2/0.1, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s) = ( (0.225805, "Poor"), (0.245933, "Average "), (0.272623, "Good"),
(0.255638, "Excellent"))
?L46=0.64
vii. Failure of hoisting down limit
L 47	 (1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0, 5/0, 610, 710]
C 47 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 47 = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
S47 = C47 o E 47xP47 = (1/0.1, 2/0.1, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S (S 47) = ((0.225805, "Poor"), (0.245933, "Average"), (0.272623, "Good"),
(0.255638, "Excellent"))
0.64
viii. Low boost pressure switch fails to open
L 48 = (1/1.0, 2/0.9, 3/0.2, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0]
C48 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 48 = (1/0, 2/0.1, 3/0.75, 4/1.0, 5/0.75, 6/0.1, 7/0)
S 48 =C 48 OE 4sXP 48 = (1/0.1, 2/0.1, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 48) = ((0.225805, 'Poor"), (0.245933, "Average"), (0.272623, "Good"),
(0.25563 8, "Excellent"))
x48 = 0.64
= 0.48
5. Hydraulic servo transmission system
Seven failure modes of this subsystem are identified and evaluated as follows:
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i. Major leak
L 51 = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/1.0, 4/0.8, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
C 51 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 51 = [ 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.7, 5/1.0, 6/0.3, 7/0)
S 51 = C51 o E 51 x.P 51 = (1/0.1, 2/0.3, 3/0.3, 4/0.3, 5/0.1, 6/0, 7/0)
5(s 51) = [(0.186270, "Poor"), (0.241453, "Average"), (0.341080, "Good"),
(0.231196, "Excellent"))
= 0.88
ii. Minor leak
L 52 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.08, 5/1.0, 6/0.3, 7/0)
C 52 = (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0.2, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 52 = [1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.75, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S 52 = C52 o E 52xP 52 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0.1, 4/0.75, 5/0.75, 6/0.3, 7/0)
5 (552) = ((0.137888, "Poor"), (0.568525, "Average"), (0.167319, "Good"),
(0.126268, "Excellent ")
52 = 0.21
iii. Shaft failure
L 53 = ( 1/0.25, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C53 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.3, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E53 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.8, 6/1.0, 7/0.3)
553 = C53 o E 53xP 53 = (1/0.25, 2/0.8, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S (s 53) = ((0.169884, "Poor"), (0.181104, "Average"), (0.3 85875, "Good"),
(0.263 138, "Excellent"))
= 0.44
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iv. No output from the package motor
L = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.9, 6/1.0, 7/0.3)
C = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 54 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0.6, 4/1.0, 5/0.6, 6/0, 7/0)
S M = C S4 oExp 54 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.1, 6/0.1, 7/0.1)
"S(s) = ((0.249886,	 oor i, (0.279311, "Average"), (0.249886, "Good"),
(0.220917, "Excellent"))
= 0.44
v. Hydraulic short circuit
L 55 = ( 1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 55 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.3, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
E 55 = ( 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.5, 6/0.8, 7/1.0)
S 55 = C 55 o E 55x.P 55 = ( 1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S (s 55 )	 ( (0.175962, "Poor"), (0.186099, "Average "), (0.346332, "Good"),
(0.291607, "Excellent"))
= 0.44
vi. Motor seizure
L 56 = ( 1/0.3, 2/1.0, 3/0.8, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 56 = ( 1/0, 2/0.25, 3/1.0, 4/0.75, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
E 56 = ( 1/0.3, 2/0.7, 3/1.0, 4/0.7, 5/0.3, 6/0.1, 7/0)
556 = C 56 o E 56xP 56 = ( 1/0.3, 2/0.75, 3/0.75, 4/0.1, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 56)	 ( (0.169055, "Poor"), (0.180786, "Average"), (0.376335, "Good"),
(0.273824, "Excellent"))
= 0.44
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vii. Pipe burst
L 57	 (1/1.0, 2/0.75, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
C 57 = f 1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 5/0.1, 6/0.75, 7/1.0)
E57 = (1/0, 2/0, 3/0, 4/0.1, 5/0.8, 6/1.0, 7/0.25)
S 57 = C57 o E 57xP57 = (1/0.75, 2/0.75, 3/0.1, 4/0, 5/0, 6/0, 7/0)
S(s 57)	 ((0.106954,
(0.652392, "Excellent"))
= 0.21
= 0.98
"D	 t\oor j, (0.112284, "Average"), (0.128371, "Good"),
7.5.2 Safety Synthesis
Using the hierarchical evidential reasoning approach described in section 7.4, the
syntheses of safety evaluations at the subsystem level and system level can be carried
out. Uncertain evaluations of the subsystems are obtained as follows:
1.Hydraulic oil tank
S (l)	 ((0.134298, "Poor"), (0.201362, "Average"), (0.451697, "Good"), (0.200029,
"Excellent ") }
2. Auxiliary system
S ) = ((0.116894, "Poor"), (0.200282, "Average "), (0.437804, "Good"), (0.202550,
"Excellent ")}
3.Control system
S (3)	 ((0.162497, "Poor"), (0.299497, "Average"), (0.299230, "Good"), (0.211705,
"Excellent"))
4.Protection system
S (4) = ((0.166221, "Poor"), (0.224034, "Average "), (0.325006, "Good"), (0.237506,
"Excellent"))
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5. Hydraulic servo transmission system
S (S) = ((0.141912, "Poor"), (0.207604, "Average "), (0.362763, "Good"), (0.246110,
"Excellent"))
Uncertain evaluation of the whole system is obtained as follows:
S =	 ((0.115566, "Poor"), (0.203768, "Average"), (0.425980, "Good"), (0.223201,
"Excellent ")
From the above results, it is obvious that four subsystems (the hydraulic oil tank,
auxiliary system, protection system and hydraulic servo transmission system) have to a
large extent been assessed as "Good". For example, the hydraulic oil tank has been
assessed as "Good" with a belief of 45.1697 percent; as "Excellent" with 20.0029
percent; as "Average" with 20.1362 percent; and as "Poor" with 13.4298 percent. The
control system has been evaluated to a slightly larger extent as "Average" and "Good ".
Since the safety of the hydraulic transmission system is determined by the safety of
each of the constituent subsystems, the system safety should be evaluated as "Good" to
a large extent. This is in harmony with the result obtained above as the safety of this
hydraulic transmission system has been assessed as "Good" and "Excellent" to the extents
of 42.5980 percent and 22.3201 percent, respectively.
The above information provides an analysis of the safety of the crane hydraulic
transmission system and an idea of the potential problem areas. From this information,
the design engineer can have an insight into system safety and may then decide if
design actions need to be taken to improve matters.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
A new methodology is proposed in this chapter for safety analysis and synthesis based
on fuzzy set theory and an evidential reasoning approach. In this methodology, the
safety of a failure event is analysed using fuzzy set modelling. This provides the safety
analyst with flexibility in articulating judgements about such parameters as failure
likelihood, consequences severity and failure consequence probability which are often
used in safety analysis. The examination of the safety of a complex system with a
hierarchical evaluation structure is carried out using an evidential reasoning approach,
based on the information produced. Such a reasoning framework provides the safety
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analyst with a rational tool to make full use of the information generated at the lowest
level in design to evaluate the safety of the whole system.
The proposed methodology can be used as an alternative approach for safety analysts to
carry out analysis particularly in those situations where distributions of variables for use
in probabilistic risk studies are difficult or impossible to obtain. Furthermore, since
human reasoning is intrinsically fuzzy, it is believed that the proposed approach will be
potentially useful in safety analysis and synthesis in many industrial environments.
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CHAPTER 8
Techno-economic Modelling for Design
and Maintenance Optimisation
Based on Safety Analysis
SUMMARY
"Design for safety" necessarily involves decisions about design features and/or
operating practices that can be included in a practical design. A techno-economic
analysis may be beneficially carried out to achieve this. A techno-economic analysis
may be considered as one in which both safety and cost objectives are simultaneously
analysed to aid design decisions.
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, several safety methodologies have been developed to identify
the top events and associated prime implicants (cut sets) of a MTO product, to assess
their probabilities of occurrence, and to predict component/subsystem failures. Such
information can be utilised to construct a techno-economic model for design and
maintenance optimisation.
This chapter proposes a techno-economic modelling methodology which brings together
safety and cost objectives into the decision making process for the improvement of
design aspects and maintenance policies. Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM)
techniques are then employed to process the formulated techno-economic model. The
produced results can assist designers in developing good compromise designs and
maintenance policies that take into account system top event-caused consequences,
maintenance cost, repair cost and design review cost. A technical example of a
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hydraulic hoist transmission system of a marine pedestal crane is presented to
demonstrate the interaction between economic modelling and safety analysis and to
indicate the potential use of this techno-economic modelling methodology in the
decision making process involving design and maintenance.
8.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 2, the report on the inquiry into the Piper Alpha accident has
identified the need for the consideration of "design for safety" issues from the early
design stages to minimise the inherent hazards of a MTO product [8.3], and a "safety
case" approach is suggested to include the identification of a representative sample of
accident scenarios and the assessment of the consequences of each scenario together
with an assessment, in general terms, of the likelihood of occurrence using Qualitative
Risk Analysis (QRA). Techno-economic analysis is proposed here to evaluate
reasonably practicable steps to control risks and to incorporate safety aspects into the
design process from as early a stage as is possible. Then safety can be considered as a
criterion and "design for safety" can move from an assessment function to a decision
making function and finally to a verification function.
There are several general steps that appear in a decision making process. These may be
presented in terms of the following three steps [8.2]:
i. Recognition and formulation of the problem.
ii. Search for feasible alternatives.
iii. Analysis and selection.
The recognition and formulation of the problem may be the key step in decision
making. The search for feasible alternatives involves developing potential solutions to
the problem. The aim of this step is to develop a list of potential alternatives, and then
to screen these alternatives to select a small group of feasible alternatives. As will be
described in this chapter, formal Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM) tools
for design synthesis may be used to process the constructed techno-economic model to
produce feasible alternatives. Finally, an assessment of the feasible alternatives is
carried out and the preferred alternative is then selected.
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In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, several QRA methodologies involving FMECA, the MBRM, the
qualitative reasoning approach and the Monte Carlo simulation method have been
developed to identify the top events and associated prime implicants (cut sets) of a
MTO product, to assess their probabilities of occurrence, and to predict
component/subsystem failures. Such safety information has not been fully utilised to aid
design decisions. However, such information may be effectively utilised to construct a
techno-economic model in order to optimise both design aspects and maintenance
policies of an engineering system within both economic and technical constraints.
Techno-economic modelling of the safety of large MTO products has been extensively
discussed in literature(8.l[S.4I(S.S1ft&9, but rty t' pTaC'LCa\ app\cañons are
reported. This could be largely because of the uncertain value placed ou hurcn rift rid
difficulties in quantifying risks [8.6]. However, it has been noted that if the uncertainty
regarding the risks of a MTO product is not unacceptably high, a techno-economic
analysis may be beneficially carried out to process the safety information produced and
to make design decisions. Techno-economic analysis has been used by the E(ea(th. aI
Safety Executive (HSE) to determine whether risks are acceptable [8.6]. However, risk
reduction ceases to be "reasonable" when cost becomes "grossly disproportionate" [8.6].
It has been recognised that it is necessary to quantify not only risks but also the cost of
proposed measures and the benefit in terms of the reduced risks. It has also been noted
that techno-economic analysis may beneficially be carried out not only in comparative
terms but also using formal decision making tools to achieve the effective and efficient
risk reduction.
Safety and cost are obviously two conflicting objectives, with higher safety leading to
higher cost. It is generally impossible to have a design which could maximise safety
(i.e. minimise risks) and minimise the life cycle cost simultaneously. A compromise is
therefore required. The decision as to which objective is to be stressed will be
dependent on the particular situation in hand. The appropriate level of safety then
becomes dependent on the relative importance of cost and safety objectives. If the non-
dominated design options for such a situation have to be obtained, it becomes feasible
to use a formal MODM tool to arrive at efficient or optimal decisions, although other
approaches could also be used.
In this chapter, a techno-economic modelling methodology is proposed to interrelate
economic modelling with safety analysis using the methodologies developed in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to formulate a techno-economic model in which both safety and
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cost objectives are involved. This model takes into account both design aspects and
maintenance activities. MODM techniques are then employed to process the model to
generate the best compromise maintenance policies and design review actions.
8.2 Safety Modelling
8.2.1 Safety Analysis
The top events and associated prime implicants (cut sets) of a MTO product can be
identified, in the form of a Boolean representation table, using the inductive bottom-up
methodology incorporating the MBRM and FMECA, as described in Chapter 4. Such
an inductive methodology may give a higher level of confidence that all system top
events and respective prime implicants are identified, especially for MTO products with
a comparatively high level of innovation.
The probabilities of occurrence of the identified system top events and associated prime
implicants can be quantitatively estimated, on the basis of the obtained final system
Boolean representation table, using the simulation model developed in section 6.4.3.
The typical model outputs are:
probability distribution of occurrence of each system top event with MTBM,
and
probability distribution of occurrence of each prime implicant (cut set) with
MTBM.
Component/subsystem failures can also be simulated on the basis of the constructed
component/subsystem failure simulation model. As described in section 6.4.2,
component/subsystem failure distributions of the system with MTBM can be produced
by applying the Monte Carlo techniques to such a model.
After the top events of the system have been identified, consequence analysis can be
carried out to study the possible effects caused by the occurrence of each identified
system top event. As described in Chapter 3, the possible consequences caused by the
occurrence of a system top event can be quantified in terms of the possible loss of lives
and property, and the degradation of the environment.
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The safety information produced can be used to construct a techno-economic model
designed to improve the safety of the system and to reduce the life cycle cost. In the
remainder of this chapter, a techno-economic modelling methodology is proposed in
which both the probabilities of occurrence of the system top events and the costs of
system failures, maintenance, repairs and design review over the product life time can
be simultaneously taken into consideration.
8.2.2 Safety Modelling
The occurrence of a system top event could result in serious consequences. The safety
of a large engineering system can be improved by reducing the probabilities of
occurrence of the system top events.
The occurrence of a system top event is completely dependent on the occurrence of the
associated minimal prime implicants (cut sets). Therefore, reduction of the probability
of occurrence of a system top event is a matter of reducing or eliminating the
probabilities of occurrence of the associated prime implicants. The usual way of
reducing the probabilities of occurrence of the system top events is to reduce or
eliminate the probabilities of occurrence of some significant prime implicants with
relatively higher probabilities of occurrence since it is impractical and impossible to
reduce or eliminate all the associated prime implicants.
Suppose there are n system top events and P . (MTBM) represents the probability of
occurrence of top event i's . Suppose c prime implicants are taken into account for
reduction or elimination regarding all the system top events. Let PDJ(MTBM) represent
the original probability of occurrence of the jth prime implicant before a design review
action is taken and PDJ represent the probability reduction of occurrence of this prime
implicant as a results of a design review action. P(MTBM) and PDJ (MTBM) can be
obtained using simulation as described in the last section. It should be noted that such
probabilities are functions of MTBM. As MTBM increases, the probabilities become
larger. Such probability functions are also discrete and nonlinear because they can only
be obtained at discrete MTBM values.
The safety of a system can be improved by minimising risks. If the reduction or
elimination of one prime implicant does not significantly affects others, the risk
function can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of the system
top events and c prime implicants considered for reduction or elimination while each
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system top event is weighted on the basis of the severity of the possible consequences.
Suppose Risk represents such a function. The safety model can be constructed as
follows:
mm: Risk = EK1 X P(MTBM) 
+ C	
X (PD) (MTBM) - Dj)
subject to: MTBMmax MTBM ^ MTBM
0 ^ &D) PD)
 (MTBM ) (j = 1, 2,	 , c)
where: K1 = the weighting factor for top event 7's.
MTBM X the largest MTBM value used in the simulation analysis for the
prediction of the probabilities of occurrence of the system top events and
associated prime implicants.
MTBM, = the smallest MTBM value used in simulation analysis for the
prediction of the probabilities of occurrence of the system top events and the
associated prime implicants.
KDJ = K, if the jth prime implicant is associated with top event T1.
The first term of the Risk function deals with maintenance policies. This term represents
the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of system top events before design actions
are taken. The second term takes into account both maintenance policies and design
review actions. This term represents the remainder of the probabilities of occurrence of
c prime implicants after design actions have been taken. The occurrence of the prime
implicants considered for reduction or elimination contributes to the occurrence of
system top events. Obviously, the smaller the sum of the two terms is, the higher the
safety level of the system. It can be noted that some prime implicants may be double
accounted in the Risk function. The purpose of modelling safety in such a way is to
make sure that Risk is a monotonicly increasing function of MTBM. Risk assessment is
not affected by double accounting of some prime implicants. This implies that the
model is sound. The above safety model implies that maintenance policies and design
review actions should be implemented to minimise the risks associated with the system.
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8.3. Economic Modelling
Cost is always an important issue in the design process of a large engineering product.
The life cycle cost of a large engineering product may be modelled by taking into
account the top event-caused consequences, repair cost, maintenance cost and design
review cost. The following simplifying assumptions are made to implement economic
modelling.
i. The basic diagram of the system to be analysed is not changed.
ii. Manpower and spare parts are sufficient for repair and maintenance activities.
iii. Cost incurred is expressed as the present value.
The life cycle cost model is proposed as follows.
8.3.1 Top Event-caused Cost Modelling
A system may have several serious top events, each of which could result in a system
breakdown and possibly cause serious consequences such as injury or loss of lives,
damage or loss of property and the degradation of the environment. Top event-caused
cost includes the following three parts:
i. CTC: cost directly resulting from the occurrence of the system top events.
ii. c: lost income due to the loss of the production capacity.
iii. CTR : repair cost caused by the occurrence of the system top events.
lop event-caused cost COST is given by:
COSTT
 = CTC + C + CTR
CTC
	
CrXP1(MTBM)
cit =ECP1(MTBM)
CTR = CRjXPj(MTBM)
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where: CT = cost directly caused by the occurrence of top event T1.
C = lost income caused by the occurrence of top event T1.
CR = repair cost caused by the occurrence of top event T.
8.3.2 Maintenance Cost Modelling
Maintenance cost includes the following three parts:
i. CML: cost of labour.
ii. CMP: cost of parts.
iii. CMM: lost income during the periods of maintenance activities.
Maintenance cost COSTM is given by:
COSTM = CML + CMP + CMM
T.
MTBM
CML =
	CMLi
i=1
TPr
MTBM
CMP =	 CMPI
i =1
MTBM
CMM =
	
CMMI
i =1
where: CMli = cost of the labour required for the ith maintenance.
CMP	 cost of the parts required for the ith maintenance.
CMM = lost income during the period of the ith maintenance.
T 1	 the project life time.
the number of major maintenance activities to be conducted over TPT.
If CMLI	 CML, CMPI = CMP and CMMI = CMM for i = 1, 2	 TPT COSTM can be
''MTBM'
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expressed as follows:
T
CM = (CML + CMP + CMM) x MTBM
8.3.3 Repair Cost Modelling
If a key component/subsystem in a system fails, the system should be shut down and
the failed component/subsystem should be replaced or repaired immediately. Repair
cost includes the following three parts:
i. C: cost of labour.
ii. Cm,: cost of parts.
iii. C: lost income caused by the loss of the production capacity due to failures
of the components/subsystems.
Repair cost COSTR is given by:
COSTR = CRL + CRP + CRR
CRL =CRu xf(MTBM)
CRP =CRP1 xf1(MTBM)
CRR = CRRi x f(MTBM)
where: CR = cost of the labour for repairing the ith subsystem.
CRP = cost of the parts for repairing the ith subsystem.
= lost income caused by the loss of the production capacity due to failures
of the ith subsystem.
f(MTBM) = the number of failures of the ith component/subsystem, which is a
function of MTBM and can be obtained from the component/subsystem failure
simulation analysis as described in section 6.4.2.
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m = the number of the components/subsystems.
8.3.4 Design Review Cost Modelling
Since the basic design diagram of the system to be analysed is not changed, a design
review may only involve the use of more reliable components or provision of protection
systems, sensors and redundancies, or combinations of such measures, to reduce or
eliminate the most significant prime implicants associated with the identified system top
events. Obviously, as more investment is directed at the system for safety improvement,
a higher safety level of the system can be achieved. A higher safety level of the system
results in the lower probabilities of occurrence of the system top events, which lead to
a less expenditure in the operation and maintenance processes.
In the design review cost modelling, the following assumptions are made for the
convenience of analysis.
i. The investment to be assigned to the system safety improvement first goes to
the reduction or elimination of the prime implicants (associated with the
identified system top events) with relatively higher probabilities of
occurrence.
ii. After a design review action is taken on a prime implicant, other prime
implicants are not significantly affected.
iii. The probability reduction in the occurrence of a prime implicant is normally
proportional to the amount of money assigned to this prime implicant.
Suppose M1
 (j = 1, 2, , or c) represents the cost required to eliminate the jth prime
implicant in the design review process. The relationship between the amount of money
assigned to this prime implicant (MI1 ) and its probability reduction in occurrence (PDf)
can be described as follows:
MI
= L PDJ (MTBM)
The cost incurred in the reduction or elimination of c prime implicants in the design
review process is given by:
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COSTR = MI
The elimination or reduction of the jth prime implicant can result in a probability
reduction of occurrence of top event 1', if top event T, is associated with the jth prime
implicants. The possible benefit resulting from the elimination or reduction of c prime
implicants is given by:
Benifit =
	
x CDI
where CDI = CT1 + C + CR, if top event T is associated with the jth prime implicant.
The total design review cost COST0 is given by:
COSTD
 = COSTR - Benefit
= MI
1 -	 'DJ x CDI
=: PDJ(M7BM) - 
CD) ) J'DJ
8.3.5 Operational Cost Modelling
Average daily operational cost COST0 is given by:
COST0 = 
Co
where C0 is the annual operational cost of the system.
The models concerned with top event-caused consequences, maintenance cost, repair
cost and design review cost should be modified by taking into account the operational
cost. The modified models are shown as follows:
COST = COSTT - COST0
COST, = COSTM - COST0
COST; = COSTR - COSTOR
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COSTI = COSTD + COSTOD
COSTOT E COST0 x P (MTBM) x BT
C0ST0
 P•(MTBM) xBT
T
COSTOM COST0 > BT,,. x MTBM
COSTOR = COST0 x f, (MTBM) x BTRi
= COST0 f (MTBM) x BTRI
COSTOD = COST0	 -'Dj (MTBM) x BT01
where: COST = top event-caused cost after the modification.
COSTJ = maintenance cost after the modification.
COST; = repair cost after the modification.
COSTS = design review cost after the modification.
BTr1	 the product breakdown time caused by the occurrence of the i th top
event.
BTMI	 the expected time required for the ith maintenance.
BTRI	 the time required for repairing the ith subsystem.
BTDJ	 BT 1 if top event i is associated with the jth prime implicant.
8.3.6 Economic Modelling
An economic model is proposed to combine top event-caused cost, maintenance cost,
repair cost and design review cost. Let Cost represent the life cycle cost function. Such
a model is given by:
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mm: Cost = COST; + COST + COST; + COSTS
subject to: MTBM maX
 ^ MTBM ^ MTBMrnin
0 ^ M'DJ ^ PDJ (MTBM) (j 1, 2,	 c)
The first three terms of the cost model deal with the maintenance policies and the last
term takes into account both the maintenance policies and design review cost. This
model implies that maintenance policies and design review actions should be
implemented to minimise the life cycle cost.
8.4 A Bi-criteria Model for Techno-economic Analysis
8.4.1 Techno-economic Modelling
A techno-economic model is proposed to combine the safety model with the economic
model. Let X = MTBM, y = LV'DJ and Y = [y 1 Y2. Since COST, COST, and
CosT; are functions of X, and COSTS is a function of X and Y, such a techno-economic
model can be represented as follows:
mm: Cost = CO5T;(x) + COST(X) + CO5T;(x) + COST(X, Y)
mm: Risk [K XP(X)+EKDJ x(PDJ(X)—yJ)}
subject to: X	 > x > Xflux -	 - finn
0 ^y, ^PDJ(X)(j=l,2, ",c)
X and Y are design variables which need to be determined to attain the cost and risk
objectives as closely as possible.
After the system process diagram has been constructed and safety analysis has been
carried out using the safety analysis methodologies developed in Chapter 4, 5 and 6,
the above techno-economic model can be formulated.
As described previously, Cost and Risk are two competing objectives, with a lower risk
level (i.e. a higher safety level) leading to higher cost. The purpose of design synthesis
is therefore to evolve compromise design solutions by balancing and effectively
utilising resources so that these two objectives can be simultaneously achieved.
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8.4.2 Problem Transformation and Optimisation
The probability distributions P(X) and P01 (X) (i = 1, 2, , n; j = 1, 2, , c) and
the failure distributions f,(X) (i = 1, 2, •, m) are generally not known explicitly. At
a specific x, however, the values of these distributions can be obtained from the
simulation analysis. If such a simulation analysis is conducted at a sufficient number of
discrete values of X, the values of these distributions at any x with x,, ^ x ^ x, may
then be predicted using the linear interpolation, resulting in piecewise linear distribution
functions. Representation of piecewise linear functions is described in some detail in
Appendix 3.
The piecewise linear probability function P(X) of top event 7 can be represented as
follows [8.23]:
N-I
P(X)=	 alX _XI^13pX +fp	 i1,2, . ..
j=I
where: N = the number of the sections of P(X).
X i is a sampled value of X (j = 0, 1, . . . , N).
aPi) = f(tpj .j+i -
13Pi =	
+ tpj,N)
= (sp + Sp ,N)
is the slope of the jth section and sp.1 is the y-intercept for the jth
section of the probability function ?(X), Starting from X	 and being
terminated at X, that is
- __________
tpi - XJ—XJ-1
= P(X°) -
Sp = P(X") -
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If the following auxiliary variables a 7 and af are introduced,
—X 1 1+(X _X1)}
= f{ix - X 1 I - (X - X1)}
then the probability function ?(X) can be represented by {8.23J:
N-I
P, (X) =	 a, ,,, (a1 + af) + j3p1X + ypj,	 i=1, 2,	 , n	 (8.1)
1='
under the restrictions
a1 —af=X —X';
X af = 0; af, af ^ ,	 j=I,'• , N—I;
Similarly, the subsystem failure functions f(X) can be represented as follows:
N-I
f X) =	 a11 , (a7 + af) +	 + ,	 i = 1, 2, .. , m	 (8.2)
j=I
where: a111 
= f(hij.j+i -
	
=	 + fi,N)
	
=	
+ Sj,)
- f1(X1)—f1(Xi)
	
1j,j -
	 xi -
S11 , j =f1 (X°) -
_eivNSf1.N JiV I - tfi,NA
PDI(X) can also be represented as follows:
N-I
PD1 (X) =	apD1,J(af+af)+f3pD1X + YpDj,	 1=1,2, . ,c	 (8.3)
j=1
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1
where: aPDI,f = -- (tpDIJ+1 - tpD1)
3PDi 
= +(tpD1.1 + tPDI.N)
YPDI FspD + SPDIJ.')
PD1 (X') - PDj(X')
IPD1.j	
- xi-'
n	 vO
= FDj/ ) - tpDj,1I'
n ,vN	 vNSpDjJv = FDjIA ) - IPDi,N7k
The bi-criteria Goal Programming (GP) problem for optimising both risk and cost
objectives may then be transformed as follows:
mm Cost = (CTl + C'LI + CR1 - COSTxBTTl)PI(X)
TPT
+ (CMLI + CMPI + CMMI - COSToxBTMI )—, ---
+ (CRLi + CRPI + CRRI - COSTOxBTRI )f (X)
M.
+ (	 - CD + COSTOXBTDI)YI
1=1 PDI(X)
GP mm Risk =	 K1 x P . (X) + (KDJXPDJX) - Yf)	 (8.4)
1=1	 j=,
S.t. X, ^X ^Xmax ,	 1' [Yi.Yz	 y]T
O^yI ^PDI (X),	 i=1,2, •,c
X—aj +a7=X 1	j=1,,N-1
a 7 x a 7 = 0; a7, af ^ 0	 j=1,	 , N—i
The GP as defined in (8.4) can be used to obtain compromise designs and to find the
interaction between Cost and Risk, on the basis of which design decisions can be made
regarding the particular requirements of Cost and Risk. In (8.4), P1 (X), f1 (X) and PDI(X)
are represented by (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3), respectively. GP defined in (8.4) is a non-
linear bi-criteria programming problem.
Let V = [X, aj, aj, ..., a.1 , a_1 , Yi.... . y]T. V is referred to as a design vector. The
problem as represented by (8.4) is then to search for designs that can attain the two
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objectives as closely as possible. As described early, there is generally no single design
vector available which could simultaneously minimise the Cost and Risk objectives. It is
therefore significant to search for non-dominated (or efficient) design vectors for
evaluation [8.22]. Such efficient design vectors can be obtained using existing MODM
techniques [8.14][8.21][8.23].
In the next section, an example will be used to demonstrate how to construct a techno-
economic model and generate efficient designs.
8.5. An Example
The diagram of the hydraulic hoist transmission system of a marine crane is shown
functionally in Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4. The descriptions of this system and its five
constituent subsystems can also be found in Chapter 4.
8.5.1 Top Event-caused Cost Modelling
The top events and the associated prime implicants of the hydraulic transmission system
can be identified using the inductive bottom-up methodology incorporating the MBRM
and FMECA described in Chapter 4. The final Boolean representation table of this
system is shown in Table 4.21 of Chapter 4. Each row in Table 4.21 represents a
possible condition for an occurrence of the system's output state. For example, the first
row associated with the top event s1 represents that if "the output of the control system
cannot be closed for lowering motion" and "shaft failure of the hydraulic servo
transmission system" simultaneously occur, the top event S 1 will happen.
Three system top events S 1 , S 2 and S 3, have been identified from the constructed system
Boolean representation table. Let T 1 = S, T = S 2 and T2 = S 3 . These three system top
events are:
T1: Hoisting down continuously not as required.
T2: Hoisting up continuously not as required.
T3: No output from the package motor of the hydraulic servo transmission system
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In Table 4.21 of Chapter 4, there are 10 prime implicants identified to be associated
with T 1 , 43 prime implicants with T2 and 14 prime implicants with T3. The possible
consequences resulting from these three identified system top events have been
comprehensively described in section 4.5.
The probabilistic assessment of the top events can be carried Out Ofl the basis of the
obtained final system Boolean representation table. The probability distributions of the
top events T 1 , T2 and T3 with MTBM can be produced from the simulation analysis for
the prediction of the probabilities of occurrence of the system failure events. Such
probabilities distributions of T 1 , T2 and T3 are shown in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.11 of
Chapter 6. The piecewise linear failure distributions of T 1 , T2 and T3 with MTBM are
shown graphically in Figure 8.1.
In the failure-caused cost model, n is equal to 3 and other parameters are assumed and
shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 The parameters in the top event-caused cost model
CT	 pounds
	 CL 	 pounds	 CR	 pounds
CT!	 200000 CL!	 10000 CR1
	
10000
CT2 600000 CL2 20000 CR2 20000
CT3	 100000 CL3 5000	 CR3 5000
8.5.2 Maintenance Cost Modelling
The parameters in the maintenance cost model are assumed and shown as follows:
CML + CMP = 4000 pounds
CMM = 500 pounds
T,. = 20 x 365 x 24 hr
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Figure 8.1 Failure distributions of T 1 , T2 and T3 with MTBM
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 8	 7	 8	 9 10 Ii 12 tJ 14 15 18 17 19 19 20
.10'
Mean Time Between Maintenance
Figure 8.2 Subsystem failure distributions with MTBM
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8.5.3 Repair Cost Modelling
As described in Chapter 6, the failure distributions of the subsystems with MTBM can
be producted using the component/subsystem failure simulation model. Such
distributions are shown in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.10 of Chapter 6. Obviously, these
distributions are discrete and nonlinear functions of MTBM because they can only be
obtained by simulation at discrete MTBM values. The piecewise linear failure
distributions of the subsystems with MTBM are graphically shown in Figure 8.2.
In the repair cost model, m is equal to 4 and other parameters are assumed and shown
in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 The parameters in the repair cost model
CRL	 pounds	 CRP	 pounds	 CRR	 pounds
CRLI	 1000	 CRP1	 2000	 CRR1	 2000
C 2 	 2000 CRP2	 4000 CRR2
	
4000
CRL3	 2000 CRP3	 4000 CRR3	 4000
CRL4	 1000 CRP4
	
2000 CRR3	 2000
8.5.4 Design Review Cost Modelling
The probabilities of occurrence of the prime implicants associated with the system top
events T 1 , T2 and T3 with respect to MTBM can be produced using the simulation
model described in section 6.4.3. If six prime implicants with the highest probabilities
of occurrence with respect to each MTBM value are taken into account, the total eight
prime implicants regarding all MTBM values are identified for reduction or elimination.
This is because the six prime implicants may not be the same for different MTBM
values. These eight prime implicants are described as follows:
Prime implicant 1: the 5th prime implicant associated with T 1 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 2: the 6th prime implicant associated with T 1 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 3: the 4th prime implicant associated with T2 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 4: the 1st prime implicant associated with T 3 in Table 4.20.
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Prime implicant 5: the 3rd prime implicant associated with T3 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 6: the 5th prime implicant associated with T3 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 7: the 7th prime implicant associated with T3 in Table 4.20.
Prime implicant 8: the 10th prime implicant associated with T3 in Table 4.20.
For each MTBM value, the range of the probability reduction of occurrence of each
above prime implicant is shown in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3 The range of the probability reduction of occurrence of each prime
implican t
MTBM	 Prime implicants
(hr)	 D2	 D3	 D4	 DS	 1'D6	 "Dl	 D8
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
1000
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
.0539
.0539
.0539
.0539
.054 1
.0553
.0553
.0560
.05 64
.06 13
.0693
.0236
.0236
.0237
.0253
.0257
.0257
.0257
.0257
.0274
.0286
.0292
.000 1
.0002
.00 11
.0022
.0058
.0 117
.0 199
.0253
.0340
.0419
.0507
.0060
.0076
.0076
.0079
.0086
.0088
.0088
.0096
.0098
.0098
.0108
.0020
.0026
.0026
.0026
.0032
.0034
.0034
.0036
.0036
.0036
.0036
.0074
.0090
.0090
.0092
.0104
.0106
.0108
.0110
.0110
.0120
.0130
.0014
.0014
.0014
.0018
.0026
.0034
.0038
.0062
.0062
.00 64
.0112
.0036
.0036
.0054
.0054
.0054
.0056
.0094
.0142
.0142
.0142
.0190
More clearly, the range of the probability reduction of each above prime implicant is
shown in Figure 8.3.
In the design review cost model, c is equal to 8 and other parameters are assumed and
shown as follows:
CDI = CD 2
 = CTI + CL! + CR! = 220,000 pounds
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MTBM
Figure 8.3 The range of the probability reduction of occurrence of each cut set
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CO3 = C-2
 + CL2 + CR2 = 640,000 pounds
C04 = CD5 = C06 = CJ = CD8 = CT3 + CL3 + CR3 = 110,000 pounds
M 1
 = M 2
 = M 3 = M4 = M5 = M 6 = M 7 = M 8 = 8,000 pounds
8.5.5 Operational Cost Modelling
Assuming that the annual operational cost of this hydraulic hoisting transmission system
is 10,000 pounds, the daily operational cost COST0 can be obtained by:
10000COST0 =	 pounds
365
The parameters for the modification of the models of the top event-caused cost, repair
cost, maintenance cost and design review cost are assumed and shown in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 The parameters for the modification of the models
BTRI = 2
BTR2 = 1
BTR3 2
BTR4 = 1
BTD1
 = BTTI = 5
BTD2
 = BTTI = 5
BTD3 = BT 2 = 5
BT04
 = BT 3 5
BTTI = 5
BT 2 = 5
BTT3 = 5
BTMI = 5
BTD5 = BT- 3 = 5
BTD6
 = BTT3 = 5
BTD7 = BTT3 = 5
BT08
 = BTr3 = 5
wherei=1,2,
8.5.6 Techno-economic Modelling
Other parameters in the techno-economic model are shown as follows:
KDI = KD2 = K04 = KD5 = KD6 = K07 = K08 = K 1 = K 3 1
K03 = K2 = 2
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= 1000 hr
Xmax = 20000 hr
All parameters have been given for the Cost and Risk models of the crane hoist
transmission system. The nonlinear GP shown in (8.4) can be solved using the
Integrated MCDM-Based Decision Support System [8.14]{8.21][8.23] written in "C"
computer language.
8.5.7 Optimisation Results
The optimisation results are shown in Figure 8.4 and discussed as follows:
If only the Cost objective is optimised, the minimum Cost is equal to 121,631 pounds
and the design is located at point 2 as shown in Figure 8.4. In this case, the Risk
objective is equal to 0.32, X or MTBM is equal to 18000 hr, and prime implicants 1
and 3 are required to be eliminated. Elimination of such prime implicants can be made
by the use of more reliable components, the provision of protection systems, sensors
and alarm systems, or a combination of such measures, as described previously. A
detailed study in this area would be necessary to move further in this area.
If only the Risk objective is minimised, the minimum Risk is equal to 0.10 and the
design is located at point 1. In this case, the Cost objective is equal to 839,600 pounds,
x is equal to 1000 hr, and prime implicants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are all required to
be eliminated.
Each point in the curve shown in Figure 8.4 is an efficient design with regard to both
Cost and Risk objectives. A design is efficient or Pareto optimal if it is not dominated
by any other feasible designs in terms of the two objectives. At point 5, for example,
the Cost and Risk objectives are equal to 262,364 pounds and 0.1082, respectively, X is
equal to 4241 hr, and all eight prime implicants are required to be eliminated. There is
no other design available which could have the Cost and Risk values lower than 262,364
pounds and 0.1082 simultaneously. At point 6, the Cost and Risk objectives are equal to
139,516 pounds and 0.1696, respectively, X is equal to 10000 hr, and prime implicants
1, 2, 3 and 6 are required to be eliminated.
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Figure 8.4 The optimisation results
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The ideal design is located at point 3 where both the Cost and Risk objectives are
simultaneously minimised. However, such a design is not feasible. Therefore, only
compromise designs can be obtained. The best compromise design is located at a point
in the frontier, which is nearest to the ideal design point. If the Cost and Risk objectives
are of equal importance, such a best compromise design (i.e. point 4) can be obtained
using minimax approach [8.14][8.23]. At point 4, Cost and Risk are equal to 193,020
pounds and 0.1198, respectively, x (MTBM) is equal to 6269 hr, and prime implicants
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 are required to be eliminated.
It can be noted, from Figure 8.4, that Cost is significantly reduced with a slight increase
of Risk from point 1 to point 5 in the efficient frontier, and that Risk is significantly
reduced with a slight increase of Cost from point 2 to point 6. These two sections
should obviously be avoided in the design. A practical efficient design can be at some
point in the section between 5 and 6, depending on the particular requirements on cost
and safety to be considered. For instance, if safety is a comparatively important factor,
an efficient design may be chosen from the section between points 5 and 4; and if cost
is a comparatively important factor, an efficient design may be chosen from the curve
between points 4 and 6. Each point corresponds to a fixed design vector V.
From the the above analysis, it is obvious that the optimisation results as illustrated by
Figure 8.4 can assist the designer in understanding the problem in hand and making a
decision as to what maintenance policies and design review actions should be taken.
8.6. Concluding Remarks
A techno-economic modelling methodology is proposed in this chapter for decision
making based on safety analysis. The techno-economic modelling methodology
proposed can be used to process the information produced using the safety analysis
methodologies developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to construct a bi-criteria techno-
economic model. MODM techniques can then be applied to deal with the constructed
model. Such a techno-economic modelling methodology provides the safety analyst
with a rational tool to make full use of the information produced in safety analysis and
to take into consideration both design aspects and maintenance policies simultaneously.
In the illustrative example, there are two competing demands of safety and economy.
The decision as to which one is to be stressed may be dependent on the particular
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situation in hand. The proposed techno-economic modelling methodology can be used
to assist designers in understanding the interaction between safety and economic
considerations, so as to balance and best utilise resources to design a large MTO
product
This chapter does not deal with how protection systems, alarm systems and more
reliable components are to be added to the system to reduce or eliminate the prime
implicants considered in the design review process. This could be a subject of further
research. In addition, the following areas are also considered worthwhile for further
research:
i. A practical and real "safety case" would help to validate the developed
methodology, and rea ise where improvements can be made, as will be
described in Chapter 9.
ii. The extension of the techno-economic modelling methodology to deal with
more objectives which may be involved in the design process.
iii. The modification of the techno-economic modelling methodology to taken into
account the rearrangement of the system design.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusions and Further Work
SUMMARY
This chapter summarises the results of the research project carried out and indicates
where the developed safety analysis methodologies would be of benefit in the "design
for safety" process. The areas where further effort is required to improve the developed
methodologies are outlined, as those areas are considered suitable for possible further
study. Finally, other important topics related to safety analysis methodologies are
discussed with reference to further development.
9.1 Conclusions
The previous chapters of this thesis have developed a range of safety analysis
methodologies and the reasons behind the development of such methodologies have
been explained. The many valid reasons for using the developed safety analysis
methodologies in the "design for safety" process of marine and other large MTO
products have also been discussed, and will not be repeated here. However, it is
necessary to summarise in general terms the developed safety analysis methodologies.
The "design for safety" methodology has been developed in a generic sense to be
theoretically applicable to all designs of marine and other large MTO products. Such a
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methodology can be used as a basis for the development of various safety analysis
methods and decision making procedures for effective use to make "design for safety"
more objective, efficient and effective.
The MBRM developed in Chapter 4 can benefit fully from the information produced
from FMECA. Since top events of MTO products may not be available from previous
accidents and incident reports of similar products and since a complete identification of
all failure causes associated with system top events is required, it will be very effective
for the developed MBRM to be applied together with FMECA to identify and evaluate
risks of MTO products. Risk identification and risk evaluation at a higher indenture
level can directly make use of the information produced at lower indenture levels using
the methodology incorporating the MBRM and FMECA. Complex interactions of the
subsystems of a large MTO product can be considered properly, and system top events
and associated causes can be identified with less omissions using this methodology.
The proposed qualitative reasoning and simulation modelling approaches can greatly
extend the use of the MBRM. The former has been combined with the MBRM to form
a mixed safety modelling methodology. Such a mixed methodology can be used to
model large systems for which component input-output relationships are difficult to
obtain. Precise Boolean representation descriptions of such systems can easily be
obtained using this mixed safety modelling methodology. The simulation modelling
approach has been developed to take into account maintenance factors, different
distributions of basic failure events, and covert and revealed failures, to estimate safety
parameters.
The developed subjective reasoning methodology incorporating fuzzy set modelling and
evidential reasoning provides the safety analyst with the flexibility in articulating non-
numerical safety data and in assessing the safety of engineering systems for which great
uncertainty is involved and failure distributions of variables for use in probabilistic risk
analysis are difficult or impossible to obtain.
The proposed techno-economic modelling methodology can make full use of the
information produced using FMECA, the MBRM and the proposed simulation models
to construct a techno-economic model for decision making purposes. Such a techno-
economic modelling methodology provides the safety analyst with a rational tool to
incorporate safety into the design process from the initial stages by optimising both
design aspects and maintenance policies.
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Obviously, it could be time-consuming to conduct safety analysis of complex MTO
products using the developed safety analysis methodologies and it may take time to
learn how to use such methodologies although today's powerful computers and flexible
man-machine interfaces may solve such problems. In addition, common cause failures
have not been dealt with using the MBRM. In some circumstances, common cause
failures even in higher-order prime implicants may play an important role in safety
analysis. Therefore, the MBRM needs to be further investigated to be capable of
dealing with common cause failures.
The safety of large MTO products such as offshore topsides is usually affected by
process system failures, structure failures, fire, etc. Therefore, design for safety of large
MTO products should involve studying all such aspects. However, structural safety and
fire safety have not been studied in this thesis. The safety analysis methodologies
developed in this thesis are in nature capable of processing and synthesising the
structural and fire safety information and the safety information of process systems to
obtain comprehensive assessments of MTO artefacts. As will be described in the next
section, it is required to apply the developed safety analysis methodologies to a
practical MTO product so that the architectural and fire aspects and process systems can
be studied together to further modify the developed safety analysis methodologies.
It is believed that modification of such methodologies may extend the use of them.
Apart from the required modification discussed above, the other areas required to be
investigated further are discussed in section 9.2.
This thesis is not concerned with how alarm systems, sensors, protection systems and
more reliable components are designed and provided to reduce or eliminate high risks
although such areas are considered to be worthwhile ones for exploration and
exploitation in the future.
It is believed that the methodologies developed in this thesis possess enormous potential
as valuable aids and effective alternatives in the areas of "design for safety", and will
gain increased usage in the design of marine and the other large MTO products. It is
also believed that practical applications of these methodologies will result from
utilisation by organisations who deal with safety problems with high uncertainty and
insufficient safety data. In such cases, the implementation of the developed
methodologies could have a highly beneficial effect. In fact, it is widely accepted that
any developed safety analysis methodology should preferably be introduced into a
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commercially stable environment in order that the applications have the chance to
become established in order to prove feasible, otherwise it is more likely that its full
potential will not be realised.
9.2 Further Work
9.2.1 Further Work Required to Improve the Developed Safety Analysis
Methodologies
The following areas may be worthwhile to be further explored and exploited on the
basis of the methodologies developed in this thesis.
The developed safety analysis methodologies need a sufficiently large and realistic
test bed for detailed evaluation. A practical MTO product such as an offshore
topside may be taken as a test case to modify and validate the proposed
methodologies. Transfer of the technology to industry may then be possible.
The safety analysis methods outlined in Chapter 3 are required to be studied in
more detail regarding data flows and interrelations in order to fully make use of
the advantages of each method and to effectively utilise the safety information
produced using each method.
A combination of computer databases, expert system and safety analysis could be
used to maximise the safety of large MTO products within both technical and
economic constraints.
A knowledge based expert system may utilise the results produced using the
methodologies developed in this thesis, to arrive at design rules that provide
guidance on the design changes that can be made to improve safety. Such an
expert system may be designed to interact with safety analysis using the MBRM
and the qualitative reasoning approach to deduce and determine system behaviour
in order to take effective design actions.
Further studies in the development of more flexible and objective bottom-up
approaches should be carried Out to face the challenge imposed by the increasing
complexity of large MTO products and the increasing public concern for safety.
Further studies of combining bottom-up and deductive top-down safety analysis
CHAPTER 9 - Conclusions and Further Work	 Page 247
methods should also be carried out to achieve more realistic, convenient and
effective safety analysis.
For the MBRM and the qualitative reasoning approach, further studies may be
required in the following areas:
i. Integrate more aspects of these two approaches with other formal safety
analysis methods.
ii. Construct a module libraiy so that given the description of a system its
component models can directly be obtained by referring to the library
and the system behaviour description can then be easily obtained by
studying the interrelations of the components and applying the rules
developed in Chapters 4 and 5.
.	 As far as computer simulation is concerned, it is believed that the application and
integration of simulation techniques to the established safety analysis modelling
methodologies described in this thesis, including the construction of simple and
flexible simulation models, will need to be developed further.
For the subjective reasoning methodology developed in Chapter 7, further studies
may beneficially be carried out in the following areas:
i. Modification of the developed methodology. This may be achieved by
applying this methodology to a reasonably sizable practical test case.
ii. Development of a decision making approach incorporating evidential
reasoning [9.14] to process the information produced using the
methodology, to rank the design proposals of the system and to make
design decisions. Multiple objectives represented by the methodology
may be dealt with using formal decision making approaches.
iii. The decision making analysis may be further extended to combine
evidential reasoning and formal Multiple Objective Decision Making
(MODM) tools [9.13] to study the effect of a design review on system
safety, and to optimise design aspects and maintenance activities.
The techno-economic methodology proposed in Chapter 8 may be modified to take
into account the initial cost of a MTO product, to deal with the rearrangement of
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the system design and perhaps to optimise more objectives such as operability.
Such a modification may provide a practical tool with which design decisions can
be made effectively in the design process.
9.2.2 Other Further Work
In author's view, further work required in the areas which are related to the safety
analysis methodologies developed in this thesis can be described as follows:
. Human behaviour
The scope and precision of engineering modelling have increased in the pursuit of
safety. One area in particular has received scant attention from engineers, given its
importance: human behaviour. It is realised that human beings are crucial
components in most MTO products, and they are also, historically, the most
unreliable [9.12].
Human error is one of the major sources of accidents - not from malicious intent,
but from ignorance, overstress, misinterpretation and fatigue, among other factors
[9.12]. Human error is now receiving increasing attention, particularly from
industries concerned with the design and use of marine and other large MTO
products.
Although human error can be reduced by the introduction of safety warning
devices such as sensors and alarms for the timely detection of the condition as
described in Chapter 3, it may also be greatly altered by better education and
training since safety is very much a matter of attitude and a way of thinking, and
also by better design. Far more attention is required to devote to studying human
behaviour in the future, especially in the areas of:
i. Human performance prediction.
ii. Performance analysis of man-machine systems.
iii. Reliability allocation to human performance.
Reliability data
Quantitative risk assessment of large MTO products is frequently inhibited by the
lack of representative failure and repair statistics [9.1]. It has been realised that the
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collection of failure and repair data of components and systems, already practised
in various industries, needs to be more widespread. Individual companies should
be persuaded to release their data to a general pooi and this larger quantity of data
should be available for the benefit to all industries. More effort should be devoted
to the reliability data management systems to collect failure and repair data in
order to estimate and evaluate system safety more confidently and reliably.
Education
For many engineers, design education is oriented towards using prescriptive
regulations which are applied in a systematic and often routine way. However, it is
realised that the shift to more goal-setting regulations may offer more explicit
consideration of safety and a clear understanding of the underlying principles
involved in design.
Although such a shift may make engineering design more difficult, it will give
much more rewarding results, particularly for the design of marine and other large
MTO products, which involves the broadest range of engineering skills and
requires a great deal of innovation.
Observability and controllability
The concepts of observability and controllability used in control engineering may
beneficially be introduced to safety analysis. Such a study may produce a general
framework with which the observability and controllability of each failure variable
of a MTO product can be determined in order to monitor and reduce high risk
areas. Such a framework may also be used to optimally determine where alarm
systems, sensors and protection systems are required to make all serious failure
events observable and controlled.
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APPENDIX 2
MODSIM jj TM: The Language for Object-Oriented Programming
MODSIM jj1 is a modular, object-oriented, strongly typed, block-structured simulation
language. The characteristics of MODSIM 11lM are described as follows [A2.1]:
- Modular: MODSIM 11TM programs may be divided into "modules", each of
which can be stored in a separate file.
- Object-oriented: An object is an encapsulation of a data record which
describes the state of the object and the associated procedures, called
methods, which describe the object's behaviour.
- Strongly-typed: Every expression, assignment statement and parameter is
type checked at compile time for consistency.
- Block-structured: A block is made up of declarations and executable
statements. The block-structured feature of this language is that the scope or
visibility of variables is restricted to the block in which they are declared and
any subsidiary blocks.
- Simulation: Simulation capabilities are provided in library modules. The
modules provide direct support for all capabilities needed to program discrete
event simulation models.
Structure of MODSIM 11TM programs
Most large programs written in MODSIM jjT consist of a number of modules in
separate files. Modular structure allows programs to be constructed from library
modules. Any part of a program can import types, variables, constraints and procedures
from library modules as needed. There are three types of modules MAIN,
DEFINITION, and IMPLEMENTATION, each of which is named with a identifier and
can be compiled separately to facilitate program maintenance and to reduce
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development time. Any constant, type, variable or procedure declared in a
DEFINITION module is implicitly visible in the accompanying IMPLEMENTATION
module. Constants, types, variables, procedures and objects defined in a DEFINITION
module can be imported to other DEFINITION modules, IMPLEMENTATION
modules or MAIN modules.
The program structure of MODSIM JJTM is similar to that of the languages such as Algol,
Pascal, Modula-2 or Ada. A typical structure of a simple MODSIM JJ" program is
shown as follows:
MAIN MODULE MODSIM Example;
FROM Definition_Example IMPORT Object_Example;
CONST
TYPE
VAR
PROCEDURE Procedure_ExampleQ;
END PROCEDURE;
BEGIN	 ( main program code starts here }
Procedure_Example;
END MODULE.
DEFINITION MODULE Definition_Example;
TYPE
Object_Example = OBJECT;
END OBJECT;
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END MODULE.
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Definition Example;
OBJECT
Object_Example;
END OBJECT;
END MODULE.
Object-Oriented Programming (OOP)
Objects in MODSIM 11TM are dynamically allocated data structures which add several
new programming capabilities to the programmer's toolbox. Such capabilities include:
- Encapsulation of data and code: Tying together the fields which describe
the object's state with the procedures (called methods) which define its
behaviour. Controlling access to the fields.
- Inheritance: New types can be defined based on the existing types. Each
descendant in the hierarchy can add its own fields and method definitions to
those of its ancestors.
- Message passing: An object's method is invoked by sending a message to
the object asking it to perform a specific method.
- Polymorphism: Allowing different object types in a hierarchy to share the
same method name but provide their own definitions.
- Hierarchical types: A descendant is type compatible with any of its
ancestors.
Simulation
MODSIM II has powerful and flexible capabilities for dealing with discrete-event
simulation. Each object is capable of carrying on multiple and concurrent activities,
each of which can elapse simulation time. The activities can operate autonomously or
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they can synchronise their operation. Any or all activities of an object can be
interrupted if necessary.
In the MODSIM J1TM simulation language, objects can be selectively added to or
removed from a group which contains objects queuing for a resource or a series of
events scheduled to happen at a specific time.
Pseudo-random number generators are available in MODSIM JJTM•
In putlO utput
There are a number of ways in which to do input and output in MODSIM ii. A
standard library module, which contains the stream I/O object called SteamObj, is
provided in MODSIM JJTM• This object allows the user to do formatted stream oriented
input and output to other devices and files.
Graphics
S!MGRAPHICS ii is a graphical tool kit built on MODSIM JJTM Using SIMGRAPHICS II,
animation, presentation graphics and graphical user interfaces can be easily incorporated
into a MODSIM II' program.
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- f(X)—f(X1..1)
ti_	 xi-x_i (A.4)
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APPENDIX 3
Representation of Piecewise Linear Functions
An optimisation problem (OP) may generally be represented as follows [A3.1]:
f max f(X)
°"ls.t. XE (A.1)
c2 ={x
gk (X)^O /c=1,	 ,m1
h1 (X) = 0 j=I,
X0 ^ X ^ X
where x is a design variable, f(X) is a piecewise linear objective function, and g(X)
and h1 (X) are nonlinear inequality and equality constraint functions.
Suppose the interval (x0 , XN) is divided into N sections, and X_1 and X, are the end
points of the ith section. f(X) is a linear function of x in the interval (x,_1 , X1 ) and can
be represented by the following equivalent form [A3.l]:
N-i
f(X)= aIX—XJ+13X+y forXE^
i=i
where
= +(hi+i - z r ),	 = --(t 1 + tN) and '= f(s i + SN)
(A.2)
(A.3)
t, and s, are the slope and the y-intercept of the ith section of the piecewise linear
function f(X), respectively.
i =f(X 0) - tJ(X 0); SN = f(KN) - tNf(XN)	 (A.5)
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For instance, Figure A.l shows a piecewise linear function f(X) with the feasible
interval of x being divided into three equal sub-intervals.
A
Xo	 Xl	 XX2	 X3
Figure A. 1 A Piecewise Linear Function
f(X) can be calculated by
	
f(X) =	 fO + t 1 (IX—X 0 1—IX—X 1 1) ^ t 2(IX—X 1 1—IX—X 2 1) + ,3(IX—X21—IX—X31) +f3)}
	
=	 [(i 2_t i )IX_X i I + (t3_t IX_X 2 I]+[(ti+ t3)X]+[ 0_tiX o) + 3_t3)]}
	Let's introduce the following auxiliary variables	 and aL,
=	 - X1 I + (X - X1 )} and a1 = {IX - X I - (X - X1 )}	 (A.6)
Then f(X) can be represented by
N-i
	
f(X) =	 a1 (a1 + a) + 3X + y for XE^2
	 (A.7)
i=i
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under the restrictions
a - a1 =X 
-
XL ; axa[=O;	 af^O, i=1,	 ,N-1	 (A.8)
The problem OP may then be obtained by solving the following auxiliary goal
programming (GP) problem
N-i
max f(X) = cç(a + a1 )+ X +y
i=1
s.t. X€2
GP	 X -a+a[=X i=1,
	 ,N-1	 (A.9)
axa=O; a•,a^O i=1,	 ,N- 1
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